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Abstract
Over the course of this dissertation, I introduce the idea of the true self construct as a
personalized route to individual meaning and stability at a time in history when external
direction regarding values and purpose is in decline. Setting aside the question of the
ontological status of the true self, I emphasize that beliefs about and representations of
the true self have distinctive psychological impact and cite research supporting this
assertion. I then review evidence of the aptness of such true self-orientations in
supporting well-being, fulfillment of basic psychological needs, and resilience against
threat. Across two studies, I investigated the effectiveness of connecting with one’s true
self-orientations for defending against three levels of personal morality threat severity.
Compelling support arose for well-being being positively related to participants’ belief in
having a true self. Evidence consistently suggested this to be the case across threat
severity, but moderate evidence also supported the possibility that true self-orientations
are ineffective against strong threat (Study 1). Participants highly preferred to engage
with their true self-concepts across threat condition, and in doing so reported significantly
higher subjective vitality than those who explored self-flexibility. Other well-being
outcomes were unaffected by threat and connection to different self-conceptualizations
(Study 2). I then consider theoretical implications and propose multiple pathways for
fruitful future exploration. In particular, trait-level true self-orientations seem most
effective for predicting well-being, and people may need additional guidance to
effectively utilize their true self-orientations for active coping support.
Keywords: self-essentialism, true self, well-being, meaning, threat resilience
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True Self as Resilience Anchor:
Using Essentialist Self-Views to Neutralize Personal Morality Threats
Like most theories, the self theory is a conceptual tool for accomplishing a
purpose. The most fundamental purpose of the self theory is to optimize the
pleasure/pain balance of the individual over the course of a lifetime. Two other
basic functions, not unrelated to the first, are to facilitate the maintenance of selfesteem, and to organize the data of experience in a manner that can be coped with
effectively (emphasis in original; Epstein, 1973, p. 4).
Over the course of the past decade of research in psychology, interest has been
growing for studying the ‘true self’ as a construct. Theorists have increasingly taken note
of the prevalence with which lay narratives assert the usefulness of the true self and its
inherence as the core self inside each person. As I will outline, the truth of the true self’s
existence is difficult to ascertain yet does not preclude beliefs about its existence and
traits from being relevant for positive psychological functioning. In fact, a building
literature suggests that these beliefs might be uniquely adaptive for navigating today’s
challenges.
Two trends have developed throughout human history to now converge and bring
to bear certain pressures on a great number of people alive today. Modern life in
thoroughly-developed Western countries, in part due to changes in shared traditions,
professions, and religiosity in the 20th century, struggles to provide a consistent and
compelling set of values by which to live and relate to others meaningfully (Baumeister,
1991; Baumeister & Vohs, 2002). In concordance with this change, from about the 11th
century onwards there has been an increasing focus on the self as a site of moral and
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societal tensions and a source of dynamic individuality (for review, see Baumeister,
1987). The result is that at the time of weakened direction supplied by modern Western
societal structures, a centuries-long consideration of human life has elevated the self as a
potential locus of gravity. Baumeister and Vohs (2002) argued that as a response to the
“value-gap” left by modern life, a greater emphasis has been placed on the importance of
the self and the pursuit of self-knowledge, placing the search for values squarely on the
shoulders of each individual and framing it as their birthright for self-actualization. These
authors illustrate the significance of this development:
This is a remarkable change from the traditional moral system, which usually
arrayed moral injunctions against anything that was self-serving. Indeed, the
restraint of selfish pursuits is arguably the essential core of previous morality and
the reason that morals emerged in the first place. Shifting the cultivation of self
from the enemy of moral values to one of the staunchest bases of moral values is a
fundamental and far-reaching realignment (Baumeister & Vohs, 2002, p. 612).
While searching for one’s personal set of values it seems natural to guess that they must
lay somewhere within oneself, for who else could say what one’s own values are? Thus,
the individual is presented with a complex puzzle with no guide as valid as themselves,
and no guide for how to listen to the knowledge they supposedly contain. A person could
be forgiven for being confused by the questions of who they are and what they value, and
indeed psychologists seeking to fully understand the self empirically have been similarly
confounded. Since the beginning of psychology as a field, different definitions of the self
and its contents have been forwarded, but from within these divisions an
acknowledgement of the self as a useful tool—a loose theory for pragmatically
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organizing self-related information and motivating behavior—has emerged (Epstein,
1973). If the self serves as our own theoretical frameworks for navigating life, it would
seem that it might be up to the task of providing guidance that history has charged it with.
In light of the existential challenges faced by recent generations, research into the
self-theory as a personalized tool that is available for resolving the value-gap meaning
vacuum is a promising area for further investigation. How might the self-theory be
applied to perform such a function? In recent years, psychologists have recognized that
people report relying on their true selves—“who they really are deep down”—for selfworth, purpose, and guidance. If true, such beliefs, assumptions, and attributions
organized around the true self appear to represent precisely the sorts of resources that can
serve as personal headings against uncertain seas. I will here review evidence in support
of this encouraging possibility prior to outlining a research plan designed to directly
assess the true self as a conceptual pillar of psychological stability.
Structure of Review
I begin this exploration of beliefs and attributions surrounding the true self, as
well as their functional implications, by first defining the true self as different from the
self construct broadly. Following will be a thorough consideration of the major lines of
research into people’s thoughts about the true self, how their true self-concepts are
defined and organized, and the extent to which valence is commonly attached to the true
self. At this point I will unite these beliefs, conceptual organizations, and valence
attributions under the umbrella term “true self-orientations” as I explore the evidence for
their well-being relevance. Thus, moving forward from this foundation, I will examine
empirical well-being outcome implications of true self-orientations before turning to the
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question of how apt these orientations are for actively benefiting people. I conclude this
review by proposing how particular true self-orientations might best perform such a role.
I then proceed to outline three experimental studies to test this claim, in each case
leveraging false feedback about participants’ personal morality as a self-relevant stressor
that they might cope with using true self-orientations.
The Self at the Core? Distinguishing the True Self from the Self
Due to its name, speaking about the true self implies a boundary between the self
generally and its truest aspects, but this is misleading and is an inaccurate understanding
of the relationship between the self and the true self as psychological constructs. To
distinguish between the two, it is useful to consult the leading definitions psychology has
developed for each. According to Swann and Bosson (2010), the primary definition of the
self is as a “representation or set of representations about oneself, parallel to the
representations people have of other individuals. […] It is the “me,” or self-as-object,
about which James (1890) wrote—the entire set of beliefs, evaluations, perceptions, and
thoughts that people have about themselves” (p. 591). We can have a wide variety of
these cognitions about ourselves, and like other cognitions they can be more or less active
at a given time (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; McGuire et al., 1978),
contain semantic and episodic self-related knowledge (Kelley et al., 2002; Klein &
Loftus, 1993; Klein et al., 1992), and be malleable to serve our goals in the present
situation (Swann et al., 2002).
By contrast, for those of us that believe we possess a true self, we seem to develop
a concept of what our true self is like. This true self-concept comes to be complexly
elaborated by the traits, qualities, ideals, and imagined potentials we think best describe
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and are most central to who we think we are (Schlegel et al., 2009). As we will see, true
self-concepts frequently apply a high degree of psychological essentialism to the true
self. I emphasize that true self-concepts belong, for scientific purposes, only to those who
engage in the belief that they have a true self. This is because to all but a subgroup of
psychologists the true self is in reality a folk belief referred to as the veridical account of
true selves (Rivera et al., 2019). Further, the true self is an unscientific concept as it is
both up to each person’s subjective definition and unverifiable (Strohminger et al., 2017).
Beliefs about the true self are, by contrast, psychological realities compatible with and
worthy of scientific study. The utility of this point is already being noted. Baumeister
(2019) recently likened this non-veridical understanding of the true self to the idea of a
unicorn:
“Thus, people might have a true self-concept but they might still not have a true
self. The unicorn is a standard example for which there exists a concept without a
reality. Rivera et al. (2019) make a compelling case for the true self as like a
unicorn, that is, a concept without a reality behind it. For them, the true self
functions not as a representation of how one is but rather as a guide to how one
wants to be.” (p. 145).
While the true self may be by its nature insensitive to measurement and verification,
belief in it is so common that a wide variety of narratives and explanatory conclusions
have accumulated around the true self with not insignificant impact. Considering that
each person who believes they have a true self can choose how to define it, the types of
things people believe about true selves is remarkably consistent across cultures. For
instance, the true self is judged as good among participants in Colombia, Russia, and
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Singapore (De Freitas et al., 2018), and morally good traits are thought of as most core to
a person among Hindu Indians and Buddhist Tibetans (Nichols et al., 2018). To ascertain
whether a person can benefit from their orientation to the true self, it is first appropriate
to further describe these commonalities in true self beliefs and conceptual organizations
and review their associated outcomes for other psychological constructs.
Having the True Self in Mind: True Self-concept Accessibility
Research indicates that processing and reasoning about the true self is distinct
from the self broadly. People make a distinction between their everyday qualities and
their true nature in open-ended responses (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021a). These
everyday self qualities and the true self have been shown to differ in how quickly and
accurately they’re cognitively processed (Baldwin et al., 2014; Schlegel et al., 2011;
Schlegel et al., 2009). Writing prompts designed to elicit feelings of nostalgia have been
shown to only make participants’ ideas about who they really are more accessible and not
increase the accessibility about their everyday qualities (Baldwin et al., 2014).
The speed and accuracy with which a person can describe their true self is
referred to as true self-concept accessibility and has been shown to relate to other
psychological constructs differently than the accessibility of other self-conceptions.
Specifically, true self-concept accessibility is related to higher meaning in life while
actual self-concept accessibility is not (Schlegel et al., 2009) and compassion inductions
have been shown to induce selflessness through decreased public self accessibility while
true self-concept accessibility was unimpacted (DeLury et al., 2020). These patterns lend
credence to the true self-concept as distinct. The perception of true self-knowledge
availability, the metacognitive ease with which one can describe their true self, also
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shares different relationships with other psychological constructs than does the
subjectively-judged availability of knowledge about one’s actual everyday self (Schlegel
et al., 2011).
True Self as an Essence: Self-essentialism
The above reviews evidence that true self-concepts consist of traits and
representations about a person’s true self which are specific to the person that holds them,
and that these true self-concepts differ from other self-conceptions a person might hold
such as the everyday self. Despite these person-specific variations on what true selfconcepts contain, true selves tend to be reasoned about in very consistent ways across
people. True selves are widely portrayed in lay narratives to be stable in nature, inherent
to each person, and informative for knowing who a person is and how they will act
(Dulaney et al., 2019). This reasoning is strong in psychological essentialism throughout.
Psychological essentialism refers to the idea that members of observable
categories in the world share an underlying essence that are the source of the categories’
distinguishing qualities (Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Newman &
Keil, 2008). Studies show that people readily infer essences underlying social categories
(Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) and doing so is associated with believing stereotypes about
these social groups (Haslam et al., 2000; Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002). While it may seem
unintuitive to consider each person their own essential category, findings suggest people
do hold these beliefs about people in general (Bastian & Haslam, 2007; Bastian &
Haslam, 2008; Haslam et al., 2006). Multiple studies have found compelling evidence
that it is common for people to apply psychological essentialism when thinking about
their own true self as well, a tendency known as self-essentialism (Christy et al., 2019;
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Dulaney et al., 2019). Self-essentialism involves belief that one possesses an inherent
unchanging true self that is deeply-seated, genetically-linked, and influential over
behavior (Dulaney et al., 2019). American participants have been shown as significantly
more likely to agree that the true self exists for each person to discover, a self-essentialist
metaphor, than with a metaphor portraying the true self as something each person can
create for themselves, which is consistent with a flexible and less veridical view of the
true self (Schlegel et al., 2012). Further, while interdependent societies tend to take the
more flexible view of the self in general (Ng & Hynie, 2014, Spencer-Rodgers & Peng,
2004; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), there is indication that interdependent societies are
just as likely to think about true selves in essentialist terms, with Japanese undergraduates
reporting almost the same means and standard deviations on self-essentialism as United
States samples (Dulaney et al., 2021).
The Morality of the True Self
A robust group of findings has now gathered to show that, in addition to
widespread beliefs that the true self is a stable essence, people also consistently believe
the true self is inherently morally good. People seem to view the ideal of “being yourself”
as an ethical imperative that shapes their moral reasoning (Knobe, 2005). Further, when
asked to qualitatively describe one aspect of themselves that they valued more than any
other, a large portion of participants reported most valuing an aspect that was moral
(38.2%), nearly as many as the number of participants who most valued an aspect
involving their intelligence (41.1%) and each of these former aspect categories were
vastly more endorsed than personality (17.6%) or physical traits (3.0%; De Freitas &
Alvarez, 2019). In other words, people spontaneously and frequently endorse morality as
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being the most important part of themselves. Paralleling these findings, having a highlyinternalized sense of personal morals and directives has been shown to predict high
schoolers’ use of moral concepts as a way to describe themselves and their qualities as
well as actual moral behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002). People do not only consider their
moral qualities as being of central significance to who they are, following a moraltherefore-central line of reasoning. Rather, evidence also demonstrates a centraltherefore-moral sequence: In dominantly independent and interdependent cultures as well
as in people who scored highly on holding negative views towards humanity in general,
participants consistently assumed moral goodness about that which was most core to a
person’s identity (De Freitas et al., 2018).
People also seem to project their own moral assumptions when labelling the
appearance of others’ true selves. Participants rated vignette characters undergoing belief
or behavior change to be changing in accordance with their true selves if the change was
from morally bad to morally good, compared to when the changes proceeded in a goodto-bad pattern (Study 1, Newman, et al., 2014). Establishing that people use their own
moral beliefs rather than simply using social norms to decide when true selves are being
reflected, participants rated politically-enmeshed changes (e.g., unpatriotic to patriotic,
denying global warming to supporting the environment) as revealing characters’ true
selves when these changes would be seen as following a bad-to-good pattern in alignment
with participants’ own political identifications (Study 2).
While the persistent belief in the true self as morally good appears to be a separate
branch of beliefs than those that portray the true self as an essential entity, in fact the
attributions of moral valence have been argued to have emerged precisely as a result of
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our tendency to essentialize the true self (De Freitas et al., 2017a). Since the true self is a
compatible target onto which essentialist frames can be projected, our moralization about
the true self has developed to follow essentialist lines as well. For instance, mirroring
psychological essentialism’s assertion that essential qualities are interwoven with an
entity’s fundamental identity, changes to a person’s moral qualities are seen as more
disruptive to a person’s identity than changes to personality, nonmoral, or immoral
qualities (De Freitas et al., 2018; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). Morality notions are so
integral in true self beliefs that feedback about our own immorality seems to lead us to
feel more alienated from and less aware of who we really are (Christy et al., 2016). That
psychological essentialism underlies the belief that the true self is inherently moral is
easy to understand considering that projecting permanent positive moral valence onto the
true self is itself making a claim about something that is universal, unchanging, and
inherent about true selves.
Now that the true self-concept has been defined, and essentialist and moral beliefs
about true selves have been outlined and shown to be incredibly interlinked, it is possible
to assess the aptness of these “true self-orientations” for performing supportive functions
in service of happiness and meaning in life. Using this label will be useful for discussing
evidence of benefits associated with the variety of representations and beliefs people hold
regarding the true self.
Is it Beneficial to Believe in a True Self?
People seem to engage in seeing essences and goodness simultaneously in the true
self in flexible, logically inconsistent ways that imply effortful attempts to maintain these
beliefs. People view improvements made by a person as being truer to the person’s core
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self and are comparatively less willing to embrace examples of a person’s decline as
being true to their core (Molouki & Bartels, 2017). This parallels the tendency to see
larger essentialized entities such as countries as maintaining their fundamental identity
when making improvements as opposed to deteriorating (De Freitas et al., 2017b). Such
acceptance of improvements, while matching the goodness assumption, violates the
assumption of stability over time. People seem to apply the discovery metaphor to resolve
this, in other words claiming that by improving a person is further discovering and
realizing their true nature (Bench et al., 2015). It is a curiosity of essentialist thinking that
an essence can be a causal agent in behavior while also being capable of being obscured,
at times a mystery to its owner who can behave in ways that mismatch their true essence.
Considering that people so readily engage in motivated reasoning to maintain
their true self-beliefs, one might ask what the root of this motivation is. That is, what is
the function of these beliefs we so strongly and prevalently cling to? Despite the logical
inconsistencies that underlay seeing a dynamic, situationally-sensitive person (Fleeson &
Wilt, 2010) as having an unchanging and moral essence, a large body of evidence now
reflects benefits associated with entertaining this theory and will now be reviewed.
True Self-orientations and Subjective Well-being
Significant bivariate correlations have emerged between self-essentialism and
variables commonly used to capture subjective well-being (SWB). Such a link was hinted
at by the finding of a medium-sized positive correlation between endorsement of a single
item “The true self is real” and meaning in life (Schlegel et al., 2012). As a first endeavor
to assess this connection using a complete measure of self-essentialism, Dulaney et al.
(2019) found self-essentialism to have medium-sized positive correlations with
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satisfaction in life, meaning in life, and happiness in a student sample and small- to
medium-sized positive correlations with these variables in a sample of Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers. An extension and replication study again found a
medium-sized positive correlation between self-essentialism and satisfaction with life
(Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021b). A cross-cultural extension of this work showed that for
Japanese undergraduates, self-essentialism also correlated moderately positively with
satisfaction with life, meaning in life, and self-esteem (Dulaney et al., 2021). While the
true self is highly-esteemed cross-culturally (Kim et al., 2018b as cited in Rivera et al.,
2019; Schlegel at al., 2013a), such findings of parallel well-being patterns between selfessentialism and well-being for participants in the United States and Japan is striking
considering their different cultural heritages. Specifically, Westerners are traditionally
inclined to view the self as stable and distinct from the environment (De Freitas et al.,
2017a; Newman et al., 2014), while traditions in Japan and many East Asian countries
take a dialectical view, depicting the self as full of contrasts and permeable to social and
environmental influences (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). It has
further been proposed that taking an essential view of the self can incur well-being costs
due to its inflexibility in self-beliefs (Boyraz et al., 2019), a contrasting view suggesting a
limit to true self-orientations’ adaptiveness that I will return to in a later section.
True Self-orientations and Fulfillment of Basic Psychological Needs
Having one’s fundamental psychological needs fulfilled is thought to be highly
important and central for a person’s well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Williams, 1997,
2001), with cross-cultural support (Church et al., 2012). In keeping with selfessentialism’s connection with well-being discussed above, self-essentialism has also
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been shown to have a small positive correlation with meaning need fulfillment, a
medium-sized positive correlation with belonging need fulfilment, a medium-sized
positive correlation with control need fulfillment, and a medium-sized positive
correlation with self-esteem need fulfillment (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021b). The
findings of self-essentialism being positively correlated with fulfillment of meaning in
life needs parallel the evidence that it is positively associated with scores on meaning in
life questionnaires (Dulaney et al., 2019; Dulaney et al., 2021; Schlegel et al., 2012) in
particular.
Meaning in life implications have additionally emerged for true self-orientations
in research examining true self-concept accessibility. Higher true self-concept
accessibility has been demonstrated to repeatedly predict higher meaning in life scores
(Schlegel et al., 2009), and subjective reports of how easily available true self-knowledge
is have also been related to higher meaning in life when controlling for mood and selfesteem (Schlegel et al., 2011). Relatedly, when assessing goal motivations, Zhang et al.
(2018) found that even failed attempts to achieve a goal can be experienced as full of
meaning if the goal in question is self-concordant. The implications of this emerging link
between true self-orientations and meaning in life will be discussed in further detail in a
following section. Prior to this, let us turn to consider the aptness of true self-orientations
for serving well-being more directly.
Digging Deep: How Might True Self-orientations Provide Strength and Resilience?
In response to this converging evidence linking strong and accessible beliefs in a
true self with psychological flourishing, one might wonder whether the true self as a
construct might play an active role in promoting and defending psychological health.

15
Keeping in mind that the true self is most likely to be “evidence-insensitive”
(Strohminger et al., 2017), empirically probing the true self’s supportive fitness must
instead focus on asking whether true self-orientations can provide strength. In pursuing
these questions, it is useful to first review what we know about how people regard the
true self in everyday life given the subjective and personal nature of the true self. The
connected literatures for research on authenticity and the self-concept have also revealed
relevant patterns that will be informative to consider before focusing directly on possible
active functions of true self-orientations.
Indications Found Within Lay-beliefs
Lay narratives hold the true self to be a valuable guide in times of trial and
uncertainty by virtue of its unchanging nature. In such an essentialist vein of reasoning,
possessing a stable core allows a person to remain intact, steady, and on-course in life’s
tumultuous ocean. Participants repeatedly volunteer such narratives, reporting their belief
that they look inside themselves for strength and guidance (Dulaney & Graupmann,
2021a).
Cross-cultural examinations have revealed the international prevalence of belief
in the true self as this kind of support resource, referring to said beliefs as the “true-selfas-guide” lay theory. Survey studies on this topic asked participants in the United States
(Schlegel et al., 2013a) as well as in China, India, Singapore, and South Korea (Kim et
al., 2018b, as cited in Rivera et al., 2019) to rate how useful various decision-making
strategies were for resulting in satisfying decisions. In each country surveyed the true self
was consistently rated as among the most valuable guides for decision-making. In the
United States and Singapore, the true self was rated the most valuable guide of all twelve
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rated sources of guidance such as seeking information from others, intuition, religion, and
rational processing (Rivera et al., 2019; Schlegel et al., 2013a). Participants in China,
India, and South Korea rated the true self in the top three most useful resources for
decision-making (Rivera et al., 2019).
Feelings of Being Yourself: Considering Authenticity
While remarkable in light of the societal and philosophical differences between
these countries, worldwide cross-cultural belief in the true self as decision guide does not
fully establish whether the true self can effectively serve this function in reality. That is,
are these beliefs simply culturally-inherited narratives, or do people actively rely on their
true self-orientations in moments of uncertainty? Findings within the companion
literature on authenticity point to such a role.
Kernis and Goldman’s (2006) influential article on the components of authenticity
describe it as “the unobstructed operation of one’s true or core self in one’s daily
enterprise” (p. 32). Heavily concordant with our discussion, it has been argued that
psychological essentialism underpins each dimension of authenticity (Newman, 2019)
and that an essentialist account of authenticity best explains the patterns revealed by
research into authenticity (van Gerven et al., 2019). Researchers in this literature are
currently striving to arrive at an adequate complete definition of authenticity considering
its subjectivity and the difficulty in measuring the authenticity of a given action (Hicks et
al., 2019; Jongman-Sereno & Leary, 2019), an endeavor that has thus far spanned
multiple decades (Harter, 2002). Acknowledgements of true self-orientations laying at the
root of authenticity theory have long surfaced in this debate, with Vannini and Franzese
(2008) arguing: “We argue that authenticity is about being true to one’s self. […] In order
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to understand authenticity, a researcher must then take into consideration at least two
things: people’s emotional experiences of being true or untrue to one’s self and people’s
ideas about what their true self is” (p. 1621). A simple working definition for our
purposes can be taken from the published development of the most widely used selfreport scale of authenticity. Therein a “person-centered view” of authenticity is adopted
and subsequently defined as being composed of a person’s feelings of their own selfalienation, living consistently with their values and beliefs, and degree of acceptance of
external influence (Wood et al., 2008).
Relevant to evaluating the active benefits of true self-orientations, assessing the
authenticity of oneself, a person, or an object has been argued to be achieved by
evaluating the target’s match with a particular essence (Newman, 2016). As such,
authenticity as a construct is debated due to its apparent requirement of the veridical
account of the true self being accurate. A partial solution to this obstacle for authenticity
research mirrors the recent acknowledgement that true self-orientations may be important
for psychological health. In recent years, increased attention has focused on
distinguishing between assessing a target’s veridical authenticity and the
phenomenological experience of feeling authentic (Lenton et al., 2013). The terms
“perceived authenticity” and “state authenticity” have gained popularity for referring to
these felt experiences in order to specify the facet of authenticity under discussion.
Considering that much of personal authenticity measurements have relied on selfassessments, perceived authenticity is arguably the umbrella containing most research on
the construct.
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Making this distinction can perhaps facilitate measurement refinement, as some
authenticity items are more relevant for representing in-the-moment authentic feelings
(e.g., “I feel that I am doing the things that are right for me”, “I feel as if I don’t know
myself very well”, Wood et al., 2008) than others (e.g., general behavior: “I always stand
by what I believe in”, social preferences: “I dislike people who pretend to be what they
are not”, daily affordances: “My daily behavior reflects ‘the real me’”, values: “I think it
is better to be yourself, than to be popular”, Wood et al., 2008; ease of selfunderstanding: “I find it very difficult to critically assess myself”, Kernis & Goldman,
2006). In addition, perceived authenticity items need to clarify for participants whether
they should respond about their in-the-moment feelings or opinions of their overall
authenticity, since phrases like “I feel…” can be interpreted as asking about feeling states
or simply as an alternate expression of “I think…”. It may be that phenomenological
feelings of authenticity warrant dedicated scales or subscales to capture their unique
contribution. Clearly highlighting the phenomenological component of assessing one’s
own authenticity also furthers the whole field of authenticity research by prompting
researchers to ask what the antecedents and benefits of the in-the-moment feeling of
being authentic and true to oneself might be (Rivera et al., 2019; Sedikides et al., 2019;
Sedikides et al., 2017). Solutions to puzzles about authenticity arise from this
consideration. For example, adding to a robust heritage of research on behavior and trait
mismatch (Mischel, 1968), people report feeling most authentic when acting in particular
ways (e.g., more extraverted, more agreeable) even when these behaviors are inconsistent
with their Big Five personality trait scores (Fleeson & Wilt, 2010). By directly
emphasizing the difference between a person’s authentic feelings and their (difficult to
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define and measure) actual authenticity, we can now appreciate such conflicts in a
person’s perceptions and behavior as providing us information about the antecedents of
perceived authenticity.
One could predict that, following the essentialist description of authenticity as the
unobstructed operation of the true self and the acknowledged primacy of subjective
experience and beliefs in the authenticity and true self constructs, a merging of the two
lines of theory and research may be fast approaching. This represents a compelling case
for using the research on perceived authenticity’s connection to well-being to enrich our
review despite the inconsistent measurement of perceived authenticity already discussed.
Paralleling the positive associations detected between true self-orientations and wellbeing, a strong link has emerged between higher authenticity self-ratings and positive
well-being outcomes (Bryan et al., 2017; Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Heppner et al., 2008;
Ito et al., 2009; Ito & Kodama, 2007; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Liu & Perrewe, 2006;
Ryan et al., 2005; Wood et al., 2008). The absence of authentic feelings shows the
opposite associations with optimal functioning, with a longitudinal design suggesting a
bidirectional relation between academic amotivation and feelings of self-alienation, a
subscale of Wood et al.’s (2008) authenticity scale (Kim et al., 2018a).
Perceived authenticity research also reveals relevant implications for the possible
threat resilience and coping readiness of true self-orientations. In a daily diary study, after
experiencing interpersonal conflicts, participants with higher authenticity did not report
lower general well-being (Wickham et al., 2016). Participants higher in authenticity
additionally have demonstrated lower tendency to distort the realities of threatening life
events’ unpleasant consequences (Lakey et al., 2008). In three studies, individuals
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reporting higher perceived authenticity experienced less loss of hope in the face of
limited future time perspective manipulations (Davis & Hicks, 2013). Resonating with
this, self-rated authenticity has been shown to be most strongly positively related to selfesteem after limited future time manipulations, indicating that feelings of authenticity
might serve a protective role against such a stressor (Davis et al., 2015). Longitudinal
work has revealed self-reported levels of authenticity to predict later increased
satisfaction with life and decreased feelings of distress (Boyraz et al., 2014). Separate
longitudinal work has also found lower self-reports of living authentically to be
associated with higher stress at a second timepoint when controlling for coping strategies
(Maffly-Kipp et al., 2020).
Strength in the Self-concept
Encouraging support for a bolstering function true self-orientations also arises in
another related literature focused on the self-concept broadly. Probes into understanding
the self-concept in terms of its organization, complexity, and perceived clarity have
yielded a few patterns that connect particular configurations of the self-concept with
being well-positioned for threat coping and as such are relevant to highlight here. Studies
have repeatedly found a more elaborate and multifaceted self-concept, referred to as selfcomplexity, to be associated with better stress coping (Campbell et al., 1991; Dixon &
Baumeister, 1991; Gramzow et al., 2000; Niedenthal et al., 1992; Rothermund &
Meiniger, 2004), although a negative relationship between self-complexity and coping
has occasionally been found by others (Brown & Rafaeli, 2007; Koch & Shepperd, 2004;
Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Importantly, it has been suggested that high selfcomplexity can be burdensome if the individual does not feel there to be an underlying
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structure unifying the various facets of their self-concept (i.e., high self-concept
differentiation, Donahue et al., 1993; Lutz & Ross, 2003).
Paralleling this, coping implications have also been demonstrated for self-concept
clarity, defined as having clear and confident definition, consistency, and stability in
one’s perceived self-aspects. Higher self-concept clarity is related to better coping with a
romantic breakup (Slotter et al., 2010) and bereavement (Boelen et al., 2012). Together,
these findings suggest that a coherent self-concept, and the confidence with which one
feels their self-concept to be stable and clearly-outlined, to be positively related to coping
success. People higher in self-concept clarity have also been shown to be more likely to
utilize information about themselves as a touchstone for guiding information-relevant
behavior (Guadagno & Burger, 2007). These combined findings represent an encouraging
sign that people with elaborated and certain self-concepts are both better able to cope
with stress and access their self-knowledge in an actionable way. Perhaps most
relevantly, participants experiencing a self-concept clarity threat reported higher tendency
to reflect on their autobiographical pasts which in turn was marginally related to higher
self-continuity, suggesting the ability to voluntarily use self-knowledge to regain selfrelated stability (Jiang et al., 2020). I will now turn to address the possibility that true
self-orientations can be similarly relied on for resilience directly.
Re-centering Ourselves: Considering the True Self’s Functions
Reviewing this collection of connected literatures elucidates a consistent pattern
that feeling in touch with yourself and possessing a sense of self-understanding seems to
be associated with better resilience, a pattern that is echoed in everyday narratives
worldwide. Having established this foundation, it is possible to explore existing research
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on the adaptive function of true self-orientations. To address how orienting to the true
self might be useful for psychological flourishing, we should be clear about what it
means to be useful in such a way. Psychological health could be most readily supported
by fostering its growth or bolstering its defenses.
Fostering Psychological Health
The link between meaning in life and both self-essentialism and true self-concept
accessibility, reviewed above, suggests a possible pathway by which these constructs
might be useful in actively increasing psychological health. Given that meaning in life is
considered a basic psychological need, if there existed a direct causal influence of selfessentialism and true self-concept accessibility on increasing meaning in life this would
demonstrate a strong case that particular orientations to the true self can benefit
psychological health. Even prior to the detection of a link between self-essentialism and
meaning in life, theorists suggested that believing in the true self grants an individual a
personalized route to forming a framework of meaning structures, framing it poetically as
a “wellspring of meaning” (Schlegel et al., 2013b, p. 180). Despite this compelling
theoretical argument, it may be difficult to empirically establish a causal link of true selforientations facilitating meaning development due to the complex lifelong process of
building a sense of meaning.
If this causal hypothesis were true, this would at least partly explain meaning’s
positive associations with both self-essentialism and true self-concept accessibility. This
assertion also dovetails with the literatures on self-affirmation (Sherman & G. Cohen,
2002; Sherman & G. Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988) and meaning maintenance (Heine et al.,
2006), which together posit that to cope with a perceived threat or loss in a self-central
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domain, people are able to gain stability and defend the self by connecting with an
unrelated central identity or group of values such as a meaning framework. Meaning’s
buffering of stressor impact has been demonstrated repeatedly in adults (Appel, 2020;
Krause et al., 2017; Larner & Blow, 2011; Park, 2010; Park, 2005; Park et al, 2008) and
adolescents (Aviad-Wilchek & Ne’eman-Haviv, 2018; Dulaney et al., 2018). These
findings suggest that, if beliefs, traits, and identities projected onto one’s idea of their true
self can help them construct personal meaning frameworks, these true self-orientations
may also indirectly protect psychological health from threats.
Defending Psychological Health
True self-orientations have also recently been linked with directly protecting
psychological health. Psychological health might be at risk when a person encounters a
threatening or uncertain situation that unbalances them, spurring them to restabilize and
potentially seek decision guidance or coping support. In the case of seeking decision
guidance, when called to make a major decision a person can feel uncertain, as discussed
previously. If they subscribe to the true-self-as-guide lay theory, this person might seek
connection with “who they really are” for direction. Insights from the qualitative
responses mentioned suggest that at the very least this theory is ready-to-mind enough for
people to endorse consulting their true selves when needing to make a decision or get in
touch with their ‘core values’ for information (Dulaney & Graupmann, 2021a). The true
self is consistently rated as a more important guide for satisfying decision-making than
other strategies (Schlegel et al., 2013a). Selecting goals consistent with the true self has
been shown to mediate the pathway to actual goal attainment among people high in selfcontrol (Stavrova et al., 2019). Higher decision-satisfaction has also been linked with
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stronger belief in the true self as something a person discovers (i.e., an extant but
undiscovered core nature) rather than creates for themselves (Schlegel et al., 2011).
Further, using daily diary methods, perceived true self-knowledge has been shown to
covary with decision satisfaction and manipulations of true self-knowledge or decisionsatisfaction have been shown to affect feelings of decision satisfaction or true selfknowledge respectively (Schlegel et al., 2013a). While facsimile recreations of major life
decisions are difficult to construct experimentally, Kim et al. (2021) have found positive
correlations between true self-knowledge and decision satisfaction (Study 1) in addition
to higher reported decision satisfaction among participants using the true-self-as-guide
for decision-making than among those using other strategies (Studies 2 & 3). Taking
these findings together, it appears that believing in a true self and having confidence in it
as a decision guide might help a person select a problem-solving strategy for dealing with
uncertainty. While compelling, clear conclusions are obfuscated by methodological
limitations. In-lab decision-making generally employs smaller decision tasks, such as
asking participants to choose between pairs of hypothetical occupations or plan their days
(and actually follow their plans) using different possible guides (Kim et al., 2021), and it
remains unclear whether the decision referents used in laboratories are appropriate for
generalizing to reasoning about major real decisions.
In contrast with times of important decision making, a scenario in which a person
might seek support and which lends itself better to being validly reproduced
experimentally is the aforementioned threat-coping process. It can be very stressful for a
person when they are caused to question their stability in important life arenas. In
addition to basic access to physical necessities, a person is likely to experience stress

25
when facing threats to their worth (Heine et al., 1999; Sherman & G. Cohen, 2002;
Sherman & G. Cohen, 2006; Steele, 1988), moral character (Mulder & Aquino, 2013;
Steele, 1988), basic psychological needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Heine et al., 2006;
Williams, 1997; Williams, 2001), sense of self-continuity (Sedikides et al., 2008), and
social comparisons (Heine et al., 1999; Leonardelli et al., 2010) to form an extensive but
non-exhaustive list. Depending on the nature of this threat, solutions might include
reframing it, neutralizing it, or seeking a source of support to aid in coping with it;
thereby regaining stability in each case. This presents another opening for true selforientations to possibly serve a protective function by way of helping to reinterpret and
resolve these threats. Indeed, in the context of the personal upheaval associated with
changes in the self over time, Bench et al. (2015) have proposed that taking an essential
view of the true self as a stable unchanging core might help diffuse such threats to selfcontinuity and foster a sense of coherence in one’s life-story. Such life story coherence
has been shown to be linked to increased well-being (Baerger & McAdams, 1999).
Dialectical Self-views: A Contrasting Case
Promising evidence is emerging to suggest just such a role for true selforientations in buffering threats to psychological security. This evidence is thus far
incomplete, representing an exciting prospect for new research to contribute to scientific
knowledge. At this important juncture, it is appropriate to consider arguments for the
benefits of taking flexible, permeable, and dialectical views of the self rather than our
essentialist case of focus as a means of predicting important boundaries of selfessentialism’s associations to well-being.
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Multiple findings in the literature on dialectical self-views suggest that allowing
for internal flexibility, evolution, and change is associated with better stressor reactions
and outcomes. Dialectical self-views have been shown to moderate the process of coping
with high betrayal traumas, an example of extreme stress, such that these views allowed
trauma survivors to maintain their self-compassion and thereby experience less posttraumatic stress (Boyraz et al., 2019). Further, dialectical self-beliefs have been shown to
buffer the threat of evidence of incompatibilities between two of one’s most central
identities (Rabinovich & Morton, 2016). In this research, only participants high in naïve
self-dialecticism were spared from decreased well-being in the face of such evidence.
Compellingly, Boyraz and colleagues (2019) discuss the coping aptness of both selfessentialism and self-dialecticism:
“compared to individuals who have a high need of maintaining stable and
consistent self-perceptions, those with dialectical self-beliefs may feel less
threatened and experience less disruption in their sense of self-coherence and selfcontinuity when their self-perceptions are challenged by traumatic events. In
addition, having a dialectical self-view may reduce maladaptive responses that
can result from an inability to tolerate or integrate contradictions” (p. 3).
In contrast, these researchers proposed that essentialist self-beliefs may limit
trauma survivors’ ability to reframe their past experiences in efforts to generate selfcompassion because such flexibility is not allowed by portrayals of the self as
unchanging (Boyraz et al., 2019). In my view, this is a compelling argument for the
boundaries of the ability of self-essentialism to usefully serve a person under stress.
Accordingly, I have integrated these boundaries into my theoretical framework and
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hypotheses following from it, as well as including elements related to self-dialecticism in
two of my planned studies. I will now discuss the theoretical case for these studies as
situated in the larger literature on true self-orientations and their potential functions.
Rationale
The question of whether true self-orientations can help a person more effectively
cope with and recover from a troubling threat, and what the limits of such a role might
be, provides a potentially fruitful avenue for understanding true self-orientations’ utility.
Lay narratives signal this role as a pillar of psychological stability. The directive that one
should “dig deep” to push through times of hardship, confusion, or challenge—while
possibly gesturing towards the inner strength or courage to be found in emotion
regulation and grit—may also be a call to discover “what you’re made of”, to reveal
“who you really are” (Dulaney et al., 2019; Rivera et al., 2019). Qualitative work reveals
lay belief in such a role for true self-orientations in these sorts of uncertain moments.
(Dulaney et al., 2021a). Among the central life arenas that can be threatened in order to
test this function, there are compelling reasons to think true self-orientations would be
most apt for assuaging threats to a person’s moral character. People are motivated to see
themselves as moral (Miller & Effron, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001), and seek to
maintain these self-views when confronted with evidence to the contrary by using
counter-evidence to shore up their moral credentials (Effron, 2014). People also cope
with self-threats by portraying themselves as more highly moral, a promising interlinking
of self-threat coping and strengthening connection to one’s sense of morality (Jordan &
Monin, 2008). Considering this motivated search to reassure and re-secure one’s moral
self-view, and given the strong evidence that the true self is thought of as highly morally
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good, a threat to one’s moral character may be precisely the type of destabilizing
experience that can be effectively coped with by engaging the true self-concept.
No efforts have directly tested the role of the true self in recovering from a threat
to one’s moral character, however some relevant evidence has emerged. While not
precisely targeting the questions at hand here, Baldwin et al. (2014, Study 6) found that
among participants experiencing threats to their true selves (writing prompts about
situations, experiences, and relationships that make it difficult or impossible to truly be
themselves, p. 11), participants who were given the opportunity to reflect on a nostalgic
personal memory did not experience decreased feelings subjective well-being and being
able to express their true selves in response to the threat. Importantly, these authors
proposed that nostalgia is capable of buffering threats to the true self-concept “by
bringing to mind past experiences in which controlling and extrinsic influences on one’s
self were (or are perceived to have been) minimal and that highlight one’s core and
authentic traits” (p. 3) and that having these experiences and central traits in mind offers
“a clear picture of the intrinsic and authentic self, which is then assimilated into the
current self-concept” (p. 3). If this proposed mechanism were true, this work signifies
that people can benefit from following pathways towards activation of their true selfconcepts and that this can help assuage direct true self-concept threats at least. While it
would be important to know that people feel defensive of their true self-concepts and
Baldwin and colleagues’ (2014) work is a step towards establishing this, our aims lay in
tackling the broader task of evaluating true self-orientations as a self-affirming resource
for compensation with threats to many types of important self-foundations.
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Closer to our line of inquiry, experimentally activating the true self-concept
before giving participants intelligence test failure experiences or asking them to describe
a time when they hurt someone’s feelings led to decreased shame (an emotion arising
from global devaluations of the self) in response to these unpleasant tasks, while these
participants remained free to experience guilt (negative evaluations of the provoking
behavior, Vess et al., 2014). Feelings of shame are not themselves a metric of well-being,
they are related to variables with implications for well-being such as psychological
distress (Velotti et al., 2017). Further, while the authors do not report on qualitative
themes contained in participants’ descriptions of their past experiences with hurting
another’s feelings, it is plausible that many of these guilt- and shame-evoking
experiences had an element of being morally unseemly. It is also useful to again recall
Christy and colleagues’ (2016) findings that evidence of our own immorality leads us to
feel more alienated from and less aware of who we really are as measured by the selfalienation and awareness subscales of Wood et al.’s (2008) Authenticity Scale. Together,
these research lines indicate that true self-orientations can dampen the emotional impact
of troubling personally relevant feedback, and that threats to moral character affect
people in a way that activates their concept of the self. The time is thus appropriate to test
the extent to which activating a person’s particular orientations to having a true self might
partly determine threat response trajectories. As discussed, threats to one’s moral
character seem to be highly relevant stressors for testing the utility of the true self as a
defense resource in many regards. This gap in the literature represents a promising
opportunity for making progress in understanding the connection between true selforientations and psychological fitness.
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The Current Research
In the research outlined here I endeavor to assess across two studies how true selforientations might aid the coping response process among participants facing threats to
their moral character. I will now introduce my theoretical foundations before presenting
the research to follow.
Theoretical Framework
Herein I use a specific theoretical framework, gathering from psychology,
philosophy, and lay ideas, in constructing hypothesized outcomes for both studies. I
theorize that true self-orientations allow an individual to maintain a sense of core stability
during times of moderate stress because, while one’s environment and circumstances may
feel disorienting and chaotic, a strong sense of true self provides a plausible route to feel
that there is an organization underlying the confusion and be confident in the worth of the
“real me” despite the moment’s discouraging challenges. In this way, true selforientations can act as a self-theory for explaining our experiences to ourselves and
remaining secure in our self-narratives. Times of extreme conflict and stress, by contrast,
may be so threatening or confusing as to challenge the applicability of the true self theory
or challenge the integrity of the true self-concept as a whole. In these times I predict
strong belief in the true self to be less effective in coping with the stressors at hand, and
perhaps even burdensomely rigid, preventing one from finding creative and pragmatic
alternative solutions. This idea has been poetically described by eminent Heideggerian
philosopher McNeill in his analysis of Heidegger’s 1939 lecture course regarding his own
contemplations of Nietzsche. In McNeill’s (2006) interpretation, the convergent
perspectives of these philosophers present the human phenomenological self, a knower
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and schematizer of the world, as a wave in the river of chaos that assaults our
comprehension at all times but from which we originate and in which we are constantly
re-constituted. McNeill writes:
Withstanding the excessive force of chaos, coming to stand fast in it, being
propelled toward stability and steadfastness—this is nothing alien to life, notes
Heidegger, but corresponds to the very essence of bodying life. It is the way in
which a living body, rising like a wave, perhaps, first emerges, comes to a stand,
stabilizes and establishes itself—erects itself. Not in such a way as to oppose life,
but in a way ‘suited to its nature,’ as Heidegger just expressed it—namely, to the
nature of life as the torrential urge of streaming chaos (p. 159).
We can think of the self, which is capable of believing it contains a true self at its core, as
holding onto and applying its true self theories to help it maintain its structural integrity
in the face of stressful threats, to metaphorically stand and assert itself briefly as a wave
and force the assimilation of the chaos it confronts into its own shapes and schemas. If
the stressors or conflicts confronted are large or powerful enough, the fragile wave-like
true self theory will collapse and instead be accommodated into the larger river.
The idea that a true self theory might be beneficial for moderate stressor coping
but less effectual or deleterious in the face of extreme challenge mirrors Proulx and
Inzlicht’s (2012) description of the process in which a person might seek to assimilate or
accommodate a threat to their meaning structures. Applying Piaget’s (2000) theory of
cognitive development to responses to meaning threats they write, “(meaningthreatening) experiences that are inconsistent with our schemata will arouse a sense of
disequilibrium, which in turn motivates an assimilation of the experience so that it
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matches our schemata, or an accommodation of our schemata so that they account for the
experience” (p. 325). Dovetailing with Schlegel and colleagues’ (2013b) assertion that
the true self is a personalized meaning framework, I theorize that the true self-concept is
precisely such a meaning-making schema that can assimilate but sometimes must
accommodate stimuli.
Research on the true self-orientations have largely focused on the prevalence,
content, and benefits of beliefs in the true self. In line with my theoretical framework, the
cross-cultural psychology literature complements the examinations of true selforientations by providing support for the prediction that rigid essentialist true self beliefs
will fail to provide support in the face of high stress. In these instances, dialectical selfviews may be more appropriate for facilitating accommodation of troubling information
or experiences. In instances of moderate stress, self-essentialism may be most useful for
addressing the threat. In the sequence of research studies outlined below, I attempt to
bring into concert the coping predictions that have arisen from the research literatures on
true self-orientations and dialectical self-views by investigating true self-orientations as
coping supports at different degrees of personal morality threat extremity, in other words
exploring the boundary conditions of belief in the true self as an anchor in rocky seas.
Outline of Studies
To test the aptness of true self-orientations as a coping support in response to
moral character threat, first I examined baseline self-essentialism beliefs as a potential
moderator of coping success in response to personal morality threat (Study 1). I then
tested the extent to which people, when under personal morality threat, sought stability
through connection with their true self and to what extent these efforts yielded coping
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success (Study 2). To test my theoretical framework, personal morality threat was
manipulated experimentally and took on low, moderate, or high threat levels. Given the
intertwining of moral beliefs and true self-orientations, I hypothesized that true selforientations would emerge as helpful at moderate levels of threat and less-so at high
levels of threat. A figure accompanies hypotheses, described in turn below, to illustrate
how this theoretical framework was predicted to apply to the specifics of each design.
Study 1
As a first step towards understanding how baseline, latent true self-orientations
might relate to threat response processes and trajectories, this study assessed selfessentialism as a moderator of self-reported well-being following a morality threat
exposure.
Hypothesis I
I predicted there would emerge an interaction of threat level and self-essentialism
predictors, such that self-essentialism would help buffer the impact of moderate personal
morality threat on measured well-being outcome variables. To investigate this prediction,
separate moderated regression analyses were performed to probe the main effect of threat
level and self-essentialism as well as a possible two-way interaction between threat level
and self-essentialism in predicting meaning, meaning searching, each psychological need
fulfillment subscale, satisfaction with life, and subjective vitality. As threat level is a
categorical variable, dummy coding was employed with participants in the low morality
threat group as the reference group. A follow-up simple slopes analysis was planned
should the interaction term between threat level and self-essentialism have emerged as a
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significant predictor of a given outcome variable. The predictions outlined have been
visualized graphically, see Figure 1.
Figure 1
Hypothesized Pattern of Well-being Outcomes for Study 1, Using Self-essentialism and
Morality Threat Level as Predictors

Low Morality Threat

Positive Well-being

Medium Morality
Threat
High Morality Threat

Self-essentialism
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through DePaul University’s Sona online platform
which displayed its recruitment posting to students in the Introductory Psychology
Subject Pool, showed a brief description of the study, and allowed students to register for
a participation slot in exchange for the standard amount of course credit. Recruitment
yielded a total N of 153 participants. Following noncompliance and manipulation
screening discussed in Study 1’s Analyses and Results section, I arrived at a final
N of 138 (age 18–37, M = 20.15, SD = 3.34; 81.9% female, 18.1% male; political
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ideology (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) M = 5.09, SD = 1.46; religiosity
(1 = not religious at all to 7 = very religious) M = 3.35, SD = 1.87; 0.7% Arab, 8.7%
Asian, 0.7% Asian and Black, 1.4% Asian and White, 9.4% Black, 1.4% Black and
Latino/a, 2.8% Black and White, 0.7% Jewish, 21.7% Latino/a, 1.4% Latino/a and White,
2.1% Middle Eastern, 0.7% North African, 0.7% Pacific Islander, 46.4% White, 0.7%
White, Black, & Native).
Procedure
Upon a participant’s registration to take part in the research, they were provided
with a link to an external Qualtrics survey containing the tasks and measures contained in
this study. As the link’s viability would not expire until the conclusion of the research but
would allow only a single use per participant, participants were advised to use the link at
a time when they had an uninterrupted space of time to completely finish the study. Once
a participant used the link, they were greeted with the first page of the study presenting a
general outline of the associated research topics, risks, and benefits; and asked them to
indicate their willingness to take part in the study by advancing to the next page as
opposed to closing the browser window. Participants were asked on this page to minimize
distractions and silence their electronic devices.
On the following survey pages, participants responded on self-essentialism items.
At this point, they were each randomly assigned to one of three levels of a personal
morality false feedback threat manipulation, followed by another series of self-report
measures targeting satisfaction with life, psychological need satisfaction, subjective
vitality, and demographic items. The study then concluded by debriefing them and
redirect them to Sona for course credit allocation.
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Morality Threat Manipulation. Participants completed a series of 40 items
asking them to report their frequency of performing specific moral (20 items) and
immoral behaviors (20 items) in the past. Afterwards, they received false feedback about
their performance with regards to their peers. This manipulation was inspired by one
employed by Christy et al. (2016), in which participants were sorted into three conditions,
such that one condition involved them endorsing 20 moral, 20 nonmoral, or 20 immoral
modified items from the Conventional Morality Scale (Tooke & Ickes, 1988), the
Moralization of Everyday Life Scale (Lovett et al., 2012), and the Aggression
Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992). In this present study, participants answered all 40
randomized moral and immoral items to ensure the false morality feedback received has
the highest chance of being believed due to the length of the list and different response
patterns that could be plausibly judged at a certain level of morality (e.g., an immoral
grade could be plausibly created by either high endorsement of immoral behaviors or low
endorsement of moral behaviors). Also, for the sake of believability I expanded the
original 2-point response scale, including “I have not done this” and “I have done this”,
to instead read “I have not done this”, “I have done this on occasion”, “I have done this
often”, and “I have done this very often.” Participant response patterns were planned for
comparing against their condition to detect any drastic variation of scores from condition.
Nonmoral items were omitted as they all referred to grocery shopping behaviors and
would be out of place when interspersed with immoral and moral behavior items.
Although the items’ prompt asks the frequency with which the participant has performed
the behaviors in their lifetime, it is also conceivable that grocery shopping behaviors have
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taken on some degree of moral valence in participants’ mid-pandemic context at the time
of study data collection.
As in Christy et al. (2016), albeit modifying the false feedback slightly,
participants were provided with a mock “visual representation” of their supposed
personal position among the range of scores obtained by all participants. Participants
were randomly assigned to receive false feedback that was either low in personal
morality threat severity: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this
study, you scored in the 90th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher
on moral qualities than 90% of DePaul students”; moderate in personal morality threat
severity: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you scored
in the 45th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities
than 55% of DePaul students”; or high in personal morality threat severity: “Compared to
the other students who have participated in this study, you scored in the 15th percentile of
behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than 85% of DePaul
students.” The corresponding visual representation of their position appeared below the
feedback statement the participant received.
Measures
Funnel Debriefing. To allow for checking the manipulation’s success and
detecting participant suspicion regarding the nature of the false feedback, immediately
prior to the true debriefing survey page participants proceeded through a funnel
debriefing sequence. This component consisted of seven pages, each containing one freeresponse question probing participants’ thoughts about the study, progressively
approaching the topic of the funnel debriefing with increasing specificity. These
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questions proceeded as so: “Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this
study?”, “Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what?”, “Did you notice
anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors questionnaire?”, “Why do
you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?”, “What do
you remember your morality score being?”, “Do you think your morality score was
accurate?”, and “To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score
relative to all other participants?”.
Meaning in Life. Meaning in life was assessed using the ten-item Meaning in
Life Questionnaire (MLQ; Steger et al., 2006). Sample items of the MLQ include “I have
a good sense of what makes my life meaningful” (Presence of Meaning subscale) and “I
am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful” (Search for Meaning
subscale). The MLQ uses a seven-point scale (-3 = Completely Untrue to
+3 = Completely True), and internal reliability for the Presence of Meaning subscale in
the original publication was very good (Cronbach’s  = .82, .86, & .86) across three
studies, as was the internal reliability for the Search for Meaning subscale ( = .86, .87,
& .87).
Psychological Need Fulfillment. Fulfillment of four basic psychological needs;
self-esteem needs fulfillment, meaning needs fulfillment, control needs fulfillment, and
belonging needs fulfillment; were assessed using 20 items developed by Zadro et al.
(2004). Sample items include (self-esteem; original publication  = .70 – .76) “I feel
good about myself”, (meaning;  = .66 – .69) “I feel meaningless”, (control;
 = .72 – .80) “I feel I have the ability to determine my actions”, and (belonging;
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 = .71 – .74) “I feel I belong”. These questions use a five-point scale (1 = Not At All to
5 = Extremely).
Satisfaction with Life. To capture their satisfaction with life, participants
completed the five-item Satisfaction with Life questionnaire (e.g., “If I could live my life
over, I would change almost nothing”, “I am satisfied with my life”; Diener et al., 1985).
This questionnaire uses a seven-point Likert-type scale (-3 = Disagree Completely to
+3 = Agree Completely). Internal reliability in the original publication was very good
( = .87).
Self-essentialism. Self-essentialism was measured using an adapted version of
Bastian and Haslam’s (2008) Essentialism Scale. The modifications; first outlined in
Dulaney et al., (2019); include five items not in the original Essentialism Scale as well as
altered language to refer to participants’ own selves. This self-essentialism measure
contains 20 items using a seven-point Likert-type scale (-3 = Disagree Completely to
+3 = Agree Completely) and is comprised of three subscales (for full discussion of
measure factor structure and comparisons with the Essentialism Scale’s factor structure,
see Dulaney et al., 2019). The 11-item Self Entitativity subscale measures belief that the
participant’s true self exists and has defined, stable boundaries (e.g., “I have a true self”,
“I am either a certain type of person or I am not”). The four-item Biological Basis
subscale measures belief that the participant’s true self is determined by their personal
genetic makeup (e.g., “Whether I am one kind of person or another is determined by my
biological make-up”, “There are different types of people and with enough scientific
knowledge the ‘type’ of person I am can be traced back to genetic causes”). The five-item
Informativeness subscale measures belief that the participant’s true self is a causal agent
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in determining their behavior, and that knowledge about their true self can be used to
predict their future behavior (e.g., “It is possible to know about many aspects of me once
you become familiar with a few of my basic traits”, “When getting to know me it is
possible to get a picture of the kind of person I am very quickly”). Internal consistency
for the overall measure in the original study was very good ( = .88 MTurk sample;
 = .85 student sample), was very good for the Self Entitativity subscale (MTurk:
 = 0.85; students:  = 0.83), was excellent for the Biological Basis subscale (MTurk:
 = 0.93; students:  = 0.89), and was good for the Informativeness subscale (MTurk:
 = 0.82; students:  = 0.75; Dulaney et al., 2019). Higher scores represent stronger
endorsement of self-essentialism beliefs.
Subjective Vitality. Subjective vitality was assessed using items from the sevenitem Subjective Vitality Scale (Ryan & Frederick, 1997). Example items include “I feel
alive and vital”; “I don’t feel very energetic” ( = .84, .84, & .86; 1 = Not At All True,
7 = Very True).
Analyses and Results
Assessment for Response-Level Noncompliance
Each participant record was checked to identify participant noncompliance. For
example, participants who chose the same response option for every item on a measure
containing reverse-scored items would have their item responses deleted for said measure
as this indicates an unengaged participant. Data from participants who did not complete a
substantial amount of the questionnaire (e.g., multiple entire measures not completed)
would also not have been used, but this behavior did not occur. Non-extreme cases, such
as one entire measure being left empty, were scrutinized for data file inclusion
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qualification and usage in pairwise analyses. Two participants were eliminated from
analyses entirely for submitting scale responses in runs of the same digit within each
measure, with the exception of one of said participants providing varying data for the
satisfaction with life and subjective vitality questions. Each of these participants
submitted responses in runs for standard- and reverse-scored items alike, and took
between two-and one-half minutes and four-and-one-half minutes to submit their full
survey answers. A further four participants showed similar, but less egregious, study
noncompliance involving answering one or more variables in sequences of runs of a
single digit. Commonly this digit was the corresponding scale’s neutral point (e.g.,
Neither Agree Nor Disagree), indicating fence-sitting. In these cases, the participants
were removed from both scale-level analyses, such as when computing bivariate
correlations, or item-level analyses, such as when computing internal reliability estimates
or performing factor analyses to assess subscale structure, for the affected variables.
Overview of Main Data Analysis
At the conclusion of this screening for noncompliance, I then thoroughly
evaluated the efficacy of the morality threat manipulation. I did this by screening
participants’ funnel debriefing scores for signs of suspicion, and also by comparing
participants’ moral behavior item endorsement to detect anyone who was an obvious
mismatch to their assigned threat condition, detailed below. Once this screening was
complete, I built all Study 1 continuous scale means using scale and subscale
construction driven by factor analysis results. Upon scale construction I calculated
descriptive statistics and bivariate correlation. I then describe my process for determining
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post-hoc sensitivity analysis decision criteria for evaluating detected effect sizes. Finally,
I proceed with the main analyses for investigating the predictions under Hypothesis I.
Manipulation Check: Morality Threat Naivete and Fit
Assessing responses to the sequential funnel debriefing required balancing
between being overly-permissive and overly-restrictive in which answers signaled
removal from analyses. For instance, by the nature of the funnel debriefing’s increasing
emphasis on the morality questionnaire, many participants likely realized the
manipulation for the first time while answering said questions. An example of a likely
occurrence of this was an answer given to the fourth question in the sequence “Why do
you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?” by a
participant who was in the highest threat condition and mentioned no suspicion in the
three prior questions in the funnel debriefing, “A possible guess is to influence or see how
it could affect my future answers.” While this participant might be screened out under the
strictest guidelines to remove the chance that they had this realization prior to being
questioned, such an approach would also be likely to screen out participants from the
threatening conditions due to the intended surprise associated with these experiences. I
approached screening for manipulation suspicion with the plan to consider participants
who reported suspicion within the first three questions, as this would be a good sign of
their having had the realization during the study, and as the third question explicitly gives
them the opportunity to comment on the morality questionnaire experience. Later
answers would also be assessed for content that could reinforce earlier vague mention of
suspicion, particularly when these later answers involved participants’ strong claims of
suspicion rather than speculative as in the example above. Of the 151 participants
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retained in the dataset following noncompliance screening, a further thirteen participants
were excluded from analyses after manipulation check screening. Five of these
participants reported problems viewing the morality score graphic and were removed due
to the risk of this complicating the manipulation’s impact for them. The remaining nine
participants volunteered thoughts of suspicion early in the debriefing, with statements
such as imagining researchers’ likely goals: “I think it was about showing you if you had
bad morals and seeing how you felt about yourself after” (response to funnel question
#1), and questioning the accuracy of the results: “I feel like the morality histogram was a
random thing not based on anything I actually picked” (response to funnel question #2).
Remaining participants’ morality questionnaire responses were then compared
against their condition to ensure no analysis retention for participants whose condition
was impossible. As an extreme hypothetical for illustration, had a participant sorted into
the highest threat condition not endorsed having done any of the twenty immoral
behaviors, and had endorsed the highest rate of performing all twenty moral behaviors,
mathematically they could not be rated below any single other participant on morality,
much less 90% of all other participants. No such impossible matches to condition
occurred. As a result, the manipulation screening process yielded a final overall N of 138,
with a by-condition N distribution of 49 participants in the low threat condition, 44
participants in the moderate threat condition, and 45 participants in the high threat
condition.
Scale Construction
To ensure confidence in scale construction as regards appropriate factor structure
and data fit in the present sample, and to complement coefficients of reliability,
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confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were employed for all measures using the following
analytic plan. Should any measure have demonstrated poor fit, evidenced by a
comparative fit index (CFI) of < .90, a Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) of < .90, a root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA) of > .08, and a significant chi-square test with
large test value far from zero, a follow-up exploratory factor analysis (EFA) would be
employed in pursuit of obtaining scales with the best factor structure possible. Such an
EFA would be performed using principal axis factoring with a direct oblimin rotation
with a default delta value of zero, retaining Eigenvalues greater than one, with the goal of
a solution with coherent simple structure that explained at least 50% total between-item
variance and fair factor item loadings of > .40 (Comrey & Lee, 1992). Should multiple
factor solutions explain more than 50% total between-item variance, item factor loadings
would be scrutinized for optimal simple structure. Additional solution confidence would
be lent by Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity emerging as significant and the Kaiser-MeyerOlkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) score of ideally reaching .90 but accepted
at > .70 (< .60 = “unacceptable”, >.70 = “middling”, > .80 = “meritorious”, >
.90 = “marvelous”; Kaiser, 1974, p. 35).
Confirmatory Factor Analyses.
Meaning in Life. Confirmatory factor analysis of the MLQ items, with five
Presence of Meaning items and five Search for Meaning items, indicated fairly good fit
(CFI = .92, TLI = .90, RMSEA = .11, RMSEA 90% CI [.087, .142], χ2 = 95.2, df = 34,
p < .001). As the RMSEA value was higher than ideal, and the chi-square test was
significant, an EFA was performed to understand whether stronger evidence would
emerge for an alternate model. The EFA strongly supported the published factor structure
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of the MLQ, as shown in Appendix Table A1, with Bartlett’s test being significant
(χ2 = 789.63, df = 45, p < .001) and a KMO score =.84. As such, the outcome variable
meaning was built using all Presence of Meaning subscale items, and the outcome
variable meaning searching was built using all Search for Meaning subscale items.
Reliability for the meaning items was very good (α = .90; McDonald’s ω = .91), and was
good for the meaning searching items (α = .87; ω = .87).
Satisfaction with Life. Satisfaction with life items were tested for the degree to
which all five items were represented appropriately by a single factor, which the CFA
strongly supported (CFI = .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .066, RMSEA CI [.00, .148],
χ2 = 8.00, df = 5, p = .16). No follow-up EFA was thus deemed necessary and the
expected configuration was retained for constructing satisfaction with life outcome
variable scale means. Reliability among satisfaction with life items was very good
(α = .89; ω = .90).
Subjective Vitality. The single-factor configuration of subjective vitality items
gained fair support for a good fit with the data (CFI = .92, TLI = .87, RMSEA = .15,
RMSEA 90% CI [.11, .19], χ2 = 57.6, df = 14, p < .001). As with the MLQ’s factor
structure, a follow-up EFA strongly supported subjective vitality items’ single-factor
structure as shown in Appendix Table A2, Bartlett’s test emerging as significant
(χ2 = 522.22, df = 21, p < .001) and KMO = .88. It may be that indications of good model
fit in the MLQ’s and Subjective Vitality Scale’s corresponding CFAs responded to the
presence of a reverse-scored item, of which both the MLQ and the Subjective Vitality
Scale have one. Subjective vitality outcome variable scores were built using all seven
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Subjective Vitality Scale items. Subjective vitality items shared very good assessments of
internal reliability (α = .90; ω = .90).
Exploratory Factor Analyses.
Psychological Need Fulfillment. The CFA performed on Psychological Need
Fulfillment items to assess the presence of the four basic needs subscales indicated poor
fit with the tested structure (CFI = .72, TLI = .67, RMSEA = .14, RMSEA 90% CI
[.13, .15], χ2 = 628, df = 164, p < .001). Displayed in Table 1, the EFA yielded a
four-factor solution with coherent simple structure. Bartlett’s test emerged as significant
(χ2 = 1598.88, df = 190, p < .001) and KMO = .89.
Table 1
Psychological Need Fulfillment Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory
Factor Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1
Factor
I

II

III

IV

(B5) I feel positive
acknowledgement.

.57

.21

.14

.18

(SE5) I feel satisfied.

.48

.10

.31

.14

(B4) I feel I belong.

.46

.18

.27

.14

(SE3) I feel liked.

.44

.25

.25

.20

(M1) I feel invisible.
(reversed)

.08

.86

.01

-.10

(M3) I feel nonexistent. (reversed)

.03

.82

-.03

-.03

(M2) I feel
meaningless. (reversed)

.13

.80

-.04

-.01

(B2) I feel rejected.
(reversed)

-.04

.76

-.03

.14

Item
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(B3) I feel like an
outsider. (reversed)

.08

.74

.04

.03

(B1) I feel
“disconnected".
(reversed)
(C4) I feel unable to
influence the actions of
others. (reversed)
(C3) I feel I have the
ability to determine my
actions.

.07

.61

.04

.15

-.10

.39

-.01

-.00

-.06

-.01

.79

-.03

(C2) I feel I have
control over the current
situation.

.09

-.03

.69

.04

(C1) I feel powerful.

.05

-.09

.63

.31

(M5) I feel useful.

.35

.16

.53

-.03

(M4) I feel important.

.27

-.03

.50

.27

(C5) I feel other people
decide on the events in
my life. (reversed)

-.32

.30

.38

-.01

(SE2) My self-esteem
is high.

.01

-.07

.08

.90

(SE1) I feel good about
myself.

.29

.04

-.07

.77

(SE4) I feel insecure.
(reversed)

-.28

.27

.08

.58

Factor Correlations
I
8.52(40.75%)
II
.07
2.59(11.02%)
III
.28
.46
1.24(4.04%)
IV
.33
.40
.52
1.10(3.81%)
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are
emphasized in bold. (B) = Belonging Need Fulfillment Subscale; (SE) = Self-esteem
Need Fulfillment Subscale, (M) = Meaning Need Fulfillment Subscale, and
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(C) = Control Need Fulfillment Subscale, with corresponding original subscale
number. Solution converged after 37 iterations.
Factor I, termed “Comfort Fulfillment,” seems to represent feelings of overall
good social standing, acceptance, and simple contentment. Factor II, termed “Meaning
Fulfillment,” strongly consisted of themes pertaining to feelings of nothingness, such that
these items asked people to endorse feeling invisible, non-existent, and ignored. This
naming was chosen not only because this factor contained items originally designed to
capture fulfillment of meaning needs, but also because it appears that as entire group the
items loading on Factor II may capture variation on feelings of “mattering”, a theorized
third component of meaning in life not assessed by the MLQ (George & Park, 2016). A
point of caution lays in the observation that the Meaning Fulfillment factor contained
only negatively-worded items and all but two of the total psychological need fulfillment
items—suggesting the possibility that negatively-worded items tended to hang
together—however the conceptual coherence of the Meaning Fulfillment items as well as
the loading of two negatively-worded items onto other factors strengthens confidence in
this factor structure being thematically significant. Factor III, termed “Control
Fulfillment,” contains items assessing participants’ feelings of efficacy and ability to
enact their desires with agency. Finally, Factor IV, termed “Self-esteem Fulfillment,”
contains items specifically targeting participants’ self-esteem directly. Internal reliability
among all psychological need fulfillment items was very good (α = .93; ω = .93) and was
good-to-very good for its subscales (Comfort Fulfillment α = .86; ω = .86; Self-esteem
Fulfillment α = .82; ω = .84; Meaning Fulfillment α = .89; ω = .89; Control Fulfillment
α = .83; ω = .84).
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Self-essentialism. The initial CFA of self-essentialism items signified poor fit
(CFI = .78, TLI = .75, RMSEA = .10, RMSEA 90% CI [.09, .12], χ2 = 416, df = 167,
p < .001), and thus a follow-up EFA was performed.
The EFA, unconstrained in number of factors and allowed to iterate based on
achieving Eigenvalues greater than one, produced a six-factor solution. Scrutinizing the
solution revealed that items on Factors V and VI—which combined together explained
5.7% of the total variance—also loaded well on another factor within Factors I–IV, which
explained a combined 52.87% of the total variance. Further, assigning those items to
Factors I–IV yielded more conceptually coherent simple structure. The four-factor
solution was supported by a significant Bartlett’s test result (χ2 = 1177.01, df = 190,
p < .001) and meritorious KMO = .80. Pattern matrix loadings of this solution when
constrained to four factors are displayed in Table 2. Pattern loadings of the initial sixfactor solution can be found in Appendix Table A3.
Table 2
Self-essentialism Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor
Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1
Factor
Item
(E3) I am either a
certain type of person
or I am not.
(E5) The kind of
person I am is clearly
defined, I either am a
certain kind of person
or I am not.
(E2) I either have a
certain attribute or I do
not.

I

II

III

IV

.88

-.04

-.07

-.10

.83

.01

.03

.11

.74

-.07

-.11

-.10
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(E4) There are certain
‘types’ of people and
the ‘type’ of person I
am can be easily
defined.
(E6) I have a distinct
personality type.
(E1) The boundaries
that define the
differences between
myself and others are
clear-cut.
(E18) I have a true self
even if I don’t always
act in accordance with
it.

.61

-.08

-.06

.29

.49

.13

.22

.11

.32

.04

-.04

-.03

-.03

.79

-.11

-.11

(E16) I have a true self.

.04

.76

-.03

-.11

(E17) Even if parts of
me change over time,
who I really am deep
down stays the same.

.01

.68

-.07

.06

(E20) My actions are
guided by who I really
am deep down.

.11

.47

-.01

.22

-.02

-.02

-.90

.00

.11

.06

-.84

-.09

-.05

.18

-.74

.10

(BB14) With enough
scientific knowledge,
the basic qualities that I
have could be traced
back to, and explained
by, my biological
make-up.
(BB13) Whether I am
one kind of person or
another is determined
by my biological makeup.
(BB15) The kind of
person I am can be
largely attributed to my
genetic inheritance.
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(BB12) There are
different types of
people and with enough
scientific knowledge
the ‘type’ of person I
am can be traced back
to genetic causes.

.09

.07

-.67

.11

(E19) The person I am
deep down changes
from situation to
situation. (reversed)

-.04

.22

.23

-.05

.03

.07

-.09

.79

.00

.09

-.09

.78

.05

.11

-.10

.69

.06

-.05

.09

.68

-.04

-.10

.01

.33

(I8) It is possible to
know about many
aspects of me once you
become familiar with a
few of my basic traits.
(I10) Knowing about a
few of the basic traits
that I have can lead to
accurate predictions of
my future behavior.
(I9) When getting to
know me it is possible
to get a picture of the
kind of person I am
very quickly.
(I7) Generally
speaking, once you
know me in one or two
contexts it is possible
to predict how I will
behave in most other
contexts.
(I11) Although I may
have some basic
identifiable traits, it is
never easy to make
accurate judgments
about how I will
behave in different
situations. (reversed)
Factor Correlations
I

5.39(24.99%)
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II
.24
2.56(10.70%)
III
-.26
-.05
2.32(9.61%)
IV
.35
-.01
-.20
1.77(6.78%)
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are
emphasized in bold. (E) = Self Entitativity Subscale, (BB) = Biological Basis subscale,
and (I) = Informativeness Subscale with corresponding original scale number in
parentheses. Solution converged after 8 iterations.
The factor solution supported building Biological Basis (III) and Informativeness
(IV) subscales as planned, and item I11’s lower-than-desired loading on the
Informativeness factor is consistent with past work (Dulaney et al., 2019) where it also
demonstrated slightly lower Informativeness loading which was attributed to the reversescoring of the item. Its inclusion in the Informativeness factor was further bolstered by its
absence of loading on any other factor. The factor solution supported splitting the original
Self Entitativity factor into two, Person Kind (I) and True Self (II), which consisted of
modified items belonging to the analogous factor of Bastian and Haslam’s (2008)
Essentialism Scale and four of the five items written for measuring self-essentialism
directly (Dulaney et al., 2019). The reverse scored item (E19) loaded weakly onto the
True Self factor, and caused internal reliability to suffer, so it was excluded from
computing True Self subscale scores. Scores for all other subscales were computed as
described. Overall reliability among all self-essentialism items was good (α = .83;
ω = .84), and was also good for its detected subscales (Person Kind α = .83; ω = .84;
Biological Basis α = .88; ω = .88; Informativeness α = .80; ω = .81; True Self α = .78;
ω = .79).
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While interpretation of differences between this factor solution and past findings
is limited by the sub-optimal 6.9:1 participant-to-item ratio in Study 1, comparing the
themes covered in Person Kind items and True Self items suggests that people make a
meaningful distinction between person/personality types and true selves outright. It may
be that the existence of “types of people” is conceptualized in lay understanding by selfessentialists as another consequence to the existence of true selves, a potentially fruitful
area for further exploration.
Initial Analyses
Descriptive statistics were calculated for all continuous variables measured, as
reported in Table 3. In addition, Table 4 displays by-condition descriptives to serve as
companion referents for informing regression findings. No cases of outlier concern were
identified for removal. To begin understanding how measured variables related to oneanother in this study, bivariate correlations were calculated and are displayed for all
variables in Table 5.
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables; Overall

Self-essentialism
Meaning
Meaning Searching
Psych. Need Fulfillment
Comfort Fulfillment
Meaning Fulfillment
Control Fulfillment
Self-esteem Fulfillment
Satisfaction with Life
Subjective Vitality
Person Kind
True Self
Biological Basis
Informativeness

M(SD)
4.46(0.70)
4.44(1.45)
5.25(1.15)
3.40(0.73)
3.22(0.87)
3.75(0.92)
3.27(0.82)
3.06(1.01)
4.28(1.45)
4.38(1.27)
4.66(1.07)
5.41(0.98)
3.60(1.24)
4.20(1.15)

Listwise N
130
135
130
128
135
132
135
135
132
129
134
136
133
135

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables; by Threat (Low, Moderate, High)
Low
Moderate
Self-essentialism
4.17(0.63); 44
4.65(0.73); 44
Meaning
4.10(1.45); 47
4.56(1.45); 44
Meaning Searching
5.28(1.26); 47
5.33(0.94); 43
Psych. Need Fulfillment
3.34(0.84); 47
3.55(0.70); 43
Comfort Fulfillment
3.11(0.89); 48
3.41(0.90); 44
Meaning Fulfillment
3.64(1.01); 48
3.80(0.91); 43
Control Fulfillment
3.24(0.93); 48
3.45(0.76); 44
Self-esteem Fulfillment
3.06(1.08); 47
3.20(1.03); 44
Satisfaction with Life
4.07(1.44); 48
4.45(1.44); 44
Subjective Vitality
4.25(1.36); 47
4.45(1.28); 42
Person Kind
4.51(1.06); 47
4.80(1.19); 44
True Self
5.14(1.03); 48
5.43(0.93); 44
Biological Basis
3.27(1.10); 46
3.99(1.22); 44
Informativeness
3.86(1.18); 47
4.42(1.16); 44
Note: All information is organized in the M(SD); N configuration.

High
4.58(0.66); 42
4.68(1.42); 44
5.13(1.24); 40
3.32(0.61); 38
3.13(0.79); 43
3.84(0.82); 41
3.13(0.73); 43
2.92(0.92); 44
4.34(1.49); 40
4.45(1.17); 40
4.67(0.94); 43
5.68(0.92); 44
3.57(1.32); 43
4.33(1.06); 44
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Table 5
Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Study 1 Variables
1.
1. Self-essentialism

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

⎯
.30**(129)

⎯

.05(124)

-.13(130)

⎯

.18*(121)

.65***(126)

-.21*(124)

⎯

.27**(128)

.63***(133)

-.21*(129)

.82***(128)

⎯

.03(124)

.41***(129)

-.19*(126)

.82***(128)

.51***(129)

⎯

.28**(128)

.66***(133)

-.04(129)

.84***(128)

.70***(133)

.48***(130)

⎯

.14(128)

.45***(133)

-.16(128)

.77***(128)

.64***(133)

.48***(130)

.61***(134)

⎯

.32***(126)

.63***(131)

-.06(127)

.61***(124)

.65***(130)

.37***(127)

.59***(131)

.43***(130)

⎯

.33***(124)

.71***(128)

-.15(124)

.72***(122)

.72***(128)

.49***(123)

.64***(128)

.62***(128)

.67***(125)

⎯

11. Person Kind

.78***(130)

.18*(132)

.03(127)

.11(124)

.09(131)

.01(128)

.23**(131)

.07(131)

.19*(129)

.20*(126)

⎯

12. True Self

.51***(130)

.43***(134)

.09(129)

.26**(126)

.28**(133)

.15(130)

.31***(133)

.15(133)

.26**(131)

.32***(128)

.23**(134)

⎯

13. Biological Basis

.63***(130)

.19*(132)

-.04(127)

.11(124)

.18*(131)

-.00(127)

.16(131)

.06(131)

.28**(129)

.21*(126)

.29**(131)

.21**(133)

⎯

14. Informativeness

.69***(130)

.09(133)

.12(128)

.08(125)

.22*(132)

-.03(129)

.09(132)

.14(132)

.19*(130)

.23**(128)

.40***(133)

.06(135)

.26**(132)

2. Meaning
3. Meaning
Searching
4. Psychological
Need
Fulfillment
5. Comfort
Fulfillment
6. Meaning
Fulfillment
7. Control
Fulfillment
8. Self-esteem
Fulfillment
9. Satisfaction with
Life
10. Subjective
Vitality

14.

Note. Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal, with correlation test Ns in parentheses and df = (N-2). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

⎯
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Assessing Bivariate Correlations
Bivariate correlations lend further insight into how self-essentialism’s subscales
relate to one-another. The idea that True Self is a related but distinct subscale among selfessentialism items, which arose during EFA of the self-essentialism items is also
supported here. True Self related to both Person Kind (r(132) = .23, p < .001) and
Biological Basis (r(131) = .21, p < .001), but not Informativeness. Because people have
autobiographical memory and therefore possibly some insight into their behavioral
inconsistencies despite believing they have a true self, the Informativeness factor—which
addresses participants’ beliefs that their behavior is cross-situationally consistent and
predictable—may be less closely-connected to self-essentialism than informativeness
notions are to other targets of essentialism. A hallmark of essentialist thought is the
assumption that knowing an object’s essence informs your predictive power regarding
what it can be expected to do in the future (Yzerbyt et al., 1997). As I have proposed in
the past (Dulaney et al., 2019), Informativeness notions may be thought of as downstream
consequences of the existence of essential entities. In other words, under psychological
essentialism, a quality of entities is that their behavior is stable over time because they are
themselves inherently stable. If so, informativeness might not be as central to essentialist
self-thinking as concepts targeted by other factors that explained greater variance such as
Person Kind and True Self.
Bivariate correlations also support to the possibility that the Meaning Fulfillment
factor of the Psychological Need Fulfillment items targets meaning in life in a different
way than do the items from the MLQ. Consistent with the idea that the Meaning
Fulfillment subscale items capture participants’ feelings of meaning in life’s mattering
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component, meaning fulfillment was positively correlated with meaning (r(127) = .41,
p < .001). Paralleling findings elsewhere (Dulaney et al., 2019; Dulaney et al., 2021),
meaning was related to self-essentialism (r(127) = .30, p = .001). Interestingly, meaning
fulfillment was not related to self-essentialism scores (r(122) = .03, p = .72). To the
extent that meaning fulfillment captures feelings of mattering, this adds greater
specificity to the link between meaning and self-essentialism constructs.
Turning to assess self-essentialism’s relationship to well-being outcomes in this
study, self-essentialism again had a medium-sized positive association with meaning just
as in Dulaney et al., 2019 (current r(127) = .30, p = .001, prior r(264) = .32, p < .001) and
had a medium-sized positive association with satisfaction with life which had ranged
from small- to medium-sized in the past research (current r(124) = .32, p < .001, prior
r(262) = .25, p < .001, r(107) = .44, p < .001). Self-essentialism likewise showed a
medium-sized positive relationship to subjective vitality (r(122) = .33, p < .001),
theoretically consistent with subjective vitality’s positive association with feelings of
being authentic (Thomaes et al., 2017). All correlations from the current endeavor
exceeded the minimum detectable correlation with their test N’s (.045–.046) at a power
of .80 testing against a null hypothesis correlation of zero. Post-hoc sensitivity analysis
approaches in Study 1 are covered in more depth in the next section.
Taken together, present and past work form a compelling case for a medium-sized
correlation between self-essentialism and these measures of well-being. As psychological
need fulfillment items evidenced a unique factor structure here, linking current
correlations to past detections is dubious, but comfort fulfillment and control fulfillment
each shared small positive correlations with self-essentialism (comfort r(126) = .27,
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p = .002; control r(126) = .28, p = .002), as did overall psychological need fulfillment
scores (r(119) = .18, p = .042), supporting a small role of self-essentialism in feelings of
one’s psychological needs being met following a threat induction. Of self-essentialism’s
subscales, True Self was most consistently positively related to well-being outcomes,
suggesting it may capture the most relevant beliefs for well-being among all
self-essentialism items.
Post-hoc Sensitivity Analysis
In the course of examining Hypothesis I, I employed post-hoc sensitivity analyses
to check whether the research was sufficiently sensitive for detecting the effect sizes
reported in the main analyses. This is done by calculating minimum detectable effect
sizes and then comparing these criteria against their corresponding observed effect sizes.
Global model sensitivity was assessed by calculating the sensitivity for a fixed linear
multiple regression model’s R2 deviation from zero, with a power of 0.80, the by-test
sample sizes reported alongside analyses, and five predictors. Local predictor sensitivity
was also assessed by calculating the sensitivity, for a two-tailed test, of a fixed linear
multiple regression’s single regression coefficient, a power of .80, the by-test sample
size, and five predictors. Cohen’s f2 (J. Cohen, 1988) was obtained for these effects using
a conversion of R2 to f2, with specific equations given for calculating both global model
and local predictor effects by Selya et al. (2012).
Hypothesis I
Using multiple moderated regression, I examined the resilience of participants to
the experience of morality threat based on their self-essentialism scores. While in my
view all items belonging to the self-essentialism measure mutually reinforce true self-

59
orientations, I expected that a particular subscale’s items may contribute more
meaningfully to psychological resilience in the moment. For instance, questions
comprising the Person Kind and True Self subscales in the detected factor structure may
be most central to people’s essentialist self-beliefs, while other subscales may capture
ideas of possible antecedents (Biological Basis) and consequences (Informativeness)
associated with such beliefs. In this vein, should self-essentialism overall not emerge as a
significant predictor in a model I planned to assess the involvement of self-essentialism’s
subscales as predictors interacting with participants’ condition for explaining target
outcomes. These would take place in separate analogous regression models with the same
structure as the model testing the contribution of self-essentialism overall. That is, all
models examined tested the contributions of the main effect term of self-essentialism or
one of its subscale variables, the main effect term of participant condition, and their
interaction term as predictors of one of the dependent variables targeted. In Hypothesis I,
I stated my expectation that increases in self-essentialism would be more positively
associated with increased well-being and positive feelings following a moderate threat as
compared to following a high threat, and that in such an instance of a high threat firm true
self-orientations may be conversely burdensome for well-being resilience. Still, people in
the moderate threat condition were expected to feel lower mean well-being than in the
low threat condition, considering the people in the low threat condition had not received
feedback of being less moral than many of their peers. By referring to Table 4 it is
possible to see that participants’ morality threat condition seemed to have a weaker than
hypothesized impact on outcome variables, with all by-condition means per variable
falling within the same major scale point with the exception of two instances. Significant
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model contributions are discussed below along with visualizations of predictor effects to
aid hypothesis assessment. Full model statistics are provided in Appendix B.
Meaning. In the overall model testing for the main effect and interaction effect
contributions of self-essentialism and participant condition predicting meaning, no
predictor effects made significant contributions. Following this finding, subscale
involvement tests were employed. When testing for the contributions of Person Kind,
True Self, Biological Basis, and Informativeness in separate regression models, a
significant main effect of True Self was detected as contributing to meaning (B = .51,
SE = .19, t(128) = 2.75, p = .007, 95% CI [.14, .89], observed predictor local f2 = 0.21,
meets criterion local f2 = .059 with test N = 134). For the overall model, F(5, 128) = 6.23,
p < .001, adjusted R2 = .16, corresponding observed global model f2 = 0.19, meets global
criterion f2 = 0.10 with test N of 134 and five predictor terms. The main effect of
condition did not significantly predict meaning (intercept estimate B = 4.26, SE = .20,
t(128) = 21.05, p < .001, 95% CI [3.86, 4.66]; moderate threat estimate B = .28, SE = .28,
t(128) = 1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.28, .85]; high threat estimate B = .27, SE = .29,
t(128) = .93, p = .35, 95% CI [-.30, .84]; predictor f2 = 0.022). Further, no interaction
effects emerged as significant (True Self X moderate threat estimate B = .25, SE = .29,
t(128) = .88, p = .38, 95% CI [-.32, .82]; True Self X high threat estimate B = .05,
SE = .29, t(128) = .16, p = .87, 95% CI [-.52, .62]; predictor f2 = 0.0063). A depiction of
this cross-condition main effect is displayed in Figure 2 for visual understanding.
Including Biological Basis in the model instead revealed no new information, and
including Person Kind and Informativeness resulted in a marginal main effect condition
difference in meaning at high threat for each of their respective models.
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Figure 2
True Self Scores Significantly Predicting Meaning Across Conditions in Study 1

These results suggest that, across conditions, believing one has a true self
substantially explains meaning. The lack of effect of condition makes it difficult to
further interpret the extent to which self-essentialism served as a protective barrier
against false feedback threat here. One interpretation is that self-essentialism was equally
effective for buffering all levels of threat. Conversely, another interpretation is that the
threat conditions were either not stressful enough, or not believable enough, to provoke
observable differences in life meaning. Still another possibility is that personallythreatening false feedback may not affect meaning in life at the moment it is received and
may rather have downstream effects on meaning via self-doubt and negative selfevaluations springing from the threatening information, with observable consequences for
meaning to follow.
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Meaning Searching. Turning to examine outcomes in meaning searching
captured by the Search For Meaning subscale, the interaction between self-essentialism
and participant condition significantly predicted meaning searching (intercept estimate
B = 5.23, SE = .19, t(118) = 28.19, p < .001, 95% CI [4.87, 5.60], self-essentialism X
high threat predictor estimate B = .82, SE = .38, t(118) = 2.13, p = .035, 95% CI
[.06, 1.58], observed predictor f2 = 0.037, does not meet criterion f2 = .064 with test
N = 124). The overall model did not significantly explain meaning searching,
F(5, 118) = 1.04, p = .40, adjusted R2 = .002, observed model f2 = .002, does not meet
criterion f2 = .11; suggesting that one or more predictor main effect terms may not be
appropriate for model inclusion. There were no significant main effects in the model
(self-essentialism B = -.30, SE = .27, t(118) = -1.10, p = .27, 95% CI [-.83, .24];
moderate threat estimate B = ., SE = .29, t(118) = -1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.87, .29]; high
threat estimate B = -.07, SE = .26, t(118) = -.28, p = .78, 95% CI [-.59, .44]), and the
remaining interaction predictor was also not significant (self-essentialism X moderate
threat predictor estimate B = .38, SE = .36, t(118) = 1.07, p = .29, 95% CI [-.32, 1.09]).
Probing the significant interaction of self-essentialism and the high threat
condition for predicting meaning searches, as significantly different from the low threat
condition, yielded an intriguing pattern. For participants in the high threat condition, the
simple slope of self-essentialism and meaning searching was positive (B = .52, SE = .27,
t(118) = 1.91, p = .058, 95% CI [-.02, 1.06]), which reversed direction for participants in
the low threat condition (B = -.30, SE = .27, t(118) = -1.10, p = .28, 95% CI [-.83, .24]).
Participants in the moderate threat condition showed a negligible slightly positive
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relationship between self-essentialism and meaning searching (B = .08, SE = .23,
t(118) = .36, p = .72, 95% CI [-.37, .54]). This pattern is depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 3
Self-essentialism Scores and Condition Significantly Predicting Differences in Meaning
Searching in Study 1

As none of these simple slopes achieved significance, it appears that data
collection from additional participants may be necessary to establish confidence in the
precise strength and magnitude of these relationships. An initial interpretation of this
pattern is that the positive link between self-essentialism and meaning searching among
participants under high threat suggests support for Hypothesis I. Searching for meaning is
associated with decreased well-being in adults (K. Cohen & Cairns, 2012), and thus it
appears that higher self-essentialism is not able to buffer the meaning threat provoked by
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high personal morality threat as hypothesized. Increased self-essentialism seems to
increase participants’ vulnerability to the psychological weight of this personal stressor
perhaps due to the rigidity strong self-essentialism implies about the true self’s ability to
change for the better. As such, this result also indicates that a personal morality threat is
threatening at least in part because it triggers self-doubt as suggested elsewhere (Christy
et al., 2016).
Under Hypothesis I, I also predicted that participants under moderate threat would
find essentialist self-views to be useful in resisting the threat, and in this simple slopes
analysis self-essentialism was unrelated to meaning searching under moderate threat. If
we are to take seriously the small positive slope between self-essentialism and meaning
searching in this condition, it may imply that the threat imposed by this manipulation
level was sufficient for provoking a slight meaning search that self-essentialism was
ineffective in buffering and potentially imposed a small burden in any attempts to resolve
the meaning search. If self-essentialism actually holds no connection, of any direction, to
meaning searching at this level of threat this would mean that it does not provide support
in this circumstance but also that it is not disadvantageous. Participants in the low threat
condition, rated above their peers on moral behavior, showed a negative relationship
between self-essentialism and meaning searching. If the pattern indeed exists beyond this
data collection where its simple slope did not reach significance, since true selforientations depict the true self as highly moral, stronger self-essentialists may be more
likely to accept moral affirmation unquestioningly. Or, this negative association between
self-essentialism and meaning searching could be another sign of self-essentialism’s
general linkages to positive well-being.
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Psychological Need Fulfillment. While Psychological Need Fulfillment is
comprised of four groups of distinct needs, a preliminary analysis of all 20 Psychological
Needs items as a global scale outcome found no involvement of self-essentialism or selfessentialism subscales. Results of this regression with overall self-essentialism as
predictor appear in Appendix Table B4. Psychological Need Fulfillment subscale
behavior was subsequently examined, with scores on each subscale as individual
outcomes.
Comfort Fulfillment. Scores on the full self-essentialism scale had a significant
main effect for predicting comfort fulfillment (B = .41, SE = .20, t(122) = 2.00, p = .047,
95% CI [.005, .82], observed predictor f2 = 0.064, meets criterion f2 = 0.062 with test
N = 128). For the overall model, F(5, 122) = 2.50, p = .034, adjusted R2 = .056, observed
model f2 = .059, does not meet criterion f2 = 0.11. The main effect of condition did not
significantly predict comfort fulfillment (intercept estimate B = 3.23, SE = .14,
t(122) = 22.79, p < .001, 95% CI [2.95, 3.51]; moderate threat estimate B = .11, SE = .19,
t(122) = .55, p = .58, 95% CI [-.28, .49]; high threat estimate B = -.08, SE = .20,
t(122) = -.39, p = .70, 95% CI [-.46, .31]), and there were no significant interaction
effects as well (self-essentialism X moderate threat estimate B = -.01, SE = .27,
t(122) = -.05, p = .96, 95% CI [-.55, .52]; self-essentialism X high threat estimate
B = -.29, SE = .29, t(122) = -1.00, p = .32, 95% CI [-.87, .29]). On their own, selfessentialism subscales were not significant contributors to comfort fulfillment in their
corresponding models. The main effect of self-essentialism predicting comfort fulfillment
across all conditions can be observed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
Self-essentialism Significantly Predicting Comfort Fulfillment Across Condition in Study
1

This main effect of self-essentialism in predicting comfort fulfillment indicates
that self-essentialism is beneficial for general feelings of satisfaction and positive social
standing, even among people who have received a threat designed to destabilize these
feelings. Again, much interpretation is limited here due to the lack of significant effects
of threat condition. Hypothesis I predicted positive relationships between selfessentialism and well-being in the low and moderate threat conditions, and this was
supported. The negative relationship between self-essentialism and well-being in
participants under high threat was not evident here when measuring comfort fulfillment.
If we consult Figure 4, it is interesting that self-essentialism did not predict comfort
fulfillment as strongly in the high threat condition, a possible glimpse of the
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disadvantages predicted for self-essentialism in this condition. However, this is again
speculative in the absence of a significant interaction effect.
Self-esteem Fulfillment. The model assessing self-esteem fulfillment showed no
significant main effects for self-essentialism or condition, and no significant interaction
effects. Model estimates are visualized in Figure 5. Models including self-essentialism
subscales as predictors similarly showed no significant main or interaction effects.
Figure 5
Self-esteem Fulfillment was Not Significantly Predicted by Self-essentialism or Condition
in Study 1

While visually the estimates map onto Hypothesis I, such that increases in selfessentialism were paired with decreased self-esteem fulfillment under high threat and
with increased self-esteem fulfillment in participants under moderate and low threat, we
do not have statistical justification for rejecting the null hypothesis that in the long run
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these estimates would not differ. Still, it would be worth returning to these patterns again
in follow-up work to confirm or disconfirm such an interaction.
Meaning Fulfillment. Turning to address meaning fulfillment, models containing
self-essentialism or alternately its subscales found no significant main effects or
interaction effects predicting meaning fulfillment. As discussed above, items in this
subscale appear to capture participants’ perceptions that their life matters, and the lack of
a significant role for self-essentialism in predicting meaning fulfillment parallels there
being no detected significant correlation between these variables. Estimates from the
model containing self-essentialism are displayed in Figure 6, and visual patterns cohere
with those described above for other outcomes such that the estimate in the high threat
condition shows a negative self-essentialism to meaning fulfillment association.
Additionally, in the low threat condition meaning fulfillment visually increased together
with self-essentialism, suggesting the possibility that these variables may share
significant positive correlations in paradigms not employing threat. Without a significant
main effect of condition, however, there is not enough evidence here to be certain of this.
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Figure 6
Meaning Fulfillment was Not Significantly Predicted by Self-essentialism or Condition in
Study 1

Control Fulfillment. Finally, examining control fulfillment, no regression
sequences found significant main or interaction effects for predicting control fulfillment
values. In the regression that included True Self as the self-essentialism-related predictor,
it had a marginal main effect (B = .19, SE = .11, t(127) = 1.71, p = .090, 95% CI
[-.03, .40], observed predictor f2 = .094, meets criterion f2 = .060 with test N = 133; overall
model: F(5, 127) = 4.27, p = .001, adjusted R2 = .11, observed model f2 = .12, meetst
criterion f2 = .10), and accordingly this is the model for which estimates are displayed in
Figure 7 below, and which was highly similar in direction and magnitude to analogous
estimates using overall self-essentialism as a predictor.
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Figure 7
True Self Marginally Predicting Control Fulfillment Across Condition in Study 1

Interpretation of marginal effects is best approached with caution. The direction
of the main effect is in line with True Self’s overall correlation with (r(131) = .31,
p < .001) control fulfillment. As with all main effects of self-essentialism and its
underlying subscales, in the absence of interaction effects it is difficult to ascertain the
extent to which the measured variable—control fulfillment in this case—was
unresponsive to the threat induction as opposed to self-essentialism being so protective
against the threats that no level of threat manipulation was strong enough to observably
overcome the buffering.
Satisfaction with Life. Satisfaction with life was marginally explained by overall
self-essentialism scores (B = .59, SE = .34, t(120) = 1.76, p = .081, 95% CI [-.07, 1.26],
observed predictor f2 = .095, meets criterion f2 = .063 with test N = 126; overall model:
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F(5, 120) = 3.01, p = .013, adjusted R2 = .074, observed model f2 = .080, did not meet
criterion f2 = .11). Examining self-essentialism subscale behavior, the inclusion of
Biological Basis scores in the model significantly explained satisfaction with life
(B = .41, SE = .19, t(123) = 2.14, p = .03, 95% CI [.03, .78], observed predictor f2 = .071,
meets criterion f2 = .062 with test N = 129; overall model: F(5, 123) = 2.74, p = .02,
adjusted R2 = .064, observed model f2 = .068, does not meet criterion f2 = .10). Condition
did not show a significant main effect or significant interaction effects (intercept
B = 4.23, SE = .22, t(123) = 19.51, p < .001, 95% CI [3.80, 4.66]; moderate threat
estimate B = .18, SE = .31, t(123) = 0.60, p = .55, 95% CI [-.43, .80]; high threat estimate
B = .21, SE = .31, t(123) = .69, p = .49, 95% CI [-.40, .83]; Biological Basis X moderate
threat estimate B = -.32, SE = .26, t(123) = -1.24, p = .22, 95% CI [-.83, .19]; Biological
Basis X high threat estimate B = .04, SE = .25, t(123) = 0.15, p = .88, 95% CI [-.46, .54]).
No other self-essentialism subscale contributed significantly in a main effect or
interaction, so it may be that the Biological Basis contribution explains the marginal main
effect of self-essentialism overall. The main effect of Biological Basis is depicted across
conditions in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
Biological Basis Significantly Predicting Satisfaction with Life Across Conditions in
Study 1

Reviewing Figure 8, it is first visually apparent that the same pattern of blunted
positive association between self-essentialist ideas (specifically Biological Basis here)
and well-being under high threat again emerged here. Hypothesis I is partially supported
by these findings, as a positive link between self-essentialism and satisfaction with life in
both low and moderate threat conditions was predicted, however the moderate threat
condition did not show an appreciably weaker relationship between the two compared to
the low threat condition. The visual weakening of this relationship under high threat
would be consistent with Hypothesis I’s prediction of an attenuated effectiveness for selfessentialism in threat resilience in this condition. Still, only the positive main effect of
Biological Basis on satisfaction with life has statistical support for consideration. Again
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these true self-orientations positively predicted well-being here, but it is less clear why
only the Biological Basis subscale—measuring participants’ beliefs that who they are is
stamped into their genetic makeup—contributed to satisfaction with life as a predictor in
this model, particularly as all self-essentialism subscales positively correlated with
satisfaction with life in bivariate analyses.
Considering that data were collected in November of 2020 and January of 2021,
participants’ national context was one of increased complexity, both in overall
assessments of life satisfaction due to the pandemic and also in people’s relationship to
their personal identities due to ongoing national conflict and disagreement surrounding
issues of social class, oppression, and election integrity. It is possible that in such a
context participants drew new satisfaction or pride from their own genetic identity, or the
idea that a person’s nature is biologically-based, as satisfaction with life has in the past
been unrelated to Biological Basis scores (Dulaney et al., 2019). If so, the implications
are not altogether positive, as tying one’s identity to genetics may heighten the extent to
which one makes distinctions between in- and out-groups, and essentializing social group
members has been linked with increased stereotype endorsement (Haslam et al., 2000;
Yzerbyt & Rocher, 2002).
Subjective Vitality. Subjective vitality was significantly explained by a main
effect of self-essentialism (B = .61, SE = .29, t(118) = 2.08, p = .040, 95% CI [.03, 1.18],
observed predictor f2 = .11, meets criterion f2 = .064 with test N = 124; overall model:
F(5, 118) = 3.10, p = .011, adjusted R2 = .079, observed model f2 = .086, does not meet
criterion f2 = .11). No other main or interaction effects were significant (intercept
B = 4.47, SE = .20, t(118) = 22.25, p < .001, 95% CI [4.07, 4.87]; moderate threat
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estimate B = -.14, SE = .28, t(118) = -0.52, p = .60, 95% CI [-.69, .40]; high threat
estimate B = -.03, SE = .28, t(118) = -0.09, p = .93, 95% CI [-.58, .53]; self-essentialism
X moderate threat estimate B = .12, SE = .39, t(118) = 0.31, p = .76, 95% CI [-.64, .88];
self-essentialism X high threat estimate B = -.14, SE = .42, t(118) = -0.34, p = .73, 95%
CI [-.97, .69]). This significant main effect was echoed by a marginal main effect of the
Biological Basis subscale (B = .33, SE = .17, t(120) = 1.91, p = .058, 95% CI [-.01, .66],
observed predictor f2 = 0.042, does not meet criterion f2 = .063 with test N = 126; overall
model: F(5, 120) = 1.29, p = .27, adjusted R2 = .012, observed model f2 = .012, does not
meet criterion f2 = .11), while no other significant subscale involvement appeared. Figure
9 portrays the significant contribution of self-essentialism for explaining subjective
vitality across conditions.
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Figure 9
Self-essentialism Significantly Predicting Subjective Vitality Across Conditions in Study
1

This finding of a main effect of self-essentialism in predicting increased
subjective vitality builds on the pattern observed throughout Study 1 that, across
conditions, self-essentialism was associated with positive well-being. The implications
here parallel the above detections of analogous main effects in other outcomes
(i.e., meaning, control fulfillment) with no model contribution of condition, either
significant or visual: For all participants, even those given threatening feedback, selfessentialism was related to positive well-being as represented by subjective vitality. It
may be that no group of participants was sufficiently threatened to show subjective
vitality differences, that subjective vitality is not an aspect of well-being that responds to
threat of this kind, or that self-essentialism so successfully neutralized the false feedback
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given in the moderate and high threat false-feedback conditions that participants in these
conditions had well-being scores that were statistically indistinguishable from
participants who were not threatened. After considering the analysis-wise implications
for these findings, I now assess Study 1’s observed patterns as a whole for further
informing and evaluating Hypothesis I.
Discussion
Under my theoretical framework, I consider true self-orientations to be bountiful
resources for constructing personal meaning and for pragmatic coping responses to
destabilizing stimuli. This led me to predict people’s baseline self-essentialism
differences to show a buffering effect of moderate threat. Acknowledging that true selforientations highly essentialize the true self, portraying it as inherent, immutable, stable,
and informative, I also predicted that self-essentialism would pose a well-being risk in
cases of high personal threat. This, I argued, was due to self-essentialism’s assumed
inability to assimilate the threatening information of immorality and inability to
accommodate new possibilities of alternate selves.
Variable patterns in the low and moderate threat conditions were largely
consistent with Hypothesis I, with slope estimates of self-essentialism or its subscales
increasing together with most well-being outcomes, many of which supported by
significant main effects of self-essentialism as a model predictor of positive well-being
(i.e., meaning, lower meaning searching, comfort fulfillment, control fulfillment,
satisfaction with life, subjective vitality). As covered in by-analysis interpretations, the
extent to which this signifies effective coping with moderate threat is unclear given the
lack of significant condition participation in most models.
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Hypothesis I’s variable predictions in the high threat condition were less
consistent to emerge, but specific analyses yielded important results supporting the
theoretical model. In the model predicting meaning searching self-essentialism interacted
with threat condition, with participants in the high threat condition reporting more
searching for life meaning the more they endorsed essentialist self-views. By comparison,
participants in the low threat condition showed less meaning searching related to higher
self-essentialism, indicating less motivation to search for meaning during times of
stability for people who believe they have a true self. Associated with well-being costs
(K. Cohen & Cairns, 2012), this increased searching for meaning among strong selfessentialists under high threat signifies evidence that rigid self-views are inconsistent
with judgments of immorality and consequently elicit motivations to resecure meaning.
Additional support for Hypothesis I’s expected patterns in high threat arose visually, but
usually not significantly, in regression models: under high threat specific positive wellbeing outcomes of self-essentialism were attenuated (i.e., comfort fulfillment, satisfaction
with life), or even inverted (i.e., meaning searching, meaning fulfillment, self-esteem
fulfillment). Together, the emergence of Hypothesis I’s expected patterns for search for
meaning while other well-being variables did not respond as conclusively to the threats
suggests that meaning searching may be the most sensitive among the well-being
variables measured here to these types of threat reactions.
Following Study 1’s analyses and questions over manipulation efficacy, I
reviewed the personal morality threat manipulation materials to identify potential areas
for improvement. Given that some participants in the low and high threat condition
remarked disbelievingly on their extreme morality scores early in the funnel debriefing,
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for Study 2 I adjusted these conditions’ feedback and in turn also adjusted the feedback
given in the moderate threat condition to maintain its position between the extremes.
Beyond the scope of this investigative sequence, Study 1’s conclusions could be further
informed by collecting baseline measurements of all outcome variables measured here
prior to administering the threat, and without administering self-essentialism items in the
design, to lend more conclusive strength regarding the effects of the threat manipulation
alone. I return to the indications and conclusions of Study 1 in the General Discussion,
where I evaluate them in broader terms alongside the findings of Study 2, which I discuss
next.
Study 2
This study was designed to directly examine true self-orientations as in-themoment adaptive coping supports. As in Study 1, participants’ moral characters were
threatened, with some adjustments for this study. After this personal morality threat,
participants were instructed to choose between three distinct activities they would
undertake next. These activities have been designed to represent an option to reflect on
and connect with their true self, an option to reflect on the flexible nature of their self, or
an option to reflect on the qualities of who they are in daily life. The goal of this design
was to explore the extent to which participants would desire and pursue connection with
their true self following low, medium, and high levels of personal morality threat.
This study examined participants’ in-the-moment use of their true selforientations for threat processing support following a personal morality threat. Study 2
aimed to first assess variation in participant preference to connect to their true
self—represented by participants’ choice and desirability ratings of three different
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activities: reflective descriptions of their true self, consideration of flexible aspects of
their self, and reflective descriptions of their everyday qualities, following low, moderate,
and high personal morality threat. Complementarily, this study investigated how effective
each of the three activities might be for helping participants cope with evidence of
personal morality threat by randomly assigning participants to one of the activities,
having them actually perform the assigned activity task, and subsequently self-report on a
variety of well-being outcome measures.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis II
I expect participants under moderate morality threat to preferentially select the
task in which they describe their true self to help them adjust to the threat. An aspect of
my hypotheses which is less certain to emerge is the possibility that participants under
high morality threat would preferentially select the flexible self-description task as a way
to escape from overly rigid true self-orientations as suggested by the literature on selfdialecticism (Boyraz et al., 2019), and would seek to avoid describing their true selves
accordingly. However, it might be that the true self is seen as so fundamentally moral and
so positively valenced that even the highest threat condition here would not be enough to
drive participants away from their attachment to their true self-orientations, producing
similar levels of true self-description preference among participants in moderate and high
threat. Additionally, I predicted that participants under low threat would most prefer
describing their true self, next prefer describing their everyday self due to its familiarity,
and least prefer describing their flexible self-aspects due to its relative unfamiliarity.
Under moderate and high threat, I predicted that participant preference for everyday
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self-description might fall substantially since it is feedback about their past behavior that
was the source of this threat. A chi-square test of independence was planned to compare
the three groups of personal morality threat on their prevalence of selecting each of the
three activity choice options. A visualization of these predictions appears in Figure 10,
which also depicts the possibility of participants under high threat choosing to describe
their flexible self-aspects.
Figure 10
Hypothesized Pattern of Choice of Task for Each Level of Personal Morality Threat
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Hypothesis III
Assessing participants’ degree of desire to perform each of the provided activity
descriptions, measured continuously, allowed me to probe their preference for each
activity beyond Hypothesis II’s analysis of the categorical activity choice. It was
expected that participants would likely mentally rank the self-description tasks in order of
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the participants’ preference to engage in them at least to some degree, and express these
rankings via the graphical sliders. This would mean that one task’s preference ratings
would be partially dependent on the other tasks’ ratings, and a repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was therefore employed to compare the low, medium, and
high morality threat conditions on preference to engage in each of the three activities.
Despite the different analytic approaches between Hypothesis II and III, the reasoning
behind the predictions was the same. Hypothesis III consists of the expectation that
participants would have a high desire to engage with the true self in states of low threat
and especially states of moderate threat, and that this desire would decrease in states of
high threat assuming they perceived the threat as sufficiently strong. Continuing,
participants would most prefer to engage with flexible self-representations under the
highest threat, and would seek to engage with their everyday selves the most under
lowest threat. Approach towards the everyday self was predicted to fall as threat level
rose. Planned comparisons were performed to assess the particulars of this hypothesis
beyond the broad expectation that a significant main effect of threat condition would
emerge for activity preference. These expected patterns are illustrated in Figure 11.
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Figure 11
Hypothesized Pattern of Desire to Perform Each of the Three Activity Options by Level of
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Hypothesis IV
Corresponding to the theoretical framework in use, I anticipated that participants
under moderate threat would most benefit from performing the true self-reflection
activity and that participants under high threat were likely to most benefit from
performing the flexible self-reflection activity. To evaluate this hypothesis, a 3 x 3
ANOVA was performed with morality threat condition and assigned activity condition
predicting each well-being score. I expected well-being to be highest in participants
exposed to low morality threat since this was the least stressful and was in fact potentially
affirming due to participants receiving the false feedback that they scored well on
morality compared to their peers. A main effect of threat condition on well-being was
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thus expected to emerge in addition to a significant interaction between threat condition
and activity task assignment. An acknowledged area for potential failure of the
theoretical framework was in the possibility that, due to the true self carrying such
positive associations in everyday life and additionally being thought of as highly morally
good, people assigned to both the high morality threat condition and the true selfreflection condition might show higher well-being scores than expected. Figure 12 has
been provided to illustrate both the hypothesized predictions and additional conceivable
likely outcomes for non-hypothesized condition permutations.
Figure 12
Hypothesized Pattern of Well-being and Psychological Need-Fulfillment for Each Level
of Personal Morality Threat and Task Assignment
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Method
Participants
Participants belonging to Prolific’s paid participation pool were recruited via
Prolific’s electronic platform. Recruitment yielded a total N of 444 participants. For all
included participants following the noncompliance and manipulation check screening
discussed in Study 2’s Analyses and Results section, the N was 388 (age 18–64,
M = 31.47, SD = 9.97, three nonresponding, for participants who input a birth year to
represent age (N = 4) their age was entered as their minimum age in years plus 0.5;
57.00% male, 0.3% Intersex, 0.3% Non-Binary, 1.5% wishing not to indicate; political
ideology M = 4.89, SD = 1.72; religiosity M = 1.93, SD = 11.72; 12.6% Asian, 0.3%
Asian and European, 0.3% Asian and Latina, 1.5% Asian and White, 13.2% Black, 1.1%
Black and White, 0.3% Hispanic/Latina, Native American, and White, 3.1% Latino/a,
0.6% Latino/a and White, 0.3% Middle Eastern, 1.0% Native American, 0.3% Native
American and European, 0.3% Native American, Pacific Islander, and White, 0.3%
Native American and White, 62.9% White, 0.3% White, Black, and Native American,
0.3% White Hispanic, 0.3% White and Hispanic, 0.3% White and Mexican, 0.3% White
and Middle Eastern, 0.9% nonresponding).
Procedure
Mirroring the procedural plan outlined in Study 1 adjusted for delivery via
Prolific, Prolific provided participants with a Qualtrics survey link containing all tasks
and measures for this study. Upon using the survey link participants who wished to do so
indicated their consent to take part in the study, they passed a page which served to
capture their unique Prolific identification string. Much like the Sona identification
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string, this information allows researchers to remain blind to participant identity while
also being able to pair their survey behavior with their study registration in Prolific for
the purposes of rejecting payment. They then answered four demographic questions to
confirm their fit with Prolific’s recruitment filters, and finally a page instructing them to
minimize distraction prior to beginning. Any non-consenting or filter-divergent
participants were routed away from the survey and instructed to withdraw from the
research on these grounds. As in Study 1, participants who passed the preliminary pages
were then randomly assigned to experience one of three levels of morality threat.
Following completion of the morality threat manipulation, participants indicated which of
three self-description activities they would most prefer to engage in if they had a choice
before continuing on to further parts of the study. After expressing their preferences,
participants were randomly assigned to complete one of the three written description
tasks regardless of their choice, after which they completed identical well-being, needsatisfaction, vitality, and demographic items as used in Study 1. The study concluded
with participant debriefing and automatically redirected them to Prolific to receive
participation payment of $3.63.
Morality Threat Manipulation. Participants were again randomly assigned to
experience one of three threat induction conditions (low personal morality threat,
moderate personal morality threat, and high personal morality threat). Due to the absence
of coherent task differences in Study 1’s findings, I modified these experiences to be both
more believable and more in line with the modes in which the materials had been shown
to be effective in other research (Christy et al., 2016). In this study, participants in the
low threat condition answered the 20 items measuring past performance of moral

86
behaviors in randomized order, and participants in the high threat condition answered the
20 items measuring past performance of immoral behaviors in randomized order.
Participants in the moderate threat condition encountered 20 items, taken from both
immoral and moral behavior lists and presented in random order, so as to more closely
induce the sense of moderate morality threat targeted here.
This combination of items included all but six of the immoral behavior items,
selected to be most relevant for participants’ lives and likely to be endorsed. Six moral
behavior items were selected for inclusion based on their low likelihood to allow
participants to restore their feelings of personal morality. Additionally, to increase the
chance of participants endorsing behaviors I expanded Study 1’s response scale to
include a fifth option, becoming the new next-to-lowest option (1 = “I have not done
this”, 2 = “I have done this once or twice”, 3 = “I have done this on occasion”, 4 = “I
have done this often”, and 5 = “I have done this very often.”). Upon completing their
conditions’ corresponding questionnaires, participants were again presented with a
component that displayed false feedback morality scores.
This false feedback phase differed slightly from its Study 1 analogue: due to the
small number of participants excluded from Study 1 for reporting that the visual
depiction of their score failed to load, to avoid this from recurring I omitted these
graphics from Study 2. To increase believability in another way, the first page
participants saw when advancing past their morality questionnaire was one containing the
message “The study will proceed to the next page in one moment.” and which
automatically advanced after five seconds to the page containing the message “As part of
our research, we have calculated your overall moral behavior score based on your
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answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these questions
in the context of all other Prolific participants who have taken part in our research. Please
proceed to the next page to view your results.” In this way, the page displayed for five
seconds lent plausibility to the idea that scores were being calculated and compared
against others during that time, more so than had participants been told their score was
calculated or shown their score outright immediately upon advancing the page.
On advancing the page, participants in the low morality threat condition saw the
message “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you
scored in the 85th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral
qualities than 85% of Prolific participants.”; participants in the moderate morality threat
condition saw “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you
scored in the 65th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral
qualities than 35% of Prolific participants.”; and participants in the high morality threat
condition saw “Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you
scored in the 40th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral
qualities than 60% of Prolific participants.” Differences in these reported percentiles
compared to Study 1’s false feedback were integrated in hopes of producing more
reliable condition differences compared to Study 1’s findings, and in hopes of reducing
the likelihood of manipulation suspicion in both the low and high threat conditions
evidenced by Study 1 participants’ shock at how strongly moral/immoral they had scored
compared to their peers.
Activity Selection Task. Participants were presented with descriptions of three
self-reflection written tasks, one involving reflecting on and describing their true self, a
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task to reflect on and describe the flexible nature of their self, and a task to reflect on and
describe their everyday self. Participants were asked to indicate their preferred task to
engage in of the three, with instructions written so as not to suggest that their doing so
would dictate the next step of the study: “Next, please choose between the following
three options to select what activity you’d prefer to complete if you had a choice. Please
choose based on what you most want to do at this time.” The following task descriptions
were presented in random order:
True Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: True Self-Description
Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then
describe your true self: Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who are you
deep down?”
Flexible Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: Flexible Self-Description
Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then
describe flexibility within yourself: Which aspects of you undergo change? How are you
as a person different over time?”
Everyday Self-Reflection Activity Description. “Option: Everyday SelfDescription Activity. This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on
and then describe your usual self: Which aspects of you do you present to the world and
in public? Who are you in everyday life?”
One challenge to the activity options provided is that the label “true self” is one
that exists in normal speech, while the idea of an everyday self is less elaborated, and as
there is not a specific label for a dialectical self the term “flexible self” has been used. I
have decided that this disadvantage is acceptable in order to keep participants as close as
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possible to the true self construct that is at the heart of the line of inquiry here. To assess
potential labeling and content differences, prior to administering these materials the
wording of each task was pilot tested among 54 DePaul University graduate students and
advanced undergraduates in the Psychology Department.
Using a Qualtrics survey these students volunteered their ratings for the task
descriptions to be used by participants to indicate their task selections. All students were
naïve to this project’s specific research questions. Each student rated all task descriptions,
which were presented in random order and on a separate page per task, on the questions
“How interesting does this activity sound to complete?” and “How easy does this activity
sound to complete?” (1 = Not At All to 5 = Extremely). A repeated-measures ANOVA
detected no differences in activity interest (true self task M = 3.61, SD = 0.98; flexible
self task M = 3.56, SD = 0.84; everyday self task M = 3.52, SD = 0.97; F(2, 106) = 0.34,
p = .71, ηp² = 0.006, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.078, criterion f = .16 for test N = 54,
power = 0.80, average correlation among repeated measures = .60, nonsphericity
correction ε = 1).
Differences in activity ease were detected, such that the everyday self-description
activity was perceived to be a bit easier to complete than either of the other tasks (true
self task M = 2.94, SD = 1.09; flexible self task M = 2.98, SD = 0.92; everyday self task
M = 3.50, SD = 0.88; F(2, 106) = 7.31, p = .001, ηp² = 0.12, corresponding Cohen’s
f = 0.37, meets criterion f = .21 for test N = 54 and average correlation among repeated
measures = .25). Post-hoc tests revealed that the everyday self-description task seemed
easier to complete than both the true self-description task (t(106) = 3.42, familywise
Bonferroni adjusted p = .003) and the flexible self-description task (t(106) = 3.19,
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familywise Bonferroni adjusted p = .006). Perhaps by virtue of having more familiarity
with the daily self, it appears that describing the everyday self is perceived as being easier
than describing the true self and flexible self. Accordingly, I proceeded in carrying out
data collection for Study 2 and approached analyses of participants’ choices with this in
mind.
After making their selection, on the following page participants rated all three
activities in terms of their preference to engage in them via graphical sliders. This design
allowed participants to provide both categorical choice responses and continuous desire
ratings which could be separately analyzed for effects of condition. The order of choice
selection options as well as the order of the rating sliders were constrained to the
randomized order that each participant received the descriptions in.
Written Self-Description Task Assignment. Upon rating all activities and
advancing to the next page, participants were then randomly assigned to complete one of
the written description tasks over the next five minutes regardless of their prior choice of
task. Administering this component consisted of two survey pages; one containing
instructions, and one containing the task itself. To ease the transition to assignment to
tasks participants may not have chosen, the instructions page read, “In this next part of
the study, you will be given one of the written description activities to complete; it may
not be your top rated activity. Please proceed to the next page to begin.” The task page
consisted of one of three task-descriptions appearing below, and automatically advanced
after 5 minutes had elapsed so as to constrain the experiential written manipulation in
length of delivery across participants.
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True Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on a
topic. Specifically, over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your true self. Which
aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who you are deep down? Describe your true
self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the aspects of you that you feel are most central
to who you are at your core, in as much detail as possible. After 5 minutes, the study will
advance to the next component.”
Flexible Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on
a topic. Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on flexibility within yourself. How might
important aspects of you be able to undergo change? How might you as a person be
different over time? Describe your self-flexibility as thoroughly as possible, reflect on
how even central aspects to who you are can change, in as much detail as possible. After
5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.”
Everyday Self-Reflection Activity. “This activity collects your written thoughts on
a topic: Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your usual self. Which aspects of you
do you present to the world and in public? Who are you in everyday life? Describe your
everyday self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the parts of yourself that you most
display publicly on a usual day when you are in usual situations, in as much detail as
possible. After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.”
Assigning a share of participants to engage with flexible self-representations of
the self allows us to assess whether, as asserted in the literature on self-dialecticism
(Boyraz et al., 2019), this flexibility might facilitate pragmatic coping with extreme
threats as opposed to rigid true self-orientations. The assignment of other participants to
describe their everyday self is consistent with the research on true self-orientations which
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frequently contrasts the true self with the everyday self (Baldwin et al., 2014; Schlegel et
al., 2011; Schlegel et al., 2009). It is meant to be a neutral baseline option that is neither
particularly strongly located on the stability-flexibility continuum nor particularly
morally valenced or useful for coping, but which still has to do with the self so as not to
introduce potential uncertainties about participant choice that other options would like
describing friendships or hobbies.
Measures
This study employed the identical measures used in Study 1 to assess meaning in
life, psychological need fulfillment, satisfaction with life, subjective vitality, participant
demographics, and funnel debriefing questions. Three graphical sliders also allowed
participants to indicate their preferences for engaging in the three self-description writing
tasks. The position of each slider started in the middle of the response scale (left extreme
(0): Not At All; right extreme (100): Very Much), and the value of the slider’s position
was not shown to participants.
In keeping with Prolific’s recommendation and allowed grounds for rejecting
participant payment, I added two attention-check questions in the latter half of the study
(“Please indicate you are paying attention by selecting “Extremely””, interspersed
randomly amongst items assessing psychological need fulfillment; & “To indicate you
are paying attention to this study, please select “Agree””, appearing in the demographic
questions). Prolific recommends adding at least two attention check questions for any
study longer than approximately five minutes, and considers failure of both attention
checks—but not one—to be grounds for rejecting payment. These questions were
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included in the latter half of the study as the first half is sufficiently interactive enough to
establish attention compared to the Likert-type response format in the latter half.
Analyses and Results
Analysis for Response-Level Noncompliance
As a first step, responses were screened for the occurrence of answering in strings
of single digit runs. This was not detected from any participant, which is understandable
given that participants belonged to a workforce of survey takers on a platform allowing
researchers to screen for compliance before approving payment. Upon reviewing
participants’ written responses, one participant was removed for inserting strong,
disorganized complaints—at being asked to write for five minutes—into the written task
box, and ran out of time to complete their answer. Accordingly, their data in the latter
half of the study were uninterpretable and they were removed from analyses due to their
erratic response there and during the debriefing section. Participants who were only able
to write a few words before the survey advanced (N = 5)—indicating inattention for five
minutes, not understanding the instructions, or losing track of time to collect their
thoughts—or who reported not wishing to volunteer that self-description information
(N = 2) were additionally removed from analyses from that point forward as their answers
on the subsequent Likert-type semantic differential questions were uninterpretable. This
was due to doubt in the manipulation success and their potential for feeling surprise,
worry about losing payment, or frustration at being interrupted that could have then
affected their later question responses. An additional three participants were considered
for exclusion due to writing very short responses (True Self Task: “I have followed my
heart, trusted my inner voice to lead me;” Flexible Self Task: “Honesty, fairness;”
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Everyday Self Task: “I am an American male who is married”) but were retained
because it was expected that participants would show natural variation in their ability to
describe these self-conceptualizations. Without a strong theoretical framework for
response length and complexity criteria, removing participants on these grounds would be
premature and imprudent.
Overview of Main Data Analysis
On the conclusion of this noncompliance screening, a second stage of screening
began for assessing manipulation naivete and degree of participants’ morality score fit
with their assigned threat condition. Following this, I constructed scale means for all
continuous variables measured, with item configurations informed by factor analysis
procedures, and computed descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for all scales. I
then described my approach to determining post-hoc sensitivity analysis decision criteria,
before commencing with main analyses to test Hypotheses II, III, and IV.
Manipulation Check: Morality Threat Naivete and Fit
Participants were again checked for extreme mismatch between their morality
score and assigned threat condition. Study 1’s design benefited from participants
answering both immoral and moral behaviors and thus being less able to track their
behavior endorsement patterns. Conversely, in Study 2 participants only answered 20
questions, making it easier for them to maintain a general sense of how moral or immoral
they were portraying themselves as being. There was thus the possibility that participants
could endorse none of the 20 immoral behavior items in the high threat condition, or
endorse none of the 20 moral behavior items in the low threat condition, but still be given
the impossible feedback of being very highly immoral or very highly moral with regard
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to their peers respectively. To screen for this, participants who had low immoral behavior
endorsement totals in the high threat condition, which if all items were answered could
range from 20–100 and had an endorsement range of 19–82 (M = 41.62, SD = 10.79) if
participants answered all items, were evaluated for how many items they endorsed and to
what degree of strength. Participants with impossible totals (a score of 19 or 20; N = 2)
were removed from analyses. Funnel debriefing responses of the remainder of lowscoring (< 30) participants were consulted for signs of suspicion in these participants.
Participant who reported suspicion or not believing their score (N = 6) were also excluded
from analyses.
Participants assigned to the moderate threat condition were then screened for
condition assignment fit. Endorsement totals of the Immoral Behavior questions, if fully
answered, could range from 14–70 and had an endorsement range of 12–55 (M = 28.22,
SD = 8.47). Endorsement totals of the Moral Behavior questions, if fully answered, could
range from 6–30 with an endorsement range of 9–30 (M = 20.16, SD = 4.75). Funnel
debriefing responses were reviewed for participants with low Immoral Behavior
endorsement (< 25 in favor of casting a wide net for suspicion detection) and/or
extremely high endorsement of Moral Behaviors (> 25). Among these participants, four
reported suspicion or not believing their score feedback, one reported feeling their score
was good and thus seem to have been affirmed rather than threatened, and two
participants reported believing their feedback score but had scored the minimum possible
on immorality and the maximum possible on morality. Consequently, these seven
participants were removed from analyses.
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Participants assigned to the low threat condition were also screened for low moral
behavior endorsement. These scores could range from 20–100 and had an endorsement
range of 32–100 (M = 72.66, SD = 13.04). Participants with low Moral Behavior
endorsement totals (< 60) were then screened for reports of suspicion or disbelief in their
funnel debriefing responses. This screening identified suspicion or skepticism among the
five lowest-scoring participants on moral behavior (range 32–48), and one participant
who reported inattention when asked about their score and its accuracy (i.e., Q5-What do
you remember your morality score being?: “I don’t remember it;” Q6-Do you think your
morality score was accurate?: “I don’t know either way;” Q7-To what extent did you
believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other participants?:”I really
don’t know. I honestly didn’t pay much attention to the ‘results’ part at all, didn’t interest
me”), who were then removed from analyses.
Following this screening for fit, I also screened to remaining participants for
naivete regardless of score-threat match. To be consistent with Study 1’s procedure for
funnel debriefing review, I again checked remaining participant mentions of suspicion
regarding the personal morality threat in the first three segments of the funnel debriefing
process, identifying and therefore excluding 24 participants with instances of early
suspicion. In cases of ambiguity, such as when a participant made a statement that could
either indicate suspicion or simply reactionary disagreement with their score (e.g., Q3Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors
questionnaire?: “Yes, I don’t think my morality score should have been that low”)
answers to the remaining debriefing steps were reviewed for clarification. If participants
did not report suspicion in those segments, they were retained for analyses (e.g., same
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participant: Q4-Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors
questionnaire? “For me to know my moral standards compared to others,” an answer
which essentially describes rather than explains the manipulation procedure). In addition,
responses to the latter four questions were reviewed, identifying people (N = 4) making
claims about their state of mind during the study (e.g., Q6-To what extent did you believe
the feedback of your morality score relative to all other participants?: “I immediately felt
like it was false”), a single participant who reported extreme beliefs and colorful selfdeprecating claims leading them to question their threat assignment to the highest threat
condition, and a single participant who said they did not see their score. At the conclusion
of noncompliance, naivete, and threat fit screening, the final study N was 388 (Low
Threat, True Self Task N = 50; Low Threat, Flexible Self Task N = 46; Low Threat,
Everyday Self Task N = 45; Moderate Threat, True Self Task N = 32; Moderate Threat,
Flexible Self Task N = 49; Moderate Threat, Everyday Self Task N = 48; High Threat,
True Self Task N = 48; High Threat, Flexible Self Task N = 35; High Threat, Everyday
Self Task N = 35).
Scale Construction
Upon arrival at the final group of participants for inclusion in analyses, scale
construction began by first assessing the extent to which each variable’s planned structure
accurately fit the patterns of variance within the data. CFAs were performed on all
measured variables using the goodness of fit criteria specified in Study 1, with the plan to
be followed by an EFA—assessing factor solutions with guidelines also specified in
Study 1—for any given variable that evidenced poor fit in CFA results.
Confirmatory Factor Analyses.
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Meaning in Life. The CFA strongly supported retention of the planned scale
structure of both the meaning and meaning searching variables (CFI = .97, TLI = .97,
RMSEA = .07, RMSEA 90% CI [.06, .09], χ2 = 103.6, df =34, p < .001), with these
scales being constructed using the five items from the MLQ’s Presence of Meaning
subscale and the five items from its Search for Meaning subscale respectively. The
meaning and meaning searching variables were thus built accordingly, and reliability was
very good for each (meaning α = .92; ω = .93; meaning searching α = .90; ω = .90).
Satisfaction with Life. CFA techniques resulted in strong support for the
Satisfaction with Life items belonging to a single satisfaction with life factor (CFI = 1.00,
TLI = 1.01, RMSEA = .00, RMSEA 90% CI [.00, .03], χ2 = 1.75, df = 5, p = .88), and the
satisfaction with life variable was thus constructed with all five items included. Internal
reliability was indicated to be good for the five satisfaction with life items (α = .88;
ω = .89).
Subjective Vitality. As theorized, items from the Subjective Vitality Scale were
well-explained by a single factor, evidenced by CFA indication of good fit (CFI = .98,
TLI = .97, RMSEA = .097, RMSEA 90% CI [.07, .12], χ2 = 65.6., df =14, p < .001). As
the RMSEA value was a bit high, a follow-up EFA was used to lend credence to this
factor solution, the results of which can be found in Appendix Table C1. The EFA
strongly supported this single-factor solution; no additional factors were suggested, and
solution assessment statistics were good (Bartlett’s test: χ2 = 2421.60, df = 21, p < .001;
KMO = .94, “marvelous”). Internal reliability was indicated to be very good for the seven
subjective vitality items (α = .94; ω = .95).
Exploratory Factor Analysis.
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Psychological Need Fulfillment. As in Study 1, CFA support for the pre-planned
subscale structure of Psychological Need Fulfillment items was lower than desired
(CFI = .85, TLI = .83, RMSEA = .12, RMSEA 90% CI [.11, .13], χ2 = 1068.00, df = 164,
p < .001). Consequently, an EFA was performed to ascertain the best factor solution for
explaining between-item variance in the present study. The EFA designed to iterate for
detection of solutions explaining Eigenvalues greater than one suggested a two-factor
solution largely grouping positively and negatively worded items into separate item
groups, supported by model assessment statistics (Bartlett’s test: χ2 = 5758.14, df = 190,
p < .001; KMO = .97, “marvelous”). Given that a more complex solution emerged in
Study 1, and my awareness of an ostensible four-factor intended design for these items, I
also examined EFA support for three and four factor solutions. Adding a third factor
explained an additional 2.04% item variance with an Eigenvalue total under one (.96),
and largely matched the two factor solution’s loadings besides isolating two of the
negatively-worded items together (C4 “I feel unable to influence the actions of others”,
C5 “I feel other people decide on the events in my life”). Given the lack of statistical
support and theoretical motivation for keeping these items separate from the other
negatively-worded items, this three-factor solution was not considered further.
The four-factor solution performed similarly, explaining an additional 1.44% of
item variance and a small Eigenvalue total of .68. This solution again exhibited the two
factors produced by the two-factor solution, the third factor produced by the three-factor
solution, and a fourth factor consisting of two items (SE2 “My self-esteem is high”, SE 4
“I feel insecure” (reversed)), which loaded more strongly onto Factors I and II
respectively. Additionally, a third item loaded weakly onto the third factor (“I feel I have
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the ability to determine my actions”), seemingly due to similar length, content, and
overlap of specific words. This item loaded more strongly onto Factor I. Following this
investigation, the four-factor solution was also judged to be statistically and theoretically
unsupported and the initial two-factor solution was thus retained for scale construction.
Examining the two-factor solution, the exception to the grouping into two factors
by question valence was that one negatively-worded question (“I feel “disconnected””),
when reversed as all negatively-worded questions were before the EFA was performed,
loaded more strongly with the positively-worded questions for unclear reasons. Given the
considerable difference in its loadings with the positive versus the negative items, it was
kept with the positively-worded questions for scale construction. The positively-worded
group of items and this single negatively-worded item in reversed form comprised Factor
I, which was termed “Positive Feelings”, and the remaining negatively-worded items
comprised Factor II, which was termed “Negative Feelings”. For the purposes of
computing an overall Psychological Need Fulfillment variable all negatively-worded
items were averaged in reverse-scoring form together with all positively-worded items.
When kept separate, in acknowledgement that the main difference in the factors was
positive and negative valence, the negative feelings variable was constructed in nonreversed form. Internal reliability among all Psychological Need Fulfillment items was
very good (α = .96; ω = .96), was also very good for the positive feelings subscale
(α = ..96; ω = .96), and was good for the negative feelings subscale (α = .88; ω = .89).
Pattern matrix loadings for the two-factor solution are displayed in Table 6.
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Table 6
Psychological Need Fulfillment Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory
Factor Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 2
Factor
I

II

(M4) I feel important.

.94

-.09

(SE1) I feel good about myself.

.93

-.03

(C1) I feel powerful.

.91

-.15

(SE5) I feel satisfied.

.87

.00

(SE2) My self-esteem is high.

.83

.03

(M5) I feel useful.

.83

.05

(B5) I feel positive acknowledgement.

.82

.00

(C2) I feel I have control over the current situation.

.78

.01

(B4) I feel I belong.

.77

.12

(SE3) I feel liked.

.73

.14

(B1) I feel “disconnected." (reversed)

.52

.42

(C3) I feel I have the ability to determine my
actions.

.48

.15

(M1) I feel invisible. (reversed)

.00

.80

(M3) I feel non-existent. (reversed)

.10

.75

(B2) I feel rejected. (reversed)

.26

.66

Item
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(M2) I feel meaningless. (reversed)

.22

.61

(B3) I feel like an outsider. (reversed)

.28

.56

(C5) I feel other people decide on the events in my
life. (reversed)

-.12

.51

(C4) I feel unable to influence the actions of others.
(reversed)

-.00

.50

(SE4) I feel insecure. (reversed)

.42

.43

Factor Correlations
I
11.21(54.42%)
II
.58
1.96(7.71%)
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and
by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are
emphasized in bold. In cases of multiple loadings > .40, the assigned factor is also
underlined. (B) = Belonging Need Fulfillment Subscale; (SE) = Self-esteem Need
Fulfillment Subscale, (M) = Meaning Need Fulfillment Subscale, and (C) = Control
Need Fulfillment Subscale, with corresponding original subscale number. Solution
converged after 5 iterations.
Initial Analyses
Descriptive statistics—overall as well as for each unique by-condition
configuration—and bivariate correlations were again calculated for all continuous
variables measured and can be found in Tables 7–10 and 11 respectively. Outlier
presence was again assessed, and no instances of concerning outliers were identified for
deletion. While predictor variables of interest were not measured continuously in this
study, meaning correlated most strongly with preference for engaging in the true selfdescription task across conditions (r(372) = .35, p < .001, medium-sized effect). This is
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interesting in that it represents another possible way of observing a connection between
meaning and true self-orientations. As preference for each self-description task was
measured continuously, these ratings were included in the descriptives and correlational
tables to facilitate maximum insight into relationships between all continuous variables
captured in ways such as this. However, these ratings’ interactions with other dependent
variables of interest can only be interpreted in a limited manner due to the written activity
that followed the ratings but preceded the assessment of all other dependent variables.
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; Overall

Meaning

M(SD)
4.62(1.54)

Listwise N
382

Meaning Searching

4.94(1.30)

381

Psychological Need
Fulfillment

3.43(.91)

356

Positive Feelings

3.19(1.02)

364

Negative Feelings

2.22(.91)

377

Satisfaction with Life

4.32(1.45)

383

Subjective Vitality

4.40(1.55)

379

True Self Task Preference

62.59(28.79)

379

Flexible Self Task
Preference

55.83(26.31)

376

Everyday Self Task
Preference

64.30(26.03)

385
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; by Threat and Self-Description Writing Task Assignment
Configuration of Threat (Low, Moderate, High) and Writing Task (True, Flexible, Everyday) Level
Low;
True

Low;
Flexible

Low; Everyday

Moderate;
True

Moderate;
Flexible

Moderate;
Everyday

High;
True

High;
Flexible

High;
Everyday

Meaning

4.78(1.54); 50

4.33(1.52); 46

4.50(1.48); 45

4.55(1.58); 30

4.64(1.49); 49

4.71(1.43); 47

4.87(1.75); 47

4.32(1.58); 33

4.80(1.50); 35

Meaning
Searching

5.15(1.23); 47

5.11(1.16); 44

4.88(1.49); 45

5.07(1.24); 32

5.06(1.20); 49

4.77(1.24); 48

4.98(1.46); 47

4.65(1.24); 35

4.70(1.40); 34

Psychological
Need
Fulfillment

3.54(0.79); 48

3.32(0.88); 40

3.19(1.01); 43

3.50(0.80); 27

3.48(0.81); 47

3.53(0.88); 45

3.69(0.91); 42

3.17(1.03); 32

3.43(1.06); 32

Positive
Feelings

3.35(0.94); 48

3.10(0.98); 41

2.96(1.11); 44

3.20(0.98); 28

3.21(0.88); 48

3.25(1.00); 47

3.46(1.06); 43

2.83(1.11); 33

3.25(1.13); 32

Negative
Feelings

2.20(0.77); 50

2.46(0.97); 44

2.40(1.08); 44

2.12(0.73); 31

2.12(0.84); 48

2.06(0.84); 46

2.00(0.83); 45

2.30(0.99); 34

2.27(1.06); 35

Satisfaction
with Life

4.38(1.50); 50

4.09(1.50); 45

4.22(1.45); 44

4.52(1.22); 32

4.49(1.33); 49

4.22(1.18); 45

4.51(1.49); 48

3.89(1.69); 35

4.54(1.66); 35

Subjective
Vitality

4.61(1.40); 50

4.02(1.41); 45

4.16(1.75); 45

4.51(1.49); 31

4.36(1.50); 46

4.47(1.56); 46

4.87(1.55); 48

3.97(1.73); 34

4.44(1.49); 34

True Self
Task
Preference

64.65(27.40); 48

62.96(27.20); 45

62.80(30.97); 45

65.47(29.64); 32

58.24(29.75); 46

59.65(31.29); 48

64.30(27.68); 47

64.06(30.28); 33

62.46(26.38); 35

Flexible Self
Task
Preference

59.44(25.69); 48

60.29(23.76); 45

63.00(25.50); 45

54.57(30.03); 30

47.17(25.00); 47

54.81(28.27); 48

54.06(24.38); 47

48.18(27.97); 33

59.91(25.15); 33

Everyday Self
Task
Preference

64.12(27.58); 49

68.30(18.09); 46

61.64(25.14); 45

69.50(27.98); 32

62.14(26.54); 48

62.92(29.32); 48

67.19(22.26); 48

55.85(32.64); 34

67.03(24.04); 35

Note: All information is organized in the M(SD); N configuration.
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics for all Study 2 variables; by Threat (Low, Moderate, High)
Low
4.54(1.51); 141
5.05(1.30); 136

Moderate
4.65(1.48); 126
4.96(1.22); 129

Meaning
Meaning Searching
Psychological Need
3.36(0.90); 131
3.50(0.83); 119
Fulfillment
Positive Feelings
3.14(1.01); 133
3.22(0.95); 123
Negative Feelings
2.35(0.94); 138
2.10(0.81); 125
Satisfaction with Life
4.24(1.48); 139
4.40(1.25); 126
Subjective Vitality
4.27(1.53); 140
4.44(1.51); 123
True Self Task
63.49(28.36); 138
60.61(30.22); 126
Preference
Flexible Self Task
60.88(24.88); 138
51.88(27.55); 125
Preference
Everyday Self Task
64.70(24.00); 140
64.27(27.91); 128
Preference
Note: All information is organized in the M(SD); N configuration.

High
4.69(1.63); 115
4.80(1.38); 116
3.45(1.01); 106
3.20(1.12); 108
2.17(0.95); 114
4.34(1.61); 118
4.48(1.62); 116
63.67(27.83); 115
54.05(25.86); 113
63.85(26.45); 117

Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 2 Variables; by Self-Description Task Assignment
(True Self, Flexible Self, Everyday Self)
True Self
4.76(1.62); 127
5.07(1.31); 126

Flexible Self
4.45(1.52); 128
4.97(1.21); 128

Meaning
Meaning Searching
Psychological Need
3.58(0.83); 117
3.34(0.90); 119
Fulfillment
Positive Feelings
3.35(0.99); 119
3.07(0.98); 122
Negative Feelings
2.11(0.78); 126
2.29(0.93); 126
Satisfaction with Life
4.46(1.42); 130
4.19(1.50); 129
Subjective Vitality
4.68(1.48); 129
4.13(1.53); 125
True Self Task
64.72(27.86); 127 61.50(28.87); 124
Preference
Flexible Self Task
56.25(26.23); 125 52.16(25.91); 125
Preference
Everyday Self Task
66.60(25.71); 129 62.69(26.03); 128
Preference
Note: All information is organized in the M(SD); N configuration.

Everyday Self
4.66(1.46); 127
4.79(1.37); 127
3.38(0.98); 120
3.15(1.07); 123
2.24(0.99); 125
4.31(1.42); 124
4.35(1.60); 125
61.52(29.72); 128
59.07(26.53); 126
63.59(26.39); 128
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Table 11
Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Study 2 Variables

1. Meaning
2. Meaning
Searching
3. Psychological
Need
Fulfillment
4. Positive
Feelings
5. Negative
Feelings
6. Satisfaction
with Life
7. Subjective
Vitality
8. True Self
Task Preference
9. Flexible Self
Task Preference
10. Everyday Self
Task Preference

1.
⎯

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

-.09(376)

⎯

.77***(351)

-.09(349)

⎯

.78***(358)

-.00(357)

.96***(356)

⎯

-.59***(372)

.22(370)

-.87***(356)

-.70***(356)

⎯

.70***(378)

.04(376)

.76***(352)

.78***(359)

-.57***(373)

⎯

.75***(373)

.05(372)

.84***(349)

.86***(356)

-.63***(369)

.71***(374)

⎯

.35***(374)

.12*(373)

.28***(348)

.34***(356)

-.13*(368)

.27***(374)

.35***(370)

⎯

.19***(370)

.13*(369)

.18**(345)

.22***(353)

-.07(365)

.20***(371)

.27***(367)

.42***(373)

⎯

.27***(379)

.10*(378)

.22***(354)

.25***(362)

-.11*(374)

.27***(380)

.27***(376)

.38***(379)

.39***(376)

Note. Pearson correlations are presented below the diagonal, with correlation test Ns in parentheses and df = (N-2). *p < .05, **p < .01,
***
p < .001.

10.

⎯
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Post-hoc Sensitivity Analysis
As in Study 1, using post-hoc sensitivity analyses I determined minimum
detectable effect sizes as decision criteria in determining whether Study 2 analyses were
sufficiently sensitive to detect observed effects. For all sensitivity analyses, a desired
power of 0.80 was used, in addition to by-test Ns reported alongside main analyses.
When tests’ observed effect sizes were produced in a form other than the test statistic
indicated in the sensitivity analysis calculator, an online calculator was used to perform
the conversion to the required statistic, specified in Appendix H. For χ² tests, sensitivity
for a generic χ² test was computed. For repeated-measures ANOVA, repeated-measures
within factors test sensitivity was computed, with average correlation among repeated
measures reported with corresponding analysis. For all other ANOVA applications, fixed
effects model sensitivity testing special, main effects, and interactions was calculated.
Post-hoc tests examining both within- and between-subjects mean differences were
compared against sensitivity criteria determined for t-tests for the difference between two
independent means using N’s of each comparison group.
Hypothesis II
A chi-square test for independence did not find significant support of an
association between threat assignment and which task participants selected when asked to
choose the one they would most want to engage in at the time (χ² (4, N = 388) = 6.24,
p = .18, Cramer’s V = 0.090, Cohen’s w = 0.13; does not meet criterion w = 0.18). A
Bayes Factor (BF) was obtained by Bayesian analysis of these contingency tables,
finding that the data was 48.51 times more likely under the null hypothesis (no effect of
morality threat) than the alternative hypothesis (a nonzero effect of morality threat),
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BF01 = 48.51 (see Analysis and Results section Hypothesis IV for discussion of the
approach to Bayesian analyses employed here). Figure 13 displays by-condition
participant counts in task choice.
Figure 13
Participant Counts in Choice of Task for Each Level of Personal Morality Threat in
Study 2
Low Threat

Moderate Threat

High Threat
60

54

Participant Count

49

49

47

50

37

21

True Self Task

21

Flexible Self Task

Everyday Self Task

Evaluating patterns in by-condition participant choice counts tentatively lends
additional, but statistically unsupported, information. Consistent with Hypothesis II’s
Figure 10, fewer participants in the high threat condition chose the true self task than
participants in the low threat condition, consistent with the idea that highly threatened
people would seek to avoid true self-connection. However, we did not see the anticipated
spike in motivation for moderately threatened participants to connect with their true
selves for coping; if anything, they also sought the true self less when threatened. The
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frequent choice to engage with the true self across conditions implies that under all
degrees of threat imposed here the true self was still seen as an attractive idea.
We also saw a large drop in participants choosing to describe their self-flexibility
under moderate and high threat. This does not match Figure 10, which depicts the
expectation that participants would increasingly prefer thinking about their self-flexibility
with increasing threat exposure severity. If this corresponds to real effect, two compatible
interpretations are evident. One on hand, it may be that for people in individualistic
Western contexts, considering flexibility within oneself is seen as novel and potentially
uncomfortable, even for nonthreatened people as participants in the low threat condition
also chose this option less frequently. For people under moderate and high threat, if
considering self-flexibility were indeed seen as a new or unpleasant idea generally, it
would make sense that these participants would avoid engaging with it even more due to
their state of discomfort. The other explanation is rooted in the task differences in
perceived ease detected in pilot testing. Since the flexible self-description task was
perceived by pilot testers as sounding significantly more challenging to complete than the
everyday self task, participants under threat may have avoided this task out of fatigue
rather than out of its conceptual content as related to their true self-orientations. Further
research would be required for discerning the extent to which each of these explanations
holds true.
Perceptions of ease might also explain why desire to describe the everyday self
was high in the threatened groups when the predictions shown in Figure 10 were such
that threatened participants were expected to avoid the everyday self. This prediction was
rooted in the fact that the morality questionnaire asked participants about their current
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and past daily behaviors. The everyday self seemed most likely to be connected to these
daily behaviors, since theoretically the true self would be protected from blame for these
actions due to its perceived moral goodness (De Freitas & Alvarez, 2019; De Freitas et
al., 2017a; Knobe, 2005), and thus I expected the everyday self to be avoided when faced
with judgments of immorality. In contrast with Hypothesis II, Study 2’s results show that
across the board people highly chose to engage with the everyday self rather than avoid
it. It may be that they identified with this self more than expected to the extent that it
could be conceptually considered part of their true-self-concept, or that they wished to
defend against the threat by doubling down on standing by who they are day to day. Or,
choice of the everyday self task may have been so high because it was perceived as an
easy activity to complete, especially because participants likely felt most familiar with
and able to describe the person they are on a daily basis. In addition to the everyday task
being perceived as significantly easier than the other two tasks in pilot testing, it may also
be that advanced psychology students find describing the true self to also be easier than
does the general US population. This signifies the potential for the gulf of perceived ease
between the two tasks as being even wider than pilot testing revealed and justifies the
relevance for further pilot testing in a wider sample. Due to the lack of a significant chisquare test result, and the very strong evidence for the null hypothesis in the Bayesian
framework, the possibilities raised here based on the distribution of task choice by
condition cannot be taken as conclusive and require further empirical evaluation.
Hypothesis III
To test Hypothesis III, I performed the planned repeated-measures ANOVA
testing the between-subjects factor of morality threat level, the within-subjects factor of
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type of self-description task, and the interaction term in explaining task preference rating
variance. This analysis detected no significant main effect of the between-subjects
morality threat level on preference ratings (F(2, 370) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp² = 0.008,
corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.090, does not meet criterion f = .13 for test N = 373), a
significant main effect of the within-subjects factor of self-description task on preference
rating (Mauchly’s W = 1.00, Approximate χ²(2) = 1.90, p = .39; main effect test
F(2, 740) = 16.73, p < .001, ηp² = 0.043, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.21, meets criterion
f = .072 for test N = 373, power = 0.80, average correlation among repeated
measures = .402, nonsphericity correction ε = 1), and no significant effect of the
interaction between morality threat level and self-description task (F(4, 740) = 1.62,
p = .17, ηp² = 0.009, corresponding Cohen’s f = 0.095, meets criterion f = .080).
Consistent with the less frequent outright selection of the flexible self-description
task seen in Hypothesis II’s analysis, here post-hoc tests found participants felt the true
self-description task to be more preferable than the flexible self-description task across
threat levels (M difference = 6.84, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [3.14, 10.53], t(744) = 4.44,
pbonf < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.23 (small effect), meets criterion d = .21). Participants also
found the everyday self-description task to be more preferable than the flexible selfdescription task (M difference = 8.37, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [4.67, 12.06], t(744) = 5.43,
pbonf < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.28 (small effect), meets criterion d = .21), and there was no
significant difference found for everyday self-description task preference over the true
self-description task preference (M difference = 1.53, SE = 1.54, 95% CI [-2.17, 5.22],
t(744) = 0.99, pbonf = .97, Cohen’s d = 0.051, criterion d = .21). Full results of the overall
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repeated-measures ANOVA and the follow-up post-hocs are displayed in Appendix D.
Figure 14 displays the main effect of self-description task type on preference ratings.
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Figure 14
Preference Rating Differences for Self-description Tasks Across Morality Threat in Study 2
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Under Hypothesis III, people in the low threat condition were expected to rate
engagement with the true self task as most preferable, engagement with the everyday self
task as less preferable, and engagement with the flexible self as much less preferable.
When moderately threatened, people were expected to look even more positively on the
idea of describing their true selves due to its theorized status as a wellspring of meaning
and morality. They were expected to decrease their approach to their everyday self due to
the threat. I expected some people under moderate threat to prefer the flexible self task
more than in the low threat condition in order to seek threat coping by describing their
self-flexibility. Finally, highly threatened participants were predicted to strongly prefer
the flexible self option to neutralize the threat, were expected to be so threatened as to not
see the true self as able to lend assistance, and expected to strongly avoid the everyday
self. The analyses described above stand in contrast to these expectations, and Figure 15
shows by-condition preference ratings for all self-description tasks.
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Figure 15
Preference Ratings for All Self-description Tasks by Morality Threat in Study 2
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As becomes evident when visually evaluating each condition’s mean preference
ratings for the three self-description tasks, task preference varied little by condition for
the true self task and the everyday self task. This generally matches the distribution of
participant choice counts discussed in the evaluation of Hypothesis II, and the lack of
threat response in preference for these tasks limits interpretability. The lower preference
for flexible self-description across conditions also matches the less frequent choosing of
this task. To the extent that this means participants across threat found it unpleasant to
think that aspects of themselves can undergo change, this pattern may be an observation
of overall positive regard for stable self-views. Interestingly, the by-condition preference
ratings visualized here suggest a smaller difference between preference for the flexible
self-description task and the other tasks than the choice counts analyzed under
Hypothesis II would first suggest. Or, this smaller difference could be a product of the
impact of the threat induction already fading.
Hypothesis III does not fit this overall results pattern, as moderately threatened
participants did not show the expected dramatic increase in true self-approach or decrease
in everyday self-approach. Highly threatened participants also did not show the expected
dramatic increase for the flexible self-description task, and only differed from
participants in the low threat condition overall in their slightly decreased flexible self task
preference. Participants in the low threat condition exhibited roughly equal preference for
all tasks. The ramifications of this for Study 2’s overall conclusions are discussed
following analyses examining Hypothesis IV.
Hypothesis IV
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To test the presence of an effect of personal morality threat and writing task
assignment on well-being and psychological need-related outcomes, separate 3 x 3
ANOVAs were performed per outcome with the strategy of consulting simple contrasts
for any detected significant effect. Full test results for all ANOVAs performed are
included in Appendix E. I planned to follow up any ANOVA that yielded null results
with a complementing Bayesian 3 x 3 ANOVA using the involved variables to gain
insight into the amount of evidence for the null hypothesis given by the present data.
Evidence for a particular model—that proposed by the hypothesis testing the relevant
research question or the model proposed by the null hypothesis—was judged according to
widely-used cut-offs (BF of 1–3 = “anecdotal” support for the model, BF of
3–10 = “substantial” support for the model, BF of 10–30 = “strong” support for the
model, BF of 30–100 = “very strong” support for the model, and BF of
100–150< = “decisive” support for the model; Jeffreys, 1961). BF10 and BF01 are the
inverse of each other.
The notation can be understood such that the subscript “1” represents the
alternative hypothesis H1 and the subscript “0” represents the null hypothesis H0. The
number on the left in the notation is the numerator, and the number on the right is the
denominator. BF10 expresses how much evidence there is for the alternative hypothesis
over the null and is used here when discussing evidence in support of the alternative,
while BF01 expresses how much evidence there is for the null hypothesis over the
alternative and is used here when discussing evidence that supports the null. All
Bayesian analyses were performed in jamovi (2021), using default priors specified by
jamovi (Morey & Rouder, 2018; Rouder et al., 2012). Results of all Bayesian analyses
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can be found in Appendix F. Over the course of this sequence of frequentist and Bayesian
analyses, a large majority of outcome variables showed no significant explanations for
the tested model, with strong Bayesian support in favor of the null hypothesis of there
being no effect. In favor of conceptual organization, this group of null effects will be
reported separately and discussed together at the beginning of Study 2’s Discussion
section. Significant and marginal effects are discussed within their corresponding tests in
keeping with the analytic approach up to this point.
Meaning. The 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their
interaction for explaining meaning found no significant effects in the model (main effect
morality threat F(2, 373) = 0.26, p = .77, η² = 0.001, f = 0.032, does not meet criterion
f = 0.16 for test N = 381; main effect task assignment F(2, 373) = 1.27, p = .28, η² = .007,
f = 0.084, does not meet criterion f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 373) = 0.57, p = .68,
η² = 0.006, f = 0.078, does not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant,
F(8, 373) = 0.53, p = .84). For assessing variable interactions visually, meaning levels for
each condition configuration can be viewed in Figure 16.
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Figure 16
Meaning Levels by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2

In order to understand these null findings in a conceptually meaningful way, a
companion Bayesian 3 x 3 ANOVA was performed and revealed strong support against
there being an effect of morality threat on meaning in life, BF01 = 25.29. Put in plain
language to aid interpretation, this indicates the present data to be 25.29 times more likely
under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis that the level of personal
morality threat affected meaning in life outcomes. There was also strong evidence against
there being an effect of self-description task on meaning in life, BF01 = 10.17, decisive
evidence against an effect of including both main effects in the model (BF01 = 260.92),
and decisive evidence against an effect of including the interaction term
(BF01 = 7766.39).
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Meaning Searching. The 3 x 3 ANOVA testing for the effect of morality threat
and task assignment, and their interaction, in explaining meaning searching did not find
any significant effects for the model’s predictors (main effect morality threat F(2,
372) = 1.63, p = .20, η² = 0.007, f = 0.084, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N =
380; main effect task assignment F(2, 372) = 1.21, p = .30, η² = 0.008, f = 0.090, does not
meet criterion f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 372) = 0.25, p = .91, η² = 0.003, f = 0.055, does
not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 372) = 0.91, p = .51).
Figure 17 depicts the tested variables’ interaction.
Figure 17
Meaning Searching Levels by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2

Follow-up Bayesian analysis revealed substantial evidence against an effect of
morality threat on meaning searching (BF01 = 9.42), strong evidence against an effect of
task assignment (BF01 = 11.67), very strong evidence against meaning searching being
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explained by including both main effects (BF01 = 93.96), and decisive evidence against
the interaction term of morality threat and task assignment explaining meaning searching
variance (BF01 = 4534.82).
Psychological Need Fulfillment. No significant main or interaction effects were
detected by the 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their
interaction for explaining psychological need fulfillment (main effect morality threat
F(2, 347) = 0.90, p = .41, η² = 0.005, f = 0.071, does not meet criterion f = 0.17 for test
N = 355; main effect task assignment F(2, 347) = 2.48, p = .085, η² = 0.013, f = 0.11,
does not meet criterion f = 0.17; interaction F(4, 347) = 1.07, p = .37, η² = 0.011,
f = 0.10, does not meet criterion f = 0.19; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 347) = 0.91,
p = .51). The marginal main effect of task assignment observed here may have arisen
from the relatively lower psychological need fulfillment means in the flexible selfdescription task condition. This raises the interesting possibility that this task is less
useful for maintaining satisfaction of psychological needs, although it may also be due to
people’s lower preference for this task detected in testing Hypothesis III. Variables are
graphically displayed in Figure 18.
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Figure 18
Psychological Need Fulfillment by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study
2

Examining this null effect from a Bayesian perspective found strong evidence for
there being no effect of morality threat on psychological need fulfillment (BF01 = 14.69),
substantial evidence for no effect of task assignment (BF01 = 3.21), very strong evidence
for no contribution of morality threat and task assignment main effects in predicting
psychological need fulfillment (BF01 = 33.33), and decisive evidence against the model
including their interaction term (BF01 = 418.30).
Positive Feelings. This 3 x 3 ANOVA, testing morality threat, task assignment,
and their interaction for predicting positive feelings, did not find significant contributions
by any model predictor (main effect morality threat F(2, 355) = 0.25, p = .78, η² = 0.001,
f = 0.032, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 363; main effect task assignment
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F(2, 355) = 2.39, p = .09, η² = 0.013, f = 0.11, does not meet criterion f = 0.16;
interaction F(4, 355) = 1.42, p = .22, η² = 0.015, f = 0.12, does not meet criterion
f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 355) = 0.77, p = .63). The marginal main
effect of task assignment seen when testing overall psychological need fulfillment was
observed again here. This seems particularly likely to have been generated by the
decreased well-being scores (represented by positive feelings) among highly-threatened
participants who completed the flexible self-description task compared to participants
who completed the true self-description task. If this signifies a true pattern, it would
suggest that people who are highly threatened benefit more from approaching their true
self than considering their self-flexibility, the inverse of what was expected under
Hypothesis IV. While marginal effects should only be consulted with care, this may be
an indication against the theoretical model, or may signify that the high threat condition
was not sufficiently stressful to cause true self-orientations to be burdensome. Figure 19
depicts variable interactions for this analysis.

124
Figure 19
Positive Feelings by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2

Bayesian analysis investigating this null finding revealed strong evidence for no
effect of morality threat (BF01 = 26.23), substantial evidence for no effect of task
assignment (BF01 = 3.34), and very strong evidence against these two main effects
making contributions to positive feelings with together in the model (BF01 = 72.81). The
analysis also found decisive evidence against the interaction term between morality threat
and task assignment contributing to positive feelings (BF01 = 566.04).
Negative Feelings. No main effects or interaction effects, in the 3 x 3 ANOVA
testing morality threat, task assignment, and their interaction for explaining negative
feelings, emerged as significant (main effect morality threat F(2, 368) = 2.64, p = .073,
η² = 0.013, f = 0.11, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 376; main effect task
assignment F(2, 368) = 1.47, p = .23, η² = 0.008, f = 0.090, does not meet criterion
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f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 368) = 0.42, p = .79, η² = 0.005, f = 0.071, does not meet
criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 368) = 1.95, p = .051). Judging from
the marginal effect of morality threat on negative feelings, which again should be
undertaken lightly, it appears that this difference might lay between the low and moderate
threat conditions. Interestingly, people in the low threat condition reported the highest
negative feelings across the board, raising further doubts in the manipulation’s efficacy.
Variable interactions for this analysis appear in Figure 20.
Figure 20
Negative Feelings by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2

I next examined this null finding with a 3 x 3 Bayesian ANOVA with these
variables and found anecdotal evidence against an effect of morality threat in predicting
negative feelings (BF01 = 2.95), substantial evidence against an effect of task assignment
(BF01 = 9.55), strong evidence against an effect of the two main effects in the model
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simultaneously (BF01 = 21.03), and decisive evidence against the model including their
interaction term for explaining negative feelings (BF01 = 720.04).
Satisfaction with Life. No significant effects of model predictors emerged in the
3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat, task assignment, and their interaction in explaining
satisfaction with life (main effect morality threat F(2, 374) = 0.65, p = .52, η² = 0.003,
f = 0.055, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N = 382; main effect task assignment
F(2, 374) = 1.47, p = .23, η² = 0.008, f = 0.090, does not meet criterion f = 0.16;
interaction F(4, 374) = 1.00, p = .41, η² = 0.011, f = 0.10, does not meet criterion
f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 374) = 1.75, p = .085). Variable interactions
for this analysis can be seen in Figure 21. While visually the flexible self-description
assignment condition showed interesting threat level differences, the test for these effects
did not approach significance and the observed patterns are contrary to Hypothesis IV.
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Figure 21
Satisfaction with Life by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2

From a Bayesian perspective, there was strong evidence against an effect of
morality threat on satisfaction with life (BF01 = 20.35) and strong evidence against an
effect of task assignment as well (BF01 = 11.78). Both the model containing the two main
effects (BF01 = 212.85) and the model containing the main effects with the interaction
term (BF01 = 3348.97) were decisively unsupported.
Subjective Vitality. In the 3 x 3 ANOVA testing morality threat and task
assignment, and their interaction, for predicting subjective vitality, a significant main
effect of task assignment emerged as the sole predictor (main effect morality threat
F(2, 370) = 0.52, p = .60, η² = 0.003, f = 0.055, does not meet criterion f = 0.16 for test N
= 378; main effect task assignment F(2, 370) = 3.87, p = .02, η² = 0.020, f = 0.14, does
not meet criterion f = 0.16; interaction F(4, 370) = 0.59, p = .67, η² = 0.006, f = 0.078,
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does not meet criterion f = 0.18; Levene’s test not significant, F(8, 370) = 1.47, p = .16).
Post-hoc tests compared all condition levels to examine the significant role of task
assignment in subjective vitality. These analyses revealed the location of the effect of
task assignment: Participants assigned to describe their true selves reported significantly
higher subjective vitality than participants describing their self-flexibility (t(370) = 2.75,
pTukey = .017, M difference = 0.54 (SE difference = .20), 95% CI [.08, 1.00], Cohen’s
d = 0.36 (medium-sized effect), meets criterion d = 0.35 with test group N’s = 129 and
125). Figure 22 displays interactions of variables included in the 3 x 3 ANOVA analysis,
and Figure 23 shows the main effect of task assignment.
Figure 22
Subjective Vitality by Threat and Self-description Task Assignment in Study 2
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Figure 23
Subjective Vitality by Self-description Task Assignment Across Conditions in Study 2

Agreeing with the ANOVA, Bayesian analyses revealed anecdotal support for the
main effect of task assignment in predicting subjective vitality (BF10 = 1.21). This
represents a positive observation of the ability of actively connecting to the true self for
producing improved well-being, or possibly signifies the challenging or unfamiliar nature
of actively exploring self-flexibility among Westerners. This convergence on agreement
for there being an effect of task on subjective vitality is also an encouraging sign that the
written tasks designed for this research are partially effective for predicting well-being
outcome scores. The precise conditions under which this might occur are unclear, but
adjustments to threat severity or method of delivery might be needed for well-being
differences to appear. The analysis supported the null for other model contributors, with
strong evidence against an effect of morality threat (BF01 = 19.92) and against the model
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containing both main effects (BF01 = 15.53), and decisive evidence against the model
containing the main effects along with the interaction term (BF01 = 433.44).
Discussion
With the exception of subjective vitality, and three marginal effects carefully
explored along with their companion analyses, no outcome exhibited a significant
response to any model predictor tested under Hypothesis IV including level of threat, task
assignment, or their interaction. In each of these cases, Bayesian analyses gave
compelling evidence for the null hypothesis (no effect of model predictors) over the
alternative hypothesis (a real effect of one or more model predictors). There are a few
interesting and informative conclusions that might be drawn as a result.
First, it may be that neither threat nor task are relevant for these well-being
outcomes, a possibility that would be informed by further pilot testing for materials
development. If this were the case, the paradigm applied in Study 2 would be insensitive
for testing Hypothesis IV, leading us very little we can draw from the variable behavior
here. The fact that all by-threat and by-task means were within one half scale point from
one-another lends credence to this proposition that the manipulation and task may not
matter for these variables. Another possibility, explored at greater length in the General
Discussion, is that providing people with the chance to reflect on what task they would
prefer complicated the pathway from threat exposure to any well-being response that
might have been detected without the choice interruption. A third possibility, also
theoretically and practically explored in the General Discussion, is more relevant for the
theoretical framework that guided these hypotheses.
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The lack of an effect for any outcome variables besides subjective vitality makes
the case of subjective vitality all the more interesting. Subjective vitality, the feeling of
aliveness and energy (Ryan & Frederick, 1997), has been shown to be positively related
to feelings of state authenticity (Sedikides et al., 2017; Thomaes et al., 2017). It may be
that subjective vitality is more closely related to feelings of connecting to one’s true self
than other well-being outcome variables, and was therefore most positively responsive to
tasks that asked participants to explore their true self and most negatively responsive to
tasks involving exploration of the transient nature of their important self-aspects.
To consider Study 2’s overall implications as a complementary sequence of
investigations. While no there were no significant condition differences in the task that
people chose following the morality threat manipulation (Hypothesis II analysis), its
distribution of participant task choice counts by threat level did raise interesting
possibilities. Across threat, interest in engaging with the true self was generally high,
supporting the idea that people look upon the true self as positive. Choice count
distribution under Hypothesis II analyses also paralleled the finding in testing Hypothesis
III that people across threat levels wished to consider their potential for self-flexibility
less than they wished to reflect on their true or everyday self-concepts. Hypothesis IV
analyses paralleled this pattern, in lower subjective vitality among those assigned the
flexible self-description task. This made the most consistent finding to emerge in Study 2,
the observation that, across analytic sequences, people appeared to desire and benefit
from connecting to self-flexibility less than connecting to the true self and the everyday
self. I now evaluate the theoretical model and overall conclusions of Studies 1 and 2
together.
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General Discussion
Examining Hypotheses and Theoretical Model
Hypothesis I
In Hypothesis I, I predicted that true self-orientations, as captured by scores on
the continuous self-essentialism variable, would differently relate to well-being variables
depending on the level of personal morality threat participants were assigned to
experience. Specifically, I predicted that participants in the low threat condition would
exhibit a positive relationship between self-essentialism and well-being. Participants
under moderate threat were expected to show lower well-being than those in the low
threat condition, due to the stronger threat exposure, but that self-essentialism would still
positively predict well-being. Finally, under the highest threat participants were
hypothesized to show a negative relationship between self-essentialism and well-being,
as true self-orientations were predicted to be burdensome under high morality threat.
The moderate support for Hypothesis I, as covered in Study 1’s Analyses and
Results section, indicates that the personal morality threat manipulation functioned
appropriately to some extent in Study 1. These types of threats seem able to observably
impact continuous well-being scores as evidenced by the significant role of condition for
meaning searching and its speculated role for other well-being outcomes judging from
visual patterns. There was also some support for the idea that self-essentialism would
protect participants from moderate threat, but expose participants to risk of greater
destabilization from high threat. Since resounding support was not seen, this indicates the
possibility that the theoretical model applies only for some well-being outcomes and not
others, or that adjustments to manipulation severity, delivery modality, or delivery time
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scale would be necessary to see significant responses on other well-being variables that
did not respond here.
Hypotheses II and III
Hypotheses II and III were twin investigations into the same question: To what
extent might people approach or avoid different self-conceptualizations depending on
their degree of threat exposure? The expected answer to this question, projected by
Hypotheses II and III onto their corresponding response variables, was that nonthreatened
participants would most wish to describe their true self due to its positive cultural cachet,
moderately threatened participants would want to describe their true self even more
strongly due to prevalent narratives that it is a source of stability during destabilization,
and that highly threatened participants would be unable to resolve strong morality threat
with rigid true self-orientations and would look to escape the threat by exploring selfflexibility.
There was a lack of statistical support for Hypothesis II, and the sole finding of
Hypothesis III being the lower preference for the flexible self task across threat levels is
only generally relevant to the extent that it represents preference for stable self-views.
The absence of threat effect in either of these analytic sequences suggests that the threat
manipulation does not motivationally affect people in the ways I predicted. Unlike in
Hypothesis I, where condition differences for continuous well-being outcome variables
were partially evident, the manipulation does not seem to be terribly relevant for altering
people’s orientations to various self-conceptualizations (i.e., true self, self-flexibility,
everyday self). This holds interesting theoretical implications for true self-orientations’
involvement in active stressor resilience and coping, discussed below at length. Taken
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together with Hypothesis I this pattern represents a qualification of the theoretical model,
in the potential for the model to predict fluctuations in relations between continuous
variables while the model seems inadequate for predicting behavioral outcomes.
Hypothesis IV
Dovetailing with Hypotheses II and III, Hypothesis IV extended the predicted true
self approach in moderate threat and flexible self approach in high threat to the
expectation that participants in each threat condition would show well-being benefits
after actually completing a task in which they actively engaged with the selfconceptualization predicted to benefit them. The theoretical model saw some support in
the form of task assignment’s ability to explain subjective vitality, specifically the
observation of lower subjective vitality among participants assigned to complete the
flexible self-description task compared to participants assigned to complete the true selfdescription task. This result is a promising sign that, in the right conditions, the tasks
employed here might be able to improve well-being outcomes, but the lack of a
contribution of morality threat leaves the precise boundary conditions required to see this
improvement by task uncertain. Little support for Hypothesis IV emerged, such that with
the exception of subjective vitality frequentist and Bayesian analytic sequences
converged to demonstrate strong evidence for the null hypothesis of no model effect in
explaining measured outcomes. This lack of well-being response to morality threat
followed by task assignment resonates with conclusions from Hypotheses II and III.
Specifically, the theoretical model, the paradigm used in Study 2, or both appear
inappropriate for explaining or affecting well-being outcome variance. The theoretical
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model is evaluated next in depth in light of these findings, followed by a consideration of
overall theoretical implications and need for adjustments to methodology.
Evaluation of Theoretical Model
As touched on above, the inconsistencies of confirmation for all of the four
hypotheses of this research of sequence lend strong critique to the theoretical model’s
prospects of veridicality. Of course, there is the parallel possibility that it was the
methodology used here rather than the theoretical model that was lacking, a possibility
explored at length below. To evaluate the theoretical model apart from methodology, it
appears that its predictions tentatively hold when concerning how continuous true selforientations (i.e., self-essentialism), relate to continuous well-being outcomes following
threat exposure. So, to the extent this is true, true self-orientations do seem to be related
to better well-being resilience in the face of threat. This resilience, also in concert with
the theoretical model, seemed to attenuate or disappear altogether under high threat. The
theoretical model did not hold for predicting participants’ preference for and subsequent
well-being responses to different self-description tasks with regards to threat condition,
suggesting that active use of true self-orientations does not occur, or was ineffectively
operationalized and captured here. I next take a higher-level approach to these ideas,
followed by a deconstruction outlining potential methodological issues.
Theoretical Implications for Self-essentialism and True Self as Resilience Anchor
Implications for the True Self as a Protective Resource
Judging from results of the analytic procedure investigating Hypothesis I, true
self-orientations did seem to positively relate to well-being at low and moderate levels of
threat, paralleling consistent positive relationships found between self-essentialism and
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well-being under bivariate correlational approaches. Visual patterns, albeit in the absence
of statistical support, also supported the predicted boundary condition of this resilience,
such that highly threatened participants exhibited weakened positive or outright negative
relationships between self-essentialism and well-being in many cases. This became most
clear in the statistically-supported finding that higher self-essentialism was related to
lower reports of the burdensome state of meaning searching in nonthreatened
participants, but related to higher meaning searching in highly threatened participants.
These patterns encouragingly signify that in high threat rigid true self-orientations do
become ineffective for support, but are a valuable resilience resource at lower threat. The
higher subjective vitality found among participants who undertook the true selfdescription task under Hypothesis IV, compared to participants who instead
deconstructed true-self-orientation ideas by exploring self-flexibility, also agrees with the
idea that across all threat levels participants may benefit from true self-connection.
Implications for the True Self as a Resource for Active Coping Strategies
Generally, Hypotheses II, III, and IV were inconsistently supported. Participants
did not exhibit expected task choice and preference differences depending on their threat
exposure, nor did they exhibit expected well-being outcome differences depending on
both this exposure and their self-description task assignment. To the extent that the
manipulation was effective in inducing degrees of perceived threat, evaluated below, this
lack of confirmation may be a sign that people’s various self-conceptualizations are not
activated and available for agentic coping during moments of destabilization. Several
implications result from this proposal.
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Despite this outcome unresponsiveness demonstrated here, people readily report
the true self as useful for guidance (Rivera et al., 2019; Schlegel et al., 2013a). One
explanation for this is that they, due to their lack of introspective accuracy and access into
the causes of their behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), are erroneous in reporting their
true self as involved in overcoming obstacles in their lives. Considering that the true self
is generally assumed from a scientific perspective not to exist beyond our personal
subjective definitions of it (Strohminger et al., 2017), we already have evidence that
people are likely in error on this topic. It would not be a large stretch to also posit that
people only think they reference their true self-concepts when searching for solutions.
After all, without knowledge of motivation, conditioning, decision-making, emotion, and
social processes, there are only so many lay-explanations for behavior and choices that
secular Westerners are offered by society that represent alternatives to the idea of the true
self as agentic actor.
Still, I argue that this conclusion is likely not wholly accurate. Given the efficacy
of meaning-making coping (Larner & Blow, 2011; Park, 2005) and the strong theoretical
connections between true self-orientations and meaning-making (Schlegel et al., 2013b),
other implications seem more likely. For one, true self-orientations may not become
activated and useful for such support until after a problem or threat has been known for
some time. If so, participants in this sequence of studies would not have had enough time
to access and be supported by their true self-orientations.
Another compatible possibility is that participants are more able to utilize their
true self-concepts effectively if they are aware of the potential benefits of doing so.
Metamotivational awareness of the existence of a threat that may need to be coped with,
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the existence of available strategy options that might be effective for coping, and the
beliefs in the likely efficacy of any or specific strategies have all emerged as key figures
for coping and self-affirmation efforts (Scholer & Miele, 2016; Scholer et al., 2018).
Additionally, people have shown individual differences in their likelihood to
spontaneously engage in self-affirmation (Harris et al., 2019), while the theoretical model
here projected the blanket expectation that all participants would generally feel
motivation to resolve threat. A paradigm for future research might be developed that
attempts to inform participants of the benefits of self-affirmation rooted in true selforientations, controls for self-affirmation individual differences, navigates the difficult
task of maintaining deception and not neutralizing threat impact, and thereby may yield
promising results.
Still another possibility is that active coping via accessing true self-orientations is
most available to people who have at least some degree of true self-concept accessibility,
a capacity shown to exhibit individual differences (Schlegel et al., 2009). Follow-up work
would illuminate this possibility, such that true self-concept accessibility might be
assessed and integrated as a moderator or covariate when further exploring how trait true
self-orientations (i.e., self-essentialism) or active true self-orientations (i.e., motivation
towards and depth of engagement in the true self-concept) might operate on well-being
outcomes.
Practical Implications
A very valuable lesson arising from this research endeavor is that, while true selforientations are discussed theoretically with a unified framework of being supportive for
well-being, moral feelings, and meaning structures, it seems to be the case that
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operationalizations of true self-orientations vary in the degree to which they relate to or
are relevant for operationalizations of these positive outcomes. This may signify the need
for re-evaluating the appropriateness of including these true self-orientations under a
single conceptual umbrella. Or, this may signal the need for careful and reproducible
measurement and diligent exploration into the exact ways to measure and manipulate
variables at each step of testing.
Given the inconsistent confirmation of the theoretical model demonstrated here, it
seems necessary to refine current manipulations and additionally design new
manipulations and paradigms that can more closely target and activate specific selfconceptualizations. Of particular need is the development of pilot testing and
methodologies that more reliably approximate the levels of threat required for testing the
theoretical model while maintaining high confidence in the persistence of deception.
For instance, it is likely that the manipulation would be more successful if applied
in person with additional techniques to reinforce the deception. If a researcher with the
air of authority were to ask participants to submit their morality scores as a separate
survey before beginning a second survey containing written task instructions and/or
outcome variables of interest, the researcher could administer the false feedback report
themselves between surveys after pretending to check participants’ scores against all
others’. Of course, this would introduce the risk of noise due to the added social
component of this paradigm. A way to remove some noise, also explored in the next
section, would be the simple adjustment of assigning participants a writing task without
first asking their preferences. This would serve dual functions: to remove the risk of
participant confusion that may have been present here due to not receiving their task of
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choice, and to preserve the impact of the threat exposure so that the writing task
experience may operate on it without an intervening step during which the threat might
fade or be otherwise psychologically reframed. Some additional strategies for making
methodological changes appear alongside specific corresponding limitations, in the
following section, that they are intended to address.
Limitations and Proposed Solutions
A major limitation in interpreting the findings presented here is the possibility that
the manipulation did not achieve the desired feelings of threat, either due to
miscalibration of strength or due to research designs straining belief. In addition, the
modifications made to this manipulation between Study 1 and Study 2, and Study 2’s
relative lack of by-condition outcome differences, make it challenging to directly
evaluate which form of feedback severity best approximated our desired threat
inductions. Further, the sample differences between Study 1 (undergraduate) and Study 2
(national) introduce the possibility that Study 1’s student participants simply found the
threat more believable than the Prolific workers in Study 2, who conceivably have more
experience with taking research surveys than university students in a low-level survey
course in psychology. Additional pilot testing of the manipulation is needed to lend
greater explanatory insight into the results discussed here.
Another limitation of both studies lays in the difficulty in interpreting funnel
debriefing responses in a manner that guarantees removing all participants who were
immediately suspicious of the personal morality threat while also retaining all
participants who only realized the false feedback manipulation during the debriefing.
Numerous Study 1 and Study 2 participants who did not volunteer reports of suspicion in
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response to the first three debriefing segments were able to give the correct answer when
asked directly why they were showed their morality score as compared to others or to
subsequent debriefing segments. This was particularly true for Study 2, again suggesting
a higher familiarity with survey designs among Prolific workers. Of course, it also could
be the case that people can easily recognize the manipulation when asked directly why
we used it. More complex in-person administration paradigms may be more successful in
employing false feedback designs believably.
Such paradigms would also allow careful regulation of written task behavior
timing, as here some Study 2 participants still reported surprise at the survey’s automatic
advancing despite having the chance to prepare for the task on a prior page and being
informed how much time they were given for writing. Given the implication that many
participants did not read this information in favor of proceeding through the survey
steadily, having a researcher present to administer each study portion would allow for
verbal explanation of paradigm structure. An additional consideration is the possible need
for excluding participants from Study 2 Hypothesis IV analyses based on the length and
conceptual relevance of their written responses for the specific task they were assigned to
complete. Due to the subjective nature of self-definitions and self-orientations, and the
range of people’s ability to describe their self-definitions (Schlegel et al., 2009),
participant exclusion based on qualitatively coding for response adequacy in future
research may yield increased precision and fruitful results thereby.
Future designs may also address the possibility that the written task segment
would be more relevant for buffering threat were participants to be assigned to complete
the task of their choice. For instance, a participant might more avidly and deeply engage
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in connection with a certain self-conceptualization if they did so under their own
choosing. Contrastingly, a participant who did not receive their task choice might be
more likely to disengage and seek to finish the study quickly. As there were three
possible tasks a participant could be assigned to here, it was more likely than not that
they would be assigned to complete a task they did not select. Participant inclusion
screening and natural variation in task choice resulted in different concentrations of
participants who received their task choice and those who did not across the nine possible
Study 2 experiences, as can be seen in Appendix Table G1. For this reason, it was not
appropriate to include task assignment concordance with task choice as a moderator in
the present analyses, but would be easily controlled for in a future study that allowed
participants to choose their activity in reality.
Finally, a commentary on the limiting methodological and conceptual factors
across these studies would be incomplete without acknowledging the ongoing pandemic
and other stressors that participants in these studies were experiencing. Participants
completed Study 1 in the height of the 2020–2021 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic’s effects on
the United States, before vaccinations were made available and while these students were
engaged in online learning. Participants in Study 1 also participated in conceivably
heightened or distinctive states of perceived threat to meaning and safety. That is, they
either contributed data to this research from November 2nd to 17th, 2020—in the midst of
a contentious and long-undecided national election and the fallout thereof—or from
January 7th to 20th, 2021—the time immediately following the January 6th Capitol
Insurrection and subsequent security concerns prior to and during the Presidential
election. To the extent that Study 1’s participants were already experiencing sustained
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perceptions of threat, this sample potentially lays outside of the population the theoretical
model was designed to generate predictions for, i.e., for people not already under
particular threat and with normative levels of meaning in life, happiness, and need
fulfillment. It may be that were Study 1 repeated using data collected during more certain
times, the relationships suggested here by visual trends would emerge clearly.
Participants in Study 2 were likely experiencing less day-to-day disruption from
the pandemic and political climate, as they participated in July of 2021 when many states
had reopened and vaccines were widely accessible. However, especially as Study 2
contained a national sample, these participants may have had lower levels of trust for
researchers and educational institutions due to the pandemic and narrative framing
surrounding it. In my view, the implications of both studies’ and in particular those of
Study 1 should be considered with care. I feel that this forwards a compelling
justification for an effort to replicate the findings covered here, using the added
methodological knowledge and detected relationships as signs for where and how to best
advance this line of work.
Future Directions
I have outlined a variety of theoretical and practical possibilities to explore
throughout this discussion. Most immediately and coherently, a follow-up sequence of
three data collections for Study 2 seems likely to yield clearer results that would already
additionally inform the present work. These would consist of a study that allowed
participants to indicate their task preference, one where they were randomly assigned a
task to complete without being first asked their preference, and one where they chose a
task and then performed their task of choice.
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I have also identified the promising prospects of helping participants focus on
connecting to their true self, with clearer definitions of each self-conceptualization and
messaging about the benefits of such connection. Spontaneous self-affirmation represents
a potential covariate to control for, and true self-concept accessibility would be an
informative moderator to include. In this vein, given the evidence here that these methods
did not sufficiently activate true self-orientations for the purposes of affecting behavioral
and self-reported outcomes, a manipulation designed to cognitively activate true selforientations may optimally position participants to show patterns of interest.
Conclusion
To conclude, in reflecting on the theoretical perspectives and sequences of
analyses explored here, it is clear that there is much still to be elucidated in understanding
how people relate to, utilize, and may be affected by engagement in true self-orientations.
A rich literature exists to indicate that the true self is a robust source of personal narrative
possibility and signpost for future aspiration, and cross-cultural evidence indicates that a
person is likely to meet wide acceptance and enjoy high culture fit if they are to entertain
the idea of having a true self. The examinations here provide useful elaboration, support,
and critique for these opportunities. Certainly, many demonstrations of true selforientations’ positive well-being link were present to be observed here, while the
boundaries for observing and affecting this link were less consistently evident. Holding
these parallel patterns of findings simultaneously, I have endeavored to offer
illumination, solutions, and direction for how this theoretical area of study might next be
advanced and grown. It is my hope that, with care and thoughtful consideration, we are
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able to fully discover the ways in which true self-orientations may be used as a resource
in supporting human flourishing.

146
References
Appel, J. E., Park, C. L., Wortmann, J. H., & van Schie, H. T. (2020). Meaning
violations, religious/spiritual struggles, and meaning in life in the face of stressful
life events. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 30(1), 1–17.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2019.1611127
Aquino, K., & Reed, A., II. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423–1440.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423
Aviad-Wilchek, Y., & Ne'eman-Haviv, V. (2018). The relation between a sense of
meaning in life and suicide potential among disadvantaged adolescent girls.
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 62(6),
1474–1487.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X16684566
Baldwin, M., Biernat, M., & Landau, M. J. (2015). Remembering the real me: Nostalgia
offers a window to the intrinsic self. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 108(1), 128–147.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038033
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2007). Psychological essentialism and attention allocation:
Preferences for stereotype-consistent versus stereotype-inconsistent information.
The Journal of Social Psychology, 147(5), 531–541.
https://doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.147.5.531-542
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2008). Immigration from the perspective of hosts and
immigrants: Roles of psychological essentialism and social identity. Asian

147
Journal of Social Psychology, 11(2), 127–140.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2008.00250.x
Baumeister, R. (1987). How the self became a problem. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 52(1), 163–176.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.1.163
Baumeister, R. F. (2019). Stalking the true self through the jungles of authenticity:
Problems, contradictions, inconsistencies, disturbing findings-And a possible way
forward. Review of General Psychology, 23(1), 143–154.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019829472
Baumeister, R. (1991). Meanings of life. Guilford.
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2002). The pursuit of meaningfulness in life. In C. R.
Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology (pp. 608–618).
Oxford University Press.
Baerger, D. R., & McAdams, D. P. (1999). Life story coherence and its relation to
psychological well-being. Narrative Inquiry, 9(1), 69–96.
https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.9.1.05bae
Bench, S. W., Schlegel, R. J., Davis, W. E., & Vess, M. (2015). Thinking about change in
the self and others: The role of self-discovery metaphors and the true self. Social
Cognition, 33(3), 169–185.
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2015.33.3.2
Boelen, P. A., Keijsers, L., & van den Hout, M. A. (2012). The role of self-concept
clarity in prolonged grief disorder. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,

148
200(1), 56–62.
https://doi.org/10.1097/NMD.0b013e31823e577f
Boyraz, G., Ferguson, A. N., Zaken, M. D., Baptiste, B. L., & Kassin, C. (2019). Do
dialectical self-beliefs moderate the indirect effect of betrayal traumas on
posttraumatic stress through self-compassion? Child Abuse & Neglect, 96,
104075.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2019.104075
Boyraz, G., Waits, B., & Felix, V. (2014). Authenticity, life satisfaction, and distress: A
longitudinal analysis. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 61(3), 498–505.
https://doi.org/10.1037/cou0000031
Brown, G., & Rafaeli, E. (2007). Components of self-complexity as buffers for depressed
mood. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 21(4), 310–333.
https://doi.org/10.1891/088983907782638761
Bryan, J. L., Baker, Z. G., & Tou, R. Y. (2017). Prevent the blue, be true to you:
Authenticity buffers the negative impact of loneliness on alcohol-related
problems, physical symptoms, and depressive and anxiety symptoms. Journal of
Health Psychology, 22(5), 605–616.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105315609090
Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. P. (1992). The Aggression Questionnaire. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63(3), 452–459.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.452
Campbell, J. D., Chew, B., & Scratchley, L. S. (1991). Cognitive and emotional reactions
to daily events: the effects of self‐esteem and self‐complexity. Journal of

149
Personality, 59(3), 473–505.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1991.tb00257.x
Christy, A. G., Schlegel, R. J., & Cimpian, A. (2019). Why do people believe in a "true
self"? The role of essentialist reasoning about personal identity and the self.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 117(2), 386–416.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000254
Christy, A. G., Seto, E., Schlegel, R. J., Vess, M., & Hicks, J. A. (2016). Straying from
the righteous path and from ourselves: The interplay between perceptions of
morality and self-knowledge. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 42(11),
1538–1550.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167216665095
Church, A., Katigbak, M., Locke, K., Zhang, H., Shen, J., de Jesús Vargas-Flores, J.,
Ibáñez-Reyes, J., Tanaka-Matsumi, J., Curtis, G., Cabrera, H., Mastor, K.,
Alvarez, J., Ortiz, F., Simon, J., & Ching, C. (2012). Need satisfaction and well
being: Testing self-determination theory in eight cultures. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 44(4), 507–534.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022112466590
Cohen J. E. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Erlbaum.
Cohen, K., & Cairns, D. (2012). Is searching for meaning in life associated with reduced
subjective well-being? Confirmation and possible moderators. Journal of
Happiness Studies, 13(2), 313–331.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-011-9265-7
Comrey, A., & Lee, H. (1992). A first course in factor analysis. Erlbaum.

150
Davis, W., & Hicks, J. (2013). Maintaining hope at the 11th hour: Authenticity buffers
the effect of limited time perspective on hope. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 39(12), 1634–1646.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213500150
Davis, W., Hicks, J., Schlegel, R., Smith, C., & Vess, M. (2015). Authenticity and selfesteem across temporal horizons. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 10(2),
116–126.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2014.910830
Deci, E., & Ryan, R. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and
the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227–268.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01
De Freitas, J., & Alvarez, G. (2019). Personal identity without mind. PsyArXiv.
De Freitas, J., Cikara, M., Grossman, I., & Schlegel, R. (2017a). Origins of the belief in
good true selves. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(9), 634–636.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.05.009
De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Newman, G., Grossman, I., De Brigard, F., Luco, A., &
Knobe, J. (2018). Consistent belief in a good true self in misanthropes and three
interdependent cultures. Cognitive Science, 42(51), 134–160.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12505
De Freitas, J., Tobia, K. P., Newman, G. E., & Knobe, J. (2017b). Normative judgments
and individual essence. Cognitive Science, 41(3, Suppl.), 382–402.
DeLury, S. S., Buffone, A. E., Ministero, L. M., & Poulin, M. J. (2020). Compassion is
partially selfless: Public self-concept accessibility following compassion and

151
threat. Self and Identity, 19(2), 181–200.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1554541
Diener, E., Emmons, R., Larsen, R., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 49(1), 71–75.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4901_13
Dixon, T. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1991). Escaping the self: The moderating effect of
self-complexity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(4), 363–368.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167291174002
Donahue, E. M., Robins, R. W., Roberts, B. W., & John, O. P. (1993). The divided self:
Concurrent and longitudinal effects of psychological adjustment and social roles
on self-concept differentiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
64(5), 834–846.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.834
Dulaney, E. S., Graupmann, V., Grant, K. E., Adam, E. K., & Chen, E. (2018). Taking on
the stress-depression link: meaning as a resource in adolescence. Journal of
Adolescence, 65, 39–49.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2018.02.011
Dulaney, E. S., Graupmann, V., & Quinn, K. A. (2019). Who am I and how often?:
Variation in self-essentialism beliefs, cognitive style, and well-being. Personality
and Individual Differences, 136, 148–159.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.011

152
Dulaney, E. S., & Graupmann, V. (2021a). The self revealed: Correspondence bias in
reasoning about other true selves. [Manuscript in preparation]. Department of
Psychology, DePaul University.
Dulaney, E. S., & Graupmann, V. (2021b). True self in conflict: Need satisfaction when
facing identity inconsistencies. [Manuscript in preparation]. Department of
Psychology, DePaul University.
Dulaney, E. S., Hirai, M., & Graupmann, V. (2021). True self essentialism in the United
States and Japan: Cross-cultural consistency in self-essentialism's relation to
self-construal and well-being. [Manuscript under review]. Department of
Psychology, DePaul University.
Effron, D. A. (2014). Making mountains of morality from molehills of virtue: Threat
causes people to overestimate their moral credentials. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 40(8), 972–985.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214533131
Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American
Psychologist, 28(5), 404–414.
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0034679
Fleeson, W., & Wilt, J. (2010). The relevance of Big Five trait content in behavior to
subjective authenticity: Do high levels of within‐person behavioral variability
undermine or enable authenticity achievement? Journal of Personality, 78(4),
1353–1382.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00653.x

153
Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origins of essentialism in everyday thought.
Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195154061.001.0001
George, L. S., & Park, C. L. (2016). Meaning in life as comprehension, purpose, and
mattering: Toward integration and new research questions. Review of General
Psychology, 20(3), 205–220.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000077
Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2002). The role of authenticity in healthy
psychological functioning and subjective wellbeing. Annals of the American
Psychotherapy Association, 5(6), 18–20.
Gramzow, R. H., Sedikides, C., Panter, A. T., & Insko, C. A. (2000). Aspects of selfregulation and self-structure as predictors of perceived emotional distress.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(2), 188–205.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167200264006
Guadagno, R. E., & Burger, J. M. (2007). Self‐concept clarity and responsiveness to false
feedback. Social Influence, 2(3), 159–177.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15534510701357270
Harris, P. R., Griffin, D. W., Napper, L. E., Bond, R., Schüz, B., Stride, C., & Brearley, I.
(2019). Individual differences in self-affirmation: Distinguishing self-affirmation
from positive self-regard. Self and Identity, 18(6), 589–630.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1504819
Harter, S. (2002). Authenticity. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of
positive psychology (pp. 382–394). Oxford University Press.

154
Haslam, N., Bastian, B., Bain, P., & Kashima, Y. (2006). Psychological essentialism,
implicit theories, and intergroup relations. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 9(1), 63–76.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430206059861
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist beliefs about social
categories. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(1), 113–127.
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466600164363
Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R., Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1999). Is there a universal
need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106(4), 766–794.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.766
Heine, S. J., Proulx, T., & Vohs, K. D. (2006). The meaning maintenance model: On the
coherence of social motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
10(2), 88–110.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1002_1
Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Nezlek, J. B., Foster, J., Lakey, C. E., & Goldman, B. M.
(2008). Within-person relationships among daily self-esteem, need satisfaction,
and authenticity. Psychological Science, 19(11), 1140–1145.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02215.x
Hicks, J., Schlegel, R., & Newman, G. (2019). Introduction to the special issue:
Authenticity: Novel insights into a valued, yet elusive, concept. Review of
General Psychology, 23(1), 3–7.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019829474

155
Ito, M., Horikoshi, M., & Kodama, M. (2009). A cross-sectional survey of age and sense
of authenticity among Japanese. Psychological Reports, 105(2), 575–581.
https://doi.org/10.2466/PR0.105.2.575-581
Ito, M., & Kodama, M. (2007). Sense of authenticity, affectivity, and cultural construal of
the self among Japanese university students. Psychological Reports, 100(1),
83–86.
https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.100.1.83-86
James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. Henry Holt and Company.
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability (3rd Ed.). Oxford University Press.
Jiang, T., Chen, Z., & Sedikides, C. (2020). Self-concept clarity lays the foundation for
self-continuity: The restorative function of autobiographical memory. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 119(4), 945–959.
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000259
Jongman-Sereno, K., & Leary, M. (2019). The enigma of being yourself: A critical
examination of the concept of authenticity. Review of General Psychology, 23(1),
133–142.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000157
Jordan, A., & Monin, B. (2008). From sucker to saint: Moralization in response to selfthreat. Psychological Science, 19(8), 809–815.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02161.x
Kaiser, H. F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika, 39, 32–36.
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02291575
Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and conceptual development. MIT Press.

156
Kelley, W., Macrae, C., Wyland, C., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. (2002).
Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 14(5), 785–794.
https://doi.org/10.1162/08989290260138672
Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of
authenticity: Theory and research. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 283–357). Elsevier Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38006-9
Kim, J., Christy, A. G., Rivera, G. N., Hicks, J. A., & Schlegel, R. J. (2021). Is the
Illusion of Authenticity Beneficial? Merely Perceiving Decisions as Guided by
the True Self Enhances Decision Satisfaction. Social Psychological and
Personality Science, 12(1), 80–90.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620903202
Kim, J., Christy, A. G., Schlegel, R. J., Donnellan, M. B., & Hicks, J. A. (2018a).
Existential ennui: Examining the reciprocal relationship between self-alienation
and academic amotivation. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 9(7),
853–862.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617727587
Kim, J., Rivera, G. N., Chen, K., Zhang, H., Scollon, C. N., Kamble, S.,... Schlegel, R. J.
(2018b). TSAG lay theory endorsement across five cultures. [Manuscript in
preparation].

157
Klein, S., & Loftus, J. (1993). The mental representation of trait and autobiographical
knowledge about the self. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social
cognition (Vol 5. pp.1–49). Erlbaum.
Klein, S., Loftus, J., Trafton, J., & Fuhrman, R. (1992). Use of exemplars and
abstractions in trait judgments: A model of trait knowledge about the self and
others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(5), 739–753.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.5.739
Knobe, J. (2005). Ordinary ethical reasoning and the ideal of 'being yourself'.
Philosophical Psychology, 18(3), 327–340.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080500177291
Koch, E. J., & Shepperd, J. A. (2004). Is self‐complexity linked to better coping? A
review of the literature. Journal of Personality, 72(4), 727–760.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00278.x
Krause, N., Pargament, K. I., Ironson, G., & Hill, P. (2017). Religious involvement,
financial strain, and poly-drug use: Exploring the moderating role of meaning in
life. Substance Use & Misuse, 52(3), 286–293.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10826084.2016.1225096
Lakey, C. E., Kernis, M. H., Heppner, W. L., & Lance, C. E. (2008). Individual
differences in authenticity and mindfulness as predictors of verbal defensiveness.
Journal of Research in Personality, 42(1), 230–238.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.05.002

158
Larner, B., & Blow, A. (2011). A model of meaning-making coping and growth in
combat veterans. Review of General Psychology, 15(1), 187–197.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024810
Lenton, A. P., Bruder, M., Slabu, L., & Sedikides, C. (2013). How does "being real" feel?
The experience of state authenticity. Journal of Personality, 81(3), 276–289.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00805.x
Leonardelli, G. J., Pickett, C. L., & Brewer, M. B. (2010). Optimal distinctiveness theory:
A framework for social identity, social cognition, and intergroup relations. In M.
P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol.
43, pp. 63–113). Academic Press.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(10)43002-6
Liu, Y., & Perrewe, P. L. (2006). Are they for real? The interpersonal and intrapersonal
outcomes of perceived authenticity. International Journal of Work Organisation
and Emotion, 1(3), 204–214.
https://doi.org/10.1504/IJWOE.2006.010788
Lovett, B. J., Jordan, A. H., & Wiltermuth, S. S. (2012). Individual differences in the
moralization of everyday life. Ethics & Behavior, 22(4), 248–257.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10508422.2012.659132
Lutz, C. J., & Ross, S. R. (2003). Elaboration versus fragmentation: Distinguishing
between self-complexity and self-concept differentiation. Journal of Social and
Clinical Psychology, 22(5), 537–559.
https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.22.5.537.22927

159
Maffly-Kipp, J., Flanagan, P., Kim, J., Schlegel, R. J., Vess, M., & Hicks, J. A. (2020).
The role of perceived authenticity in psychological recovery from collective
trauma. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 39(5), 419–448.
https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2020.39.5.419
Markus, H., & Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 51(4), 858–866.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.4.858
Markus, H. R., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological
perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 299–337.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.001503
McGuire, W., Mcguire, C., Child, P., & Fujioka, T. (1978). Salience of ethnicity in the
spontaneous self-concept as a function of one's ethnic distinctiveness in the social
environment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36(5), 511–520.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.36.5.511
McNeill, W. (2006). A wave in the stream of chaos: Life beyond the body in Heidegger's
Nietzsche. Philosophy Today, 50(Suppl.), 156–161.
https://doi.org/10.5840/philtoday200650Supplement18
Medin, D. L., & Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A.
Ortony (Eds.), Similarity and analogical learning (pp. 179–196). Cambridge
University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511529863.009
Miller, D. T., & Effron, D. A. (2010). Psychological license: When it is needed and how
it functions. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 115–155.

160
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(10)43003-8
Mischel, W. (1968). Personality and assessment. Wiley.
Molouki, S., & Bartels, D. M. (2017). Personal change and the continuity of the self.
Cognitive Psychology, 93, 1–17.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.11.006
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(1), 33–43.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.33
Morey, R. D., & Rouder, J. N. (2018). BayesFactor: Computation of Bayes Factors for
common designs. [R package]. Retrieved from https://cran.rproject.org/package=BayesFactor.
Mulder, L., & Aquino, K. (2013). The role of moral identity in the aftermath of
dishonesty. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 121(2),
219–230.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.03.005
Newman, G. E. (2016). An essentialist account of authenticity. Journal of Cognition and
Culture, 16, 294–321.
https://doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342181
Newman, G. E. (2019). The psychology of authenticity. Review of General Psychology,
23(1), 8–18.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000158

161
Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014). Value judgments and the true self.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(2), 203–216.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213508791
Newman, G. E., & Keil, F. C. (2008). Where is the essence? Developmental shifts in
children's beliefs about internal features. Child Development, 79(5), 1344–1356.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2008.01192.x
Ng, A. H., & Hynie, M. (2014). Cultural differences in indecisiveness: The role of naïve
dialecticism. Personality and Individual Differences, 70, 45–50.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.06.022
Nichols, S., Strohminger, N., Rai, A., & Garfield, J. (2018). Death and the self. Cognitive
Science, 42(1, Suppl.), 314–332.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12590
Niedenthal, P. M., Setterlund, M. B., & Wherry, M. B. (1992). Possible self-complexity
and affective reactions to goal-relevant evaluation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 63(1), 5–16.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.1.5
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports
on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231–259.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.84.3.231
Park, C. (2005). Religion as a meaning-making framework in coping with life stress.
Journal of Social Issues, 61(4), 707–729.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2005.00428.x

162
Park, C., Edmondson, D., Fenster, J., & Blank, T. (2008). Meaning making and
psychological adjustment following cancer: The mediating roles of growth, life
meaning, and restored just-world beliefs. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology, 76(5), 863–875.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0013348
Park, C. L. (2010). Making sense of the meaning literature: an integrative review of
meaning making and its effects on adjustment to stressful life events.
Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 257–301.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018301
Peng, K., & Nisbett, R. E. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.
American Psychologist, 54(9), 741–754.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.9.741
Piaget, J. (2000). Piaget's theory. In K. Lee, K. Lee (Eds.), Childhood cognitive
development: The essential readings (pp. 33–47). Blackwell.
Proulx, T., & Inzlicht, M. (2012). The five "A" s of meaning maintenance: Finding
meaning in the theories of sense-making. Psychological Inquiry, 23(4), 317–335.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2012.702372
Rabinovich, A., & Morton, T. A. (2016). Coping with identity conflict: Perceptions of
self as flexible versus fixed moderate the effect of identity conflict on well-being.
Self and Identity, 15(2), 224–244.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2015.1117524
Rafaeli-Mor, E., & Steinberg, J. (2002). Self-complexity and well-being: A review and
research synthesis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(1), 31–58.

163
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0601_2
Rivera, G. N., Christy, A. G., Kim, J., Vess, M., Hicks, J. A., & Schlegel, R. J. (2019).
Understanding the relationship between perceived authenticity and well-being.
Review of General Psychology, 23(1), 113–126.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000161
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social
categories as natural kinds? In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language and
social cognition (pp. 11–36). Sage.
Rothermund, K., & Meiniger, C. (2004). Stress-buffering effects of self-complexity:
Reduced affective spillover or self-regulatory processes? Self and Identity, 3(3),
263–281.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13576500444000056
Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Speckman, P. L., & Province, J. M. (2012). Default Bayes
factors for ANOVA designs. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 56(5),
356–374.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2012.08.001
Ryan, R. M., & Frederick, C. (1997). On energy, personality, and health: Subjective
vitality as a dynamic reflection of well‐being. Journal of Personality, 65(3),
529–565.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00326.x
Ryan, R. M., LaGuardia, J. G., & Rawsthorne, L. J. (2005). Self-complexity and the
authenticity of self-aspects: Effects on well being and resilience to stressful
events. North American Journal of Psychology, 7(3), 431–448.

164
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., Arndt, J., & King, L. A. (2009). Thine own self: True selfconcept accessibility and meaning in life. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 96(2), 473–490.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014060
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., Davis, W. E., Hirsch, K. A., & Smith, C. M. (2013a). The
dynamic interplay between perceived true self-knowledge and decision
satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 542–558.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031183
Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., King, L. A., & Arndt, J. (2011). Feeling like you know who
you are: Perceived true self-knowledge and meaning in life. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(6), 745–756.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211400424
Schlegel, R. J., Smith, C. M., & Hirsch, K. A. (2013b). Examining the true self as a
wellspring of meaning. In J. Hicks & C. Routledge (Eds.), The experience of
meaning in life (pp. 177–188). Springer, Dordrecht.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6527-6_14
Schlegel, R. J., Vess, M., & Arndt, J. (2012). To discover or to create: Metaphors and the
true self. Journal of Personality, 80(4), 969–993.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00753.x
Scholer, A. A., & Miele, D. B. (2016). The role of metamotivation in creating taskmotivation fit. Motivation Science, 2(3), 171–197.
https://doi.org/10.1037/mot0000043

165
Scholer, A. A., Miele, D. B., Murayama, K., & Fujita, K. (2018). New directions in selfregulation: The role of metamotivational beliefs. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 27(6), 437–442.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721418790549
Sedikides, C., Lenton, A. P., Slabu, L., & Thomaes, S. (2019). Sketching the contours of
state authenticity. Review of General Psychology, 23(1), 73–88.
https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000156
Sedikides, C., Slabu, L., Lenton, A., & Thomaes, S. (2017). State authenticity. Current
Directions in Psychological Science, 26(6), 521–525.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417713296
Sedikides, C., Wildschut, T., Gaertner, L., Routledge, C., & Arndt, J. (2008). Nostalgia as
enabler of self-continuity. In F. Sani (Ed.), Individual and collective selfcontinuity: Psychological perspectives (pp. 227–239).
Selya, A. S., Rose, J. S., Dierker, L. C., Hedeker, D., & Mermelstein, R. J. (2012). A
practical guide to calculating Cohen's f2, a measure of local effect size, from
PROC MIXED. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 1–6.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00111
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2002). Accepting threatening information: Selfaffirmation and the reduction of defensive biases. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 11(4), 119–123.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00182

166
Sherman, D. K., & Cohen, G. L. (2006). The psychology of self‐defense: Self‐affirmation
theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 38, 183–242.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(06)38004-5
Slotter, E. B., Gardner, W. L., & Finkel, E. J. (2010). Who am I without you? The
influence of romantic breakup on the self-concept. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 36(2), 147–160.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167209352250
Spencer-Rodgers, J., Boucher, H. C., Peng, K., & Wang, L. (2009). Cultural differences
in self-verification: The role of naïve dialecticism. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 45(4), 860–866.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.03.004
Spencer-Rodgers, J., & Peng, K. (2004). The dialectical self: Contradiction, change, and
holism in the East Asian self-concept. In R. M. Sorrentino, D. Cohen, J. M. Olsen,
& M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Culture and social behavior: The Ontario symposium
(Vol. 10, pp. 227–250). Lawrence Erlbaum.
Spencer-Rodgers, J., Peng, K., Wang, L., & Hou, Y. (2004). Dialectical self-esteem and
East-West differences in psychological well-being. Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin, 30(11), 1416–1432.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204264243
Stavrova, O., Pronk, T., & Kokkoris, M. D. (2019). Choosing goals that express the true
self: A novel mechanism of the effect of self‐control on goal attainment.
European Journal of Social Psychology, 49(6), 1329–1336.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2559

167
Steele, C. M. (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the
self. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 21,
pp. 261–302). Academic.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60229-4
Steger, M., Frazier, P., Oishi, S., & Kaler, M. (2006). The meaning in life questionnaire:
Assessing the presence of and search for meaning in life. Journal of Counseling
Psychology, 53(1), 80–93.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.53.1.80
Strohminger, N., Knobe, J., & Newman, G. (2017). The true self: A psychological
concept distinct from the self. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 12(4),
551–560.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616689495
Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131(1),
159–171.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.005
Swann, W., Jr, & Bosson, J. (2010). Self and identity. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 589–628).
Wiley.
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy001016
Swann, W., Jr, Bosson, J., & Pelham, B. (2002). Different partners, different selves: The
verification of circumscribed identities. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 28(9), 1215–1228.
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672022812007

168
The jamovi project (2021). jamovi. (Version 1.8) [Computer Software]. Retrieved from
https://www.jamovi.org.
Thomaes, S., Sedikides, C., van den Bos, N., Hutteman, R., & Reijntjes, A. (2017).
Happy to be "me?" authenticity, psychological need satisfaction, and subjective
well‐being in adolescence. Child Development, 88(4), 1045–1056.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12867
Tooke, W. S., & Ickes, W. (1988). A measure of adherence to conventional morality.
Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 6(3–4), 310–334.
https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.1988.6.3-4.310
van Gerven, D. J., Land-Zandstra, A. M., & Damsma, W. (2019). From Hitler's sweater
to dinosaur fossils: An essentialist outlook on authenticity. Review of General
Psychology, 23(3), 371–381.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019858276
Vannini, P., & Franzese, A. (2008). The authenticity of self: Conceptualization, personal
experience, and practice. Sociology Compass, 2(5), 1621–1637.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00151.x
Velotti, P., Garofalo, C., Bottazzi, F., & Caretti, V. (2017). Faces of shame: Implications
for self-esteem, emotion regulation, aggression, and well-being. The Journal of
Psychology, 151(2), 171–184.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2016.1248809
Vess, M., Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., & Arndt, J. (2014). Guilty, but not ashamed:
"True" self‐conceptions influence affective responses to personal shortcomings.

169
Journal of Personality, 82(3), 213–224.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12046
Wickham, R. E., Williamson, R. E., Beard, C. L., Kobayashi, C. L., & Hirst, T. W.
(2016). Authenticity attenuates the negative effects of interpersonal conflict on
daily well-being. Journal of Research in Personality, 60, 56–62.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2015.11.006
Williams, K. D. (1997). Social ostracism. In R. M. Kowalski (Ed.), Aversive
interpersonal behaviors (pp. 133–170). Plenum.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-9354-3_7
Williams, K. D. (2001). Ostracism: The power of silence. Guilford Press.
Wood, A., Linley, P., Maltby, J., Baliousis, M., & Joseph, S. (2008). The authentic
personality: A theoretical and empirical conceptualization and the development of
the authenticity scale. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 55(3), 385–399.
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0167.55.3.385
Yzerbyt, V. Y., & Rocher, S. (2002). Subjective essentialism and the emergence of
stereotypes. In C. McGarty, V. Y. Yzerbyt, & R. Spears (Eds.), Stereotypes as
explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups (pp.
38–66). Cambridge University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511489877.004
Yzerbyt, V., Rocher, S., & Schadron, G. (1997). Stereotypes as explanations: A
subjective essentialistic view of group perception. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N.
Ellemers, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social psychology of stereotyping and
group life (pp. 20–50). Blackwell Publishing.

170
Zadro, L., Williams, K. D., & Richardson, R. (2004). How low can you go? Ostracism by
a computer is sufficient to lower self-reported levels of belonging, control, selfesteem, and meaningful existence. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
40(4), 560–567.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2003.11.006
Zhang, H., Chen, K., & Schlegel, R. (2018). How do people judge meaning in goaldirected behaviors: The interplay between self-concordance and performance.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 44(11), 1582–1600.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218771330

171
Appendix A: Supplementary Exploratory Factor Analyses for Study 1
Table A1
Meaning in Life Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor
Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1
Factor
I

II

.91

.00

(P6) I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.
(P1) I understand my life’s meaning.
(P5) I have a good sense of what makes my life
meaningful.
(P9) My life has no clear purpose (reversed).

.88
.86

.05
.07

.78

.06

.63

-.18

(S3) I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.

.16

.81

(S7) I am always searching for something that makes
my life feel significant.

.08

.79

(S8) I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.

.08

.78

-.14

.70

-.29

.69

Item
(P4) My life has a clear sense of purpose.

(S2) I am looking for something that makes my life
feel meaningful.
(S10) I am searching for meaning in my life.

Factor Correlations
I
4.02(36.93%)
II
-.12
3.09(27.29%)
Note. The factor correlation appears below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal,
and by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .40 are
emphasized in bold. (P) = Presence Subscale; (S) = Search Subscale, with
corresponding original MLQ scale number as published. Solution converged after 4
iterations, no additional factors contributing Eigenvalues greater than 1 were present.
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Table A2
Subjective Vitality Item Factor Matrix Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis in
Study 1
Factor
Item
(7) I feel energized.
(4) I have energy and spirit.
(5) I look forward to each new day.
(1) I feel alive and vital.
(2) I don’t feel very energetic. (reversed)
(6) I nearly always feel alert and awake.
(3) Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst.

I
.86
.80
.79
.76
.75
.68
.63

Factor:
Eigenvalues
4.41
Percent variance explained
(57.18%)
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are emphasized in bold. Items appear in order of loading,
with their original scale number in the published Subjective Vitality Scale in
parentheses. No rotation was possible as only a single factor was extracted. Solution
converged after 4 iterations, no additional factors contributing Eigenvalues greater than
1 were present.
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Table A3
Self-essentialism Item Pattern Matrix Factor Loadings with Initial Six-Factor Solution
from Exploratory Factor Analysis with Direct Oblimin Rotation in Study 1
Factor
I

II

III

IV

V

VI

(E3) I am either a
certain type of
person or I am not.

.91

.02

-.04

.02

-.01

.10

(E2) I either have a
certain attribute or I
do not.

.72

-.03

-.10

-.01

.02

-.02

(E5) The kind of
person I am is
clearly defined, I
either am a certain
kind of person or I
am not.

.72

.03

.01

.16

.03

.20

(E4) There are
certain ‘types’ of
people and the ‘type’
of person I am can
be easily defined.

.51

-.08

-.07

.31

-.03

.21

(E18) I have a true
self even if I don’t
always act in
accordance with it.

-.04

.84

-.04

-.04

-.07

-.04

(E16) I have a true
self.

.01

.72

-.05

-.11

.17

.10

(E17) Even if parts
of me change over
time, who I really
am deep down stays
the same.

.03

.68

-.03

.12

.06

-.08

Item

174

(E20) My actions are
guided by who I
really am deep
down.

-.03

.45

-.02

.18

-.02

.35

(BB14) With enough
scientific
knowledge, the basic
qualities that I have
could be traced back
to, and explained by,
my biological makeup.

.00

-.07

-.91

-.04

-.02

.02

(BB13) Whether I
am one kind of
person or another is
determined by my
biological make-up.

.14

.05

-.80

-.06

-.08

-.06

(BB15) The kind of
person I am can be
largely attributed to
my genetic
inheritance.

-.11

.12

-.77

.03

-.06

.18

(BB12) There are
different types of
people and with
enough scientific
knowledge the
‘type’ of person I am
can be traced back to
genetic causes.

.18

.06

-.65

.16

.03

-.22

(I8) It is possible to
know about many
aspects of me once
you become familiar
with a few of my
basic traits.

.05

.04

-.06

.84

.01

-.08
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(I10) Knowing about
a few of the basic
traits that I have can
lead to accurate
predictions of my
future behavior.

.01

.04

-.07

.79

-.04

-.03

(I7) Generally
speaking, once you
know me in one or
two contexts it is
possible to predict
how I will behave in
most other contexts.

.05

-.06

.13

.72

-.06

-.02

(I9) When getting to
know me it is
possible to get a
picture of the kind of
person I am very
quickly.

.02

.07

-.07

.69

-.04

.05

(E19) The person I
am deep down
changes from
situation to situation.
(reversed)

.07

.15

.13

-.10

.74

-.09

(E6) I have a distinct
personality type.

.33

.12

.19

.07

-.04

.44

(E1) The boundaries
that define the
differences between
myself and others
are clear-cut.

.22

.02

-.08

-.07

-.01

.30
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(I11) Although I
may have some
basic identifiable
traits, it is never easy
to make accurate
judgments about
how I will behave in
different situations.
(reversed)
Factor Correlations
I
II
III
IV
V
VI

-.11

-.23

-.10

.22

.28

.29

5.39
(25.14%)
.21

2.56
(10.85%)

-.24

-.13

2.32
(9.89%)

.28

.00

-.24

1.77
(6.99%)

-.09

.04

.10

.04

1.13
(3.06%)

1.02
(2.64%)
Note. Factor correlations appear below the diagonal, Eigenvalues on the diagonal, and
.25

.10

-.08

.28

.09

by-factor percent of variance explained in parentheses. Factor loadings > .20 are
emphasized in bold to highlight multiple notable loadings. In cases where strong
loading here is not in accordance with factor assignment in the four-factor solution,
underlining will be used to demonstrate factor assignment in the final four-factor
solution. (E) = Self Entitativity Subscale, (BB) = Biological Basis subscale, and
(I) = Informativeness Subscale with corresponding original scale number in
parentheses. Solution converged after 10 iterations. Bartlett’s test χ2 = 1177.01,
df = 190, p < .001; KMO = .80
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Appendix B: Study 1 Multiple Regression Full Model Estimates
Table B1
Meaning Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
4.23 (0.23)
Self-essentialism
0.42 (0.34)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.21 (0.31)
Condition Level: High Threat
0.43 (0.31)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
0.26 (0.44)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
0.12 (0.47)
Note. Overall model F(5, 123) = 2.88, p = .017, adjusted R2 = 0.068

95% CI
[3.77, 4.68]
[-0.25, 1.08]
[-0.41, 0.83]
[-0.19, 1.05]
[-0.61, 1.13]
[-0.81, 1.04]

t(123)
18.42
1.24
0.67
1.37
0.60
0.25

p
< .001
0.22
0.50
0.17
0.55
0.80

t(128)
21.05
2.75
1.00
0.93
0.88
0.16

p
< .001
0.01
0.32
0.35
0.38
0.87

Table B2
Meaning Predicted by True Self and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
4.26 (0.20)
True Self
0.51 (0.19)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.28 (0.28)
Condition Level: High Threat
0.27 (0.29)
True Self X Moderate Threat
0.25 (0.29)
True Self X High Threat
0.05 (0.29)
Note. Overall model F(5, 128) = 6.23, p < .001 , adjusted R2 = 0.16

95% CI
[3.86, 4.66]
[0.14, 0.89]
[-0.28, 0.85]
[-0.30, 0.84]
[-0.32, 0.82]
[-0.52, 0.62]
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Table B3
Meaning Searching Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
5.23 (0.19)
Self-essentialism
-0.30 (0.27)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.08 (0.25)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.07 (0.26)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
0.38 (0.36)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
0.82 (0.38)
Note. Overall model F(5, 118) = 1.04, p = .40, adjusted R2 = 0.0017

95% CI
[4.87, 5.60]
[-0.83, 0.24]
[-0.43, 0.58]
[-0.59, 0.44]
[-0.32, 1.09]
[0.06, 1.58]

t(118)
28.19
-1.10
0.30
-0.28
1.07
2.13

p
< .001
0.27
0.77
0.78
0.29
0.03

Table B4
Psychological Need Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.41 (0.12)
Self-essentialism
0.25 (0.18)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.10 (0.17)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.06 (0.17)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
-0.07 (0.24)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
-0.15 (0.25)
Note. Overall model F(5, 115) = 1.10, p = .36, adjusted R2 = 0.004

95% CI
[3.17, 3.65]
[-0.10, 0.60]
[-0.24, 0.44]
[-0.41, 0.29]
[-0.56, 0.41]
[-0.65, 0.36]

t(115)
27.81
1.41
0.58
-0.35
-0.31
-0.58

p
< .001
0.16
0.56
0.73
0.76
0.56
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Table B5
Comfort Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.23 (0.14)
Self-essentialism
0.41 (0.20)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.11 (0.19)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.08 (0.20)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
-0.01 (0.27)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
-0.29 (0.29)
Note. Overall model F(5, 122) = 2.50, p = .034, adjusted R2 = 0.056

95% CI
[2.95, 3.51]
[0.00, 0.82]
[-0.28, 0.49]
[-0.47, 0.31]
[0.55, 0.52]
[-0.87, 0.29]

t(122)
22.79
2.00
0.55
-0.39
-0.05
-1.00

p
< .001
0.05
0.58
0.70
0.96
0.32

t(118)
23.96
0.72
0.41
0.82
-0.54
-0.92

p
< .001
0.47
0.69
0.41
0.59
0.36

Table B6
Meaning Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.72 (0.15)
Self-essentialism
0.16 (0.22)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.09 (0.21)
Condition Level: High Threat
0.18 (0.22)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
-0.16 (0.31)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
-0.29 (0.32)
Note. Overall model F(5, 118) = 0.38, p = 0.86, adjusted R2 = -0.026

95% CI
[3.41, 4.02]
[-0.28, 0.61]
[-0.34, 0.51]
[-0.25, 0.61]
[-0.77, 0.44]
[-0.92, 0.34]

180

Table B7
Control Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.33 (0.13)
Self-essentialism
0.25 (0.19)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.06 (0.18)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.24 (0.18)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
0.06 (0.25)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
0.21 (0.27)
Note. Overall model F(5, 122) = 2.83, p = .019, adjusted R2 = 0.067

95% CI
[3.07, 3.59]
[-0.13, 0.62]
[-0.30, 0.41]
[-0.60, 0.12]
[-0.44, 0.55]
[-0.32, 0.74]

t(122)
25.47
1.30
0.32
-1.30
0.23
0.79

p
< .001
0.20
0.75
0.20
0.82
0.43

t(127)
28.47
1.71
0.74
-1.65
1.17
0.71

p
< .001
0.09
0.46
0.10
0.24
0.48

Table B8
Control Fulfillment Predicted by True Self and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.32 (0.12)
True Self
0.19 (0.11)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.12 (0.16)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.28 (0.17)
True Self X Moderate Threat
0.20 (0.17)
True Self X High Threat
0.12 (0.17)
Note. Overall model F(5, 127) = 4.27, p = .001, adjusted R2 = 0.11

95% CI
[3.09, 3.55]
[-0.03, 0.40]
[-0.20, 0.45]
[-0.62, 0.06]
[-0.13, 0.53]
[-0.22, 0.46]
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Table B9
Self-esteem Fulfillment Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
3.07 (0.17)
Self-essentialism
0.28 (0.25)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.06 (0.23)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.10 (0.23)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
0.10 (0.32)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
-0.41 (0.34)
Note. Overall model F(5, 122) = 1.28, p = .28, adjusted R2 = 0.011

95% CI
[2.74, 3.41]
[-0.21, 0.77]
[-0.40, 0.52]
[-0.56, 0.37]
[-0.54, 0.75]
[-1.09, 0.28]

t(122)
18.07
1.14
0.26
-0.42
0.32
-1.18

p
< .001
0.25
0.79
0.68
0.75
0.24

t(120)
18.42
1.76
0.28
-0.15
-0.27
0.73

p
< .001
0.08
0.78
0.88
0.79
0.47

Table B10
Satisfaction with Life Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
4.27 (0.23)
Self-essentialism
0.59 (0.34)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.09 (0.32)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.05 (0.33)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
-0.12 (0.44)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
0.34 (0.47)
Note. Overall model F(5, 120) = 3.01, p = .013, adjusted R2 = 0.074

95% CI
[3.81, 4.73]
[-0.07, 1.26]
[-0.54, 0.72]
[-0.69, 0.60]
[-1.00, 0.76]
[-0.59, 1.28]
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Table B11
Satisfaction with Life Predicted by Biological Basis and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
4.23 (0.22)
Biological Basis
0.41 (0.19)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
0.18 (0.31)
Condition Level: High Threat
0.21 (0.31)
Biological Basis X Moderate Threat
-0.32 (0.26)
Biological Basis X High Threat
0.04 (0.25)
Note. Overall model F(5, 123) = 2.74, p = .022, adjusted R2 = 0.064

95% CI
[3.80, 4.66]
[0.03, 0.78]
[-0.43, 0.80]
[-0.40, 0.83]
[-0.83, 0.19]
[-0.46, 0.54]

t(123)
19.51
2.14
0.60
0.69
-1.24
0.15

p
< .001
0.034
0.55
0.49
0.22
0.88

t(118)
22.25
2.08
-0.52
-0.09
0.31
-0.34

p
< .001
0.04
0.61
0.93
0.76
0.73

Table B12
Subjective Vitality Predicted by Self-essentialism and Morality Threat Condition in Study 1
Model Predictors
B (SE)
Intercept
4.47 (0.20)
Self-essentialism
0.61 (0.29)
Condition Level: Moderate Threat
-0.14 (0.28)
Condition Level: High Threat
-0.03 (0.28)
Self-essentialism X Moderate Threat
0.12 (0.39)
Self-essentialism X High Threat
-0.14 (0.42)
Note. Overall model F(5, 118) = 3.10, p = .011, adjusted R2 = 0.079

95% CI
[4.07, 4.87]
[0.03, 1.18]
[-0.69, 0.40]
[-0.58, 0.53]
[-0.64, 0.88]
[-0.97, 0.69]
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Appendix C: Supplementary Exploratory Factor Analysis for Study 2
Table C1
Subjective Vitality Item Factor Matrix Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis in
Study 2
Factor
Item
(7) I feel energized.
(1) I feel alive and vital.
(4) I have energy and spirit.
(5) I look forward to each new day.
(6) I nearly always feel alert and awake.
(2) I don’t feel very energetic. (reversed)
(3) Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst.

I
.93
.92
.91
.83
.82
.78
.70

Factor:
Eigenvalues
5.28
Percent variance explained
(71.65%)
Note. Factor loadings > .40 are emphasized in bold. Items appear in order of loading,
with their original scale number in the published Subjective Vitality Scale in
parentheses. No rotation was possible as only a single factor was extracted. Solution
converged after 4 iterations, no additional factors contributing Eigenvalues greater than
1 were present.
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Appendix D: Repeated-Measures ANOVA and Post-hoc Tests Investigating
Hypothesis III in Study 2
Table D1
Repeated-Measures ANOVA of Morality Threat and Self-Description Task Type
Predicting Task Preference in Study 2
Within-Subjects
Factors

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

ηp²

Task Type

14705.39

2

7352.70

16.73

< .001

0.043

Task Type X Threat

2854.93

4

713.73

1.62

.17

0.009

325198.33

740

439.46

Threat

3798.994

2

1899.50

1.43

.24

0.008

Residuals

490526.15

370

1325.75

Residuals
Between-Subjects
Factors
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Table D2
Descriptive Statistics of Preference Ratings per Self-Description Task by Morality
Threat in Study 2
Task Type
True Self-Description Task

Flexible Self-Description Task

Everyday Self-Description Task

Morality
Threat

M

SD

N

Low

63.58

28.44

137

Moderate

60.75

30.15

124

High

63.39

28.08

112

Low

61.03

24.90

137

Moderate

51.82

27.65

124

High

54.37

25.76

112

Low

64.58

24.04

137

Moderate

63.44

27.91

124

High

64.29

26.84

112

Table D3
Post-hoc Comparisons of Self-Description Task Type on Task Preference in Study 2
95% CI for
Mean
Difference

True Self
Task

Flexible
Self Task

Flexible
Self Task
Everyday
Self Task
Everyday
Self Task

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

SE

t

Cohen’s
d

pbonf

6.84

3.14

10.53

1.54

4.44

0.23

< .001

-1.53

-5.22

2.17

1.54

-0.99

-0.051

.97

-8.37

-12.06

-4.67

1.54

-5.43

-0.28

< .001
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Appendix E: Frequentist ANOVAs Investigating Hypothesis IV in Study 2
Table E1
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning in Study 2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

12.71

8

1.59

0.70

0.69

Morality Threat

1.26

2

0.63

0.26

Task Assignment

6.03

2

3.01

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

5.43

4

1.36

887.53

373

2.38

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.77

0.001

-0.004

1.27

0.28

0.007

0.001

0.57

0.68

0.006

-0.005

Table E2
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning Searching in
Study 2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

11.16

8

1.39

0.80

0.60

Morality Threat

5.45

2

2.72

1.63

Task Assignment

4.05

2

2.02

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

1.66

4

0.41

623.59

372

1.68

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.20

0.007

0.003

1.21

0.30

0.008

0.001

0.25

0.91

0.003

-0.008
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Table E3
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Psychological Need
Fulfillment in Study 2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

9.02

8

1.13

1.48

0.16

Morality Threat

1.48

2

0.74

0.90

Task Assignment

4.05

2

2.02

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

3.49

4

0.87

283.63

347

0.82

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.41

0.005

-0.001

2.48

0.08

0.013

0.008

1.07

0.37

0.011

0.001

Table E4
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Positive Feelings in Study
2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

11.37

8

1.42

1.45

0.17

Morality Threat

0.52

2

0.26

0.25

Task Assignment

4.95

2

2.48

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

5.90

4

1.47

367.29

355

1.03

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.78

0.001

-0.004

2.39

0.09

0.013

0.008

1.42

0.22

0.015

0.005
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Table E5
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Negative Feelings in Study
2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

8.11

8

1.01

1.30

0.24

Morality Threat

4.32

2

2.16

2.64

Task Assignment

2.40

2

1.20

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

1.39

4

0.35

301.01

368

0.82

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.07

0.013

0.009

1.47

0.23

0.007

0.002

0.42

0.79

0.005

-0.006

Table E6
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Satisfaction with Life in
Study 2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

17.26

8

2.16

0.97

0.46

Morality Threat

2.74

2

1.37

0.65

Task Assignment

6.16

2

3.08

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

8.36

4

2.09

784.62

374

2.10

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.52

0.003

-0.002

1.47

0.23

0.008

0.002

1.00

0.41

0.011

-0.000
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Table E7
ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Subjective Vitality in Study
2
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

Overall Model

26.16

8

3.27

1.47

0.17

Morality Threat

2.46

2

1.23

0.52

Task Assignment

18.09

2

9.04

Morality Threat X
Task Assignment

5.61

4

1.40

878.97

370

2.38

Models

Residuals

η²

ω²

0.60

0.003

-0.003

3.81

0.02

0.020

0.015

0.59

0.67

0.006

-0.004

Table E8
Post-hoc Comparisons of Task Assignment Predicting Subjective Vitality in Study 2
95% CI for
Mean Difference

True
Self

Flexible
Self

Flexible
Self
Everyday
Self
Everyday
Self

Mean
Difference

Lower

Upper

SE

t

Cohen’s d

ptukey

0.54

-0.08

1.00

0.20

2.75

0.36

.017

0.31

-0.16

0.77

0.20

1.56

0.20

.26

-0.23

-0.70

0.23

0.20

-1.19

-0.15

.46
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Appendix F: Bayesian Analyses Investigating Hypothesis IV in Study 2
Table F1
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning in Study
2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.88

28.21

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.03

0.14

25.29

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.09

0.38

10.17

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.00

0.01

260.92

1.08

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

7766.39

1.59

Table F2
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Meaning
Searching in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.83

19.77

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.07

0.31

11.67

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.09

0.39

9.42

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.01

0.03

96.76

1.03

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

4682.10

1.46
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Table F3
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Psychological
Need Fulfillment in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.71

9.72

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.05

0.20

14.69

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.22

1.13

3.21

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.02

0.09

33.33

1.33

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

418.30

2.06

Table F4
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Positive Feelings
in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.74

11.34

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.03

0.12

26.23

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.22

1.14

3.34

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.01

0.04

72.81

1.52

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

566.04

1.13
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Table F5
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Negative
Feelings in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.67

8.12

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.23

1.17

2.95

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.07

0.30

9.55

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.03

0.13

21.03

1.13

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

720.04

2.79

Table F6
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Satisfaction with
Life in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Error %

Null Model

0.20

0.88

28.77

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.04

0.18

20.35

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.07

0.32

11.78

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.00

0.02

212.85

1.15

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

3348.97

1.84
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Table F7
Bayesian ANOVA of Morality Threat and Task Assignment Predicting Subjective
Vitality in Study 2
Models

P(M)

P(M|data)

BFM

BF01

Null Model

0.20

0.43

3.01

1.00

Morality Threat

0.20

0.02

0.09

19.92

0.02

Task Assignment

0.20

0.52

4.34

0.82

0.02

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment

0.20

0.03

0.11

15.53

1.01

Morality Threat +
Task Assignment +
(Morality Threat X
Task Assignment)

0.20

0.00

0.00

433.44

1.39

Note: The BF01 for Task Assignment is equivalent to a BF10 = 1.21

Error %
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Appendix G: Participant Manipulation Assignment by Task Choice-Task
Assignment Concordance in Study 2
Table G1
Manipulation Random Assignment Distribution by Task Concordance in Study 2

Low

Threat
Moderate

High

Total

True

32

20

28

80

Flexible

36

42

31

109

Everyday

31

28

22

81

Total

99

90

81

270

True

18

12

20

50

Flexible

10

7

4

21

Everyday

13

21

13

47

Total

41

40

37

118

Concordance
Writing
ChoiceAssignment
Mismatch

Writing
ChoiceAssignment
Match

Task
Assignment

Task
Assignment
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Appendix H: Effect Size Conversions
Calculators
Between eta squared, Cohen’s d, and Cohen’s f
https://www.psychometrica.de/effect_size.html
Between χ2 and Cohen’s w
https://ncss-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/themes/ncss/pdf/Procedures/
NCSS/Chi-Square_Effect_Size_Calculator.pdf
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Appendix I: Study 1 Materials
Recruitment
Study Name: Attributes and Self
Study Duration: 60 minutes or less; 40 minutes on average
Study Description: This is a research study designed to investigate your attitudes,
characteristics, and everyday behavior. Your participation will involve completing
questionnaires in which you answer questions about your beliefs, tendencies, and wellbeing. You will also be asked to provide basic demographic information about yourself
(e.g., sex, race, age).
Faculty Sponsor: Verena Graupmann, PhD

Informed Consent page displayed, with consenting participants indicating consent
by selecting “I agree” and advancing the page

Study Sequence
Self-essentialism
Rate the degree to which you agree with these statements. (-3, disagree completely — 0,
neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

The boundaries that define the differences between myself and others are clearcut.
I either have a certain attribute or I do not.
I am either a certain type of person or I am not.
There are different ‘types’ of people and the ‘type’ of person I am can be easily
defined.
The kind of person I am is clearly defined, I either am a certain kind of person or I
am not.
I have a distinct personality type.
Generally speaking, once you know me in one or two contexts it is possible to
predict how I will behave in most other contexts.
It is possible to know about many aspects of me once you become familiar with a
few of my basic traits.
When getting to know me it is possible to get a picture of the kind of person I am
very quickly.
Knowing about a few of the basic traits that I have can lead to accurate
predictions of my future behavior.
Although I may have some basic identifiable traits, it is never easy to make
accurate judgments about how I will behave in different situations. (Reversed)
There are different types of people and with enough scientific knowledge the
‘type’ of person I am can be traced back to genetic causes.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Whether I am one kind of person or another is determined by my biological makeup.
With enough scientific knowledge, the basic qualities that I have could be traced
back to, and explained by, my biological make-up.
The kind of person I am can be largely attributed to my genetic inheritance.
I have a true self
Even if parts of me change over time, who I really am deep down stays the same
I have a true self even if I don’t always act in accordance with it
The person I am deep down changes from situation to situation (Reversed)
My actions are guided by who I really am deep down.

Morality Survey

Think about your behavior in the past. How many of these behaviors have you ever done?
(I have done this – I have not done this)
Immoral Behaviors

Moral Behaviors

1.

1.

I have been true to my word in an
important matter.

2.

I have given a stranger directions.

3.

I have stood up for someone who was
being bullied or harassed.
I have returned extra money
accidentally given to me by a cashier.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

I have let down people who were
counting on me.
I have shifted blame to others
because it kept me out of trouble.
I have stolen something because I
was sure I could get away with it.
I have kept extra money accidentally
given to me by a cashier.
I have lied to my parents about
something.
I have lied about my age to receive
an age-based discount.
I have snuck into a movie theater
without paying.
I have parked in a handicapped
parking spot without being
handicapped.
I have ignored people who had car
trouble.

10.

I have decided to keep money for
myself rather than giving to charity.

11.

I have ignored someone struggling to
carry a bag of groceries.

12.

I have neglected to offer my seat to
an elderly or disabled individual.

4.
5.

I have donated money to a charity.

6.

I have been kind to someone I knew
was having a bad day.
I have taken responsibility for a
mistake that I made.

7.
8.

I have volunteered my time to help
with an important cause.

9.

I have assisted an older family
member with something.
I have returned a valuable item that I
found, rather than keeping it for
myself.
I have helped an animal that was
injured, lost, or otherwise distressed
or in danger.
I have given up my seat on public
transportation for someone who

10.

11.

12.
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13.
14.

I have made an offhanded racist or
sexist comment.
I have cursed or used profanity
around children.

15.

I have cheated on a relationship
partner.

16.

I have done something that went
against my values.
I have physically hurt another
person.

17.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

18.

I have threatened people I know.

19.

I have gotten into arguments when
people disagreed with me.

20.

I have flown off the handle for no
good reason.

19.

20.

needed it more.
I have given a thoughtful gift to a
friend.
I have been supportive of a friend
during a difficult time in their life.
I have helped make sure that a fair
outcome was reached in a
disagreement.
I have demonstrated courage in a
stressful situation.
I have been loyal to my friends and
family.
I have been kind to others without
thinking of what they might do for me
in return.
I have been respectful to people
whose viewpoints I strongly disagree
with.
I have handled a frustrating situation
in a mature and dignified manner.

Following page notifying of score calculation:
As part of our research, we have calculated your overall moral behavior score based on
your answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these
questions in the context of all other DePaul participants who have taken part in our
research.

Please proceed to the next page to view your results.
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Morality Survey Results:
Low Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you
scored in the 90th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral
qualities than 90% of DePaul students”

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.

Moderate Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study,
you scored in the 45th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral
qualities than 55% of DePaul students”

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.
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High Threat: “Compared to the other students who have participated in this study, you
scored in the 15th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral
qualities than 85% of DePaul students.”

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.

Dependent variables: Each questionnaire appeared on separate pages
(Groups 1 and 2 were randomly counterbalanced, with within-group questionnaire order
also counterbalanced.)

Group 1:
Life Satisfaction
Rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. (-3, disagree
completely — 0, neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
The conditions of my life are excellent.
I am satisfied with my life.
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.
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Meaning in Life Questionnaire
Rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true. Ranging from -3
(Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True)
1. I am always looking for the purpose of life
2. I am looking for an answer about the significance of life
3. I have no idea what makes my life meaningful
4. I understand the significance of life
5. I’m always looking for something that makes my life meaningful
6. I have a clear purpose in life
7. I am seeking the purpose and mission of life
8. I am looking for significance in life
9. I have a good understanding that makes my life meaningful
10. There is no clear purpose in my life

Group 2:
Subjective Vitality Scale
Please rate the following statements in terms of how they apply to you and your life at the
present time.
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True)
1. I feel alive and vital.
2. I don’t feel very energetic.
3. Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst.
4. I have energy and spirit.
5. I look forward to each new day.
6. I nearly always feel alert and awake.
7. I feel energized.

Psychological Need Fulfillment
Please indicate the number that best represents your feelings about yourself:
I feel “disconnected”

not at all
1

2

3

4

extremely
5

I feel rejected

1

2

3

4

5

I feel like an outsider

1

2

3

4

5

I feel I belong

1

2

3

4

5

I feel positive

1

2

3

4

5
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acknowledgement
I feel good about
myself

1

2

3

4

5

My self-esteem is high

1

2

3

4

5

I feel liked

1

2

3

4

5

I feel insecure

1

2

3

4

5

I feel satisfied

1

2

3

4

5

I feel invisible

1

2

3

4

5

I feel meaningless

1

2

3

4

5

I feel non-existent

1

2

3

4

5

I feel important

1

2

3

4

5

I feel useful

1

2

3

4

5

I feel powerful

1

2

3

4

5

I feel I have control
over the current
situation.
I feel I have the ability
to determine my actions
I feel unable to
influence the actions of
others.
I feel other people
decide on the events in
my life.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Demographic Information
Age (in years): ________
First language:
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Sex:

 Female
 Male
 Other (Specify: __________________)
Race/ethnicity:
 Asian
 Black
 Latino/a
 Pacific Islander
 White
 Other (Specify:
 Mixed (Specify:

)
)

Please mark the point on the scale that best indicates your political orientation.
very
conservative
(1)
I am...
(1)



(2)


(3)


(4)


(5)


(6)


very
liberal
(7)


Please indicate how religious you are using the following scale.
not
religious
at all (1)
How
religious
are you?
(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)



(6)



very
religious
(7)
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Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs?
 Jewish (1)
 Protestant (2)
 Hindu (3)
 Catholic (4)
 Buddhist (5)
 Muslim (6)
 Spiritual but Not Religious (7)
 Atheist/Agnostic (8)
 Other (please specify) (9) ____________________

Funnel Debriefing
1 Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this study?
2 Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what?
3 Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors
questionnaire?
4 Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?
5 What do you remember your morality score being?
6 Do you think your morality score was accurate?
7 To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other
participants?
Official Debriefing page followed
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Appendix J: Study 2 Materials
Recruitment
Study Name: Attributes and Attitudes
Study Duration: 30 Minutes
Study Description: This is an online research study designed to investigate your attributes
and task-related preferences. Your participation will involve completing questionnaires in
which you answer questions about your beliefs, tendencies, and well-being in addition to
completing choice and description tasks. You will also be asked to provide basic
demographic information about yourself (e.g., sex, race, age).
Faculty Sponsor: Verena Graupmann, PhD

Informed consent process, in which consenting participants select “I consent to
participate, begin the study”

Page capturing Prolific ID
Please advance to the next page.
Your Prolific ID:

Prescreening filter confirmation questions
Before beginning the study, please provide the following information:

Current Country of Residence
United States
I am not currently a United States resident.
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Age
18-64
I am not 18-64 years of age.

Nationality
United States
My nationality is not the United States

Fluent languages:
English
I am not fluent in English.

Page signaling study commencement
The study will begin on the next page. Before you begin, please silence electronic devices
and minimize distractions.

When ready, you can continue to the next page using the arrow button below.
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Main Study Sequence

Morality Survey

Think about your behavior in the past. How many of these behaviors have you ever done?
(I have done this – I have not done this)
Low Threat

Moderate Threat

High Threat

I have let down people
who were counting on
me.
I have shifted blame to others I have shifted blame to
I have given a stranger
because it kept me out of
others because it kept
directions
trouble.
me out of trouble.
I have stood up for someone I have stolen something
I have stolen something
who was being bullied or
because I was sure I could get because I was sure I
harassed
away with it.
could get away with it.
I have kept extra
I have returned extra money I have kept extra money
money accidentally
accidentally given to me by accidentally given to me by a
given to me by a
a cashier
cashier.
cashier.
I have lied to my
I have donated money to a
I have lied to my parents
parents about
charity
about something.
something.
I have lied about my
I have been kind to someone I have snuck into a movie
age to receive an ageI knew was having a bad day theater without paying.
based discount.
I have snuck into a
I have taken responsibility
I have made an offhanded
movie theater without
for a mistake that I made
racist or sexist comment.
paying.
I have parked in a
I have volunteered my time
I have cursed or used
handicapped parking
to help with an important
profanity around children.
spot without being
cause.
handicapped.
I have assisted an older
I have cheated on a
I have ignored people
family member with
relationship partner.
who had car trouble.
something
I have decided to keep
I have returned a valuable
I have done something that
money for myself
item that I found, rather than
went against my values.
rather than giving to
keeping it for myself
charity.
I have been true to my word
in an important matter.

I have let down people who
were counting on me.
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I have helped an animal that
was injured, lost, or
otherwise distressed or in
danger

I have ignored someone
I have physically hurt another
struggling to carry a
person.
bag of groceries.

I have given up my seat on
public transportation for
someone who needed it
more.

I have threatened people I
know.

I have neglected to
offer my seat to an
elderly or disabled
individual.

I have given a thoughtful
gift to a friend.

I have gotten into arguments
when people disagreed with
me.

I have made an
offhanded racist or
sexist comment.

I have been supportive of a
friend during a difficult time
in their life

I have flown off the handle
for no good reason.

I have cursed or used
profanity around
children.

I have helped make sure that
a fair outcome was reached
in a disagreement.

I have given a stranger
directions.

I have cheated on a
relationship partner.

I have demonstrated courage
in a stressful situation.

I have donated money to a
charity.

I have done something
that went against my
values.

I have been loyal to my
friends and family.

I have volunteered my time
to help with an important
cause.

I have physically hurt
another person.

I have been kind to others
without thinking of what
they might do for me in
return.

I have assisted an older
family member with
something.

I have threatened
people I know.

I have been respectful to
people whose viewpoints I
strongly disagree with.

I have returned a valuable
item that I found, rather than
keeping it for myself.

I have gotten into
arguments when people
disagreed with me.

I have handled a frustrating
situation in a mature and
dignified manner.

I have helped make sure that I have flown off the
a fair outcome was reached in handle for no good
a disagreement.
reason.

Next survey page:

The study will proceed to the next page in one moment.
(5 seconds elapse before automatically proceeding)
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Next survey page:
As part of our research, we have calculated your overall moral behavior score based on
your answers to the previous questions. The next page displays your score on these
questions in the context of all other Prolific participants who have taken part in our
research.

Please proceed to the next page to view your results.

Next Survey Page:

(Morality Survey Results: Low Threat)
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in
the 85th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored higher on moral qualities
than 85% of Prolific participants.

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.

(Morality Survey Results: Moderate Threat)
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in
the 65th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than
35% of Prolific participants.

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.

(Morality Survey Results: High Threat)
Compared to the other participants who have taken part in this study, you scored in
the 40th percentile of behaving morally. That is, you scored lower on moral qualities than
60% of Prolific participants.

Please proceed to the next page to continue to the next part of the study.
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Next component: Participants read about self-description tasks
Next, please choose between the following three options to select what activity you’d
prefer to complete if you had a choice. Please choose based on what you most want to do
at this time.

Option: True Self Description Activity

This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe your
true self:
Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who are you deep down?

Option: Flexible Self Description Activity

This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe
flexibility within yourself:
Which aspects of you undergo change? How are you as a person different over time?

Option: Everyday Self Description Activity

This activity involves having you take a few minutes to reflect on and then describe your
usual self:
Which aspects of you do you present to the world and in public? Who are you in
everyday life?
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Please indicate your activity preference:
o True Self Description Activity
o Flexible Self Description Activity
o Everyday Self Description Activity

“Please rate how much you would like to engage in each activity.”
True Self Description Activity
Not
At All

Very
Much

<-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------->

Flexible Self Description Activity
Not
At All

Very
Much

<-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------->

Everyday Self Description Activity
Not
At All

Very
Much

<-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------->
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Next Segment: Assignment to self-reflection task

First page:
In this next part of the study, you will be given one of the written description activities to
complete; it may not be your top rated activity. Please proceed to the next page to begin.

Next Page:
Performance of assigned self-reflection task:

True self-description writing task
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic.
Specifically, over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your true self.
Which aspects of you are most constant and stable? Who you are deep down?
Describe your true self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the aspects of you that you
feel are most central to who you are at your core, in as much detail as possible.
After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.

[Essay box provided]
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Flexible self-description writing task
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic.
Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on flexibility within yourself.
How might important aspects of you be able to undergo change? How might you as a
person be different over time?
Describe your self-flexibility as thoroughly as possible, reflect on how even central
aspects to who you are can change, in as much detail as possible.
After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.

[Essay box provided]

Everyday self-description writing task
This activity collects your written thoughts on a topic:
Over the next 5 minutes please reflect on your usual self.
Which aspects of you do you present to the world and in public? Who are you in
everyday life?
Describe your everyday self as thoroughly as possible, reflect on the parts of yourself that
you most display publicly on a usual day when you are in usual situations, in as much
detail as possible.

After 5 minutes, the study will advance to the next component.

[Essay box provided]

214
Dependent variables: Each questionnaire appeared on separate pages
(Groups 1 and 2 were randomly counterbalanced, with within-group questionnaire order
also counterbalanced.)

Group 1:
Life Satisfaction
Rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements. (-3, disagree
completely — 0, neither disagree nor agree — +3, agree completely)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
The conditions of my life are excellent.
I am satisfied with my life.
So far I have gotten the important things I want in life.
If I could live my life over, I would change almost nothing.

Meaning in Life Questionnaire
Rate the extent to which each of the following statements is true.
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True)
1. I am always looking for the purpose of life
2. I am looking for an answer about the significance of life
3. I have no idea what makes my life meaningful
4. I understand the significance of life
5. I’m always looking for something that makes my life meaningful
6. I have a clear purpose in life
7. I am seeking the purpose and mission of life
8. I am looking for significance in life
9. I have a good understanding that makes my life meaningful
10. There is no clear purpose in my life
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Group 2:
Subjective Vitality Scale
Please rate the following statements in terms of how they apply to you and your life at the
present time.
Ranging from -3 (Completely Untrue) to +3 (Completely True)
1. I feel alive and vital.
2. I don’t feel very energetic.
3. Sometimes I feel so alive I just want to burst.
4. I have energy and spirit.
5. I look forward to each new day.
6. I nearly always feel alert and awake.
7. I feel energized.

Psychological Need Fulfillment
Please indicate the number that best represents your feelings about yourself:

I feel “disconnected”

not at all
1

2

3

4

extremely
5

I feel rejected

1

2

3

4

5

I feel like an outsider

1

2

3

4

5

I feel I belong

1

2

3

4

5

I feel positive
acknowledgement
I feel good about
myself

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

My self-esteem is high

1

2

3

4

5

I feel liked

1

2

3

4

5

I feel insecure

1

2

3

4

5

I feel satisfied

1

2

3

4

5

I feel invisible

1

2

3

4

5

I feel meaningless

1

2

3

4

5
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I feel non-existent

1

2

3

4

5

I feel important

1

2

3

4

5

I feel useful

1

2

3

4

5

I feel powerful

1

2

3

4

5

I feel I have control
over the current
situation.
I feel I have the ability
to determine my actions
I feel unable to
influence the actions of
others.
I feel other people
decide on the events in
my life.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

Demographic Information
Age (in years): ________
First language:
Sex:

 Female
 Male
 Other (Specify: __________________)
Race/ethnicity:
 Asian
 Black
 Latino/a
 Pacific Islander
 White
 Other (Specify:
 Mixed (Specify:

)
)
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Please mark the point on the scale that best indicates your political orientation.
very
conservative
(1)
I am...
(1)



(2)


(3)


(4)


(5)


(6)


very
liberal
(7)


Please indicate how religious you are using the following scale.
not
religious
at all (1)
How
religious
are you?
(1)



(2)



(3)



(4)



(5)



(6)



very
religious
(7)


Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs?
 Jewish (1)
 Protestant (2)
 Hindu (3)
 Catholic (4)
 Buddhist (5)
 Muslim (6)
 Spiritual but Not Religious (7)
 Atheist/Agnostic (8)
 Other (please specify) (9) ____________________

Funnel Debriefing
1 Do you have any initial thoughts or reactions about this study?
2 Did you notice anything unusual in the study? If so, what?
3 Did you notice anything unusual or inconsistent about the moral behaviors
questionnaire?
4 Why do you think we showed you feedback on the moral behaviors questionnaire?
5 What do you remember your morality score being?
6 Do you think your morality score was accurate?
7 To what extent did you believe the feedback of your morality score relative to all other
participants?
Official Debriefing page followed

